The decimation of the Republican Party in the 2026 mid-term elections has shocked the US political system. More a referendum on the erratic Trump 2.0 than a typical electoral cycle, the result should be seen as a resounding dissent against the administration's choices over the past two years. The polling data is unequivocal - the blowback from the Iran war and its economic ripple effects on households and small businesses across America was the straw that broke the camel's back. Although a defeat was expected, the scale exceeded most forecasts.
In an unusual public admission, J.D. Vance, the original skeptic among otherwise gung ho warmongers in the Trump cabinet, confessed, “the reason we lost is the (Iran) war”. But he added a broader set of themes that have been bubbling beneath the surface for some time: the dilution of ‘America First', failure to address the domestic economy and the US relationship with Israel. Vance is echoing the majority. In national exit polls, 89 percent of Americans cited the cost of living as the key factor in their vote, 66 percent blamed Trump's tariffs for hurting the national economy, and 74 percent felt the Iran war was the top issue.
Looking back, Trump's misdirection on his foreign policy agenda - talking peace while preparing for war - had became apparent by the summer of 2025. Middle East was the core project, hence the early divisions between the US and Europe on managing the Ukraine conflict. Time was of the essence and a tactical thaw in Ukraine that Trump so fervently promoted allowed for the main military buildup against Iran. The launch of air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 was the opening salvo. A testing of the waters, it whetted the appetite for more. A brief, albeit unsuccessful, trade standoff with China, a passive aggressive approach to Russia, and a Cold War style imperial assertion in Latin America.
By December 2025, the US was emboldened enough to engage in a regime change operation in Venezuela with the abduction of its President Maduro. Most insiders in Washington trace this as the turning point in the lead up to the February war against Iran. The unraveling began within days of the misadventure and is too well chronicled to recount here. The remainder of 2026 was spent on the back foot finding ways to extricate the US from a catastrophic intervention and what it exposed about American power everywhere.
The US election results mark the end of Trump's domestic and international authority. But was Trump the mad king or was his political hara-kiri in subverting an immensely popular agenda, a more diabolical game played in the shadows? There is enough evidence to trace the influence of powerful donors and Middle East hawks having the ear of the President. The cabinet was carefully curated with figures that were repulsed with the original Trump platform. Vance, being the exception, was marginalized early on and used as prop for domestic audiences.
To dwell on the deeper reasons of Trump's fall is important because if the basic tenets of the MAGA platform – prioritizing core American interests by a strategic retrenchment, controlling immigration, rebuilding the domestic economy and industrial base, and, avoiding forever wars – were indeed subverted by a fifth column and powerful establishment interests, it suggests that these ideas still resonate with the American body politic and will reappear in some form in the future. The defection of young Republicans and independents to Democrat candidates along with a low turnout among the MAGA loyalists underscores this.
At the same time, the forces that seek to subvert the anti-Globalist impulses in US politics are also very much alive. We can expect this tension between a potent populism that demands a new course for the country and an establishment desperate to regain the reins over US policy to play out for several years. This makes future US behaviour unpredictable and even dangerous. Historically, states with domestic instability have typically externalized their problems and sought to resolve their internal ideological fissures by reckless foreign policy actions. Think of Mao's China during the 1960s, the US during the Vietnam war era, the EU in the 2020s, or even Pakistan closer to India's region. Trump 2.0 itself should be viewed as a classic instance of this phenomenon.
Does a Congress dominated by Democrats suggest a fresh course for US foreign policy? For all the anti-war rhetoric of the Democrats they have been itching to revive the fire, lit during the Biden administration, in Ukraine once it was obvious that the Iran war had spiraled out of control. It is instructive that 36 Senate Democrats voted in favor of the September 2026 Lindsey Graham anti-Russia and Iran sanctions act. House democrats were even more aggressive and sought un-waivable sanctions on Russia, extensive military aid for Ukraine and harder limits on Presidential waivers. This group now dominates both houses of the US Congress. Ironically, the US security establishment now has true believers in the House and Senate, without worrying about the optics of partisan clashes.
In anticipating the remainder of the Trump presidency one cannot but account for these domestic changes in the formal power centres in Washington. The wish list of the establishment is also well known: terminate the Iran war through diplomacy, restore the trans-Atlantic NATO alliance by coordinating a renewed policy of supporting Ukraine and continuing the confrontation with Russia, adopt a competitive but pragmatic approach to China, and minimize trade conflicts with core US allies. At the very least, we should expect a shift in the balance between the competing factions of the U.S. deep state on the next adjustments to western global strategy.
What are the implications for India? The popular narrative is that India-US ties suddenly soured under Trump. But the trend actually started during the Biden years as US statecraft began its geopolitical readjustment after the Ukraine war with an aim to encircle the Eurasian heartland. Containing and defeating Russia emerged as the central foreign policy objective, leading to a softening on China policy while coercing India to curtail its engagement with Moscow. Biden also presided over regime changes on India's vital flanks – the toppling of pro-India Hasina in Bangladesh and the resurrection of a hostile Pakistan Army – undermining regional security. Trump inherited this soft containment policy by imposing his trade agenda to the mix. The geopolitics, however, was scripted by the neoconservatives that revived the old Cold War playbook after the NATO-Russia proxy war broke out in February 2022. Delhi should sober its expectations regarding any radical reassessment of US policy towards India or the subcontinent. If anything, the underlying trends that have been discernible since the early 2020s will endure.
The US mid-term election has not resolved the basic structural crisis of America's place in a rapidly changing world, a crisis that propelled Trump into office twice in the past decade. The American people saw through the brazen subversion of ‘America First' as a string of inexplicable follies that finally imploded in the Middle East. The blowback from the US-Iran war has now opened multiple inter-connected geopolitical fronts for the U.S. that cannot be easily resolved without major strategic losses for Washington.
Trump's remaining term will grapple with a geopolitically overstretched America, a U.S. Congress that still believes in a world order that no longer exists in reality, and, a deeply disillusioned American polity that has made itself heard in the most dramatic way possible. The US election has reopened the Pandora's box.
(Zorawar Daulet Singh is an award winning author and strategic affairs expert based in New Delhi. You can follow his work here https://zorawardauletsingh.com/)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author