The passage of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill, 2025, by the Lok Sabha on December 17 marks a decisive inflexion point in India's energy policy. While many feel that it brings India closer to enacting the most consequential reform of its civil nuclear framework since 2010, there has been criticism, too.
The concerns raised about the SHANTI Bill deserve to be taken seriously. Nuclear energy is not an ordinary sector. It deals with high-consequence risks, demands exceptional safety standards, and requires public trust to function. In that sense, scepticism is not only legitimate but necessary. However, acknowledging valid anxieties should not lead us to dismiss a reform that addresses long-standing structural failures in India's nuclear programme and is critical for the country's future growth, energy security, and climate commitments.
Over the course of more than twenty-five years of working on international economic and regulatory issues at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva, I have seen how deeply risk-sensitive sectors are regulated when nations are serious about both safety and scale. The central question is never whether risk can be eliminated entirely; it is whether institutions are designed to manage risk credibly and transparently.
The central question before India today is not whether nuclear energy is entirely risk-free - it can never be, just like air travel or train travel. The real question is whether India is better served by a tightly regulated, modernised, investible nuclear framework or by continuing with a system that has stalled capacity expansion, deterred technology inflows, and left India increasingly dependent on fossil fuels.
On that question, the SHANTI Bill represents progress, not peril.
Private Participation Is Not a "Free-for-All"
One of the strongest criticisms has been that allowing private sector participation amounts to handing over "dangerous technology" to profit-seeking corporations. This framing is misleading. The Bill does not deregulate nuclear energy; it restructures who may participate under a strengthened regulatory regime. Private participation does not mean absence of oversight; it means diversified ownership under statutory safety, licensing, and compliance obligations.
During my many years in Geneva, engaging closely with energy, trade, and technology regulators from Europe, North America, and East Asia, one reality was constant: nuclear power is almost everywhere operated by private or corporatised entities, not by governments alone. What distinguishes safe nuclear systems is not public ownership, but strong regulation, enforceable liability, and institutional competence.
India's challenge is scale. Reaching even 50-60 GW of nuclear capacity will require trillions of rupees in capital. The public sector alone cannot bear this burden without crowding out spending on health, education, or infrastructure. Bringing in private capital is not ideological; it is practical.
Liability Caps: Imperfect, But Necessary
Concerns about liability caps merit serious discussion. Nuclear accidents can indeed impose costs far exceeding any predefined limit. However, unlimited liability is not a realistic solution - it is a guarantee that no project will ever be built, no insurer will underwrite it, and no operator will invest under such uncertainty.
This is not an abstract argument. In global fora I have participated in - whether at the WTO or in Geneva-based multilateral discussions - countries with functioning nuclear sectors all converge on one point: liability must be capped, insured, and backed by the state. Japan's response after Fukushima did not abandon this principle; it reinforced the role of layered responsibility involving operators, insurers, and government.
The SHANTI Bill aligns India with this global practice. It prioritises swift compensation through insurance-backed mechanisms rather than years of litigation that usually benefit lawyers more than victims. This is not about shielding corporations; it is about ensuring victims are paid quickly and predictably.
Moral Hazard vs National Reality
The charge of "moral hazard" assumes that operators will behave recklessly because liability is capped. This ignores two powerful constraints: regulatory enforcement and reputational risk. In high-risk industries, compliance failures destroy firms far more reliably than court judgments.
From financial services to civil aviation, sectors I have observed closely in international regulatory settings, risk is managed not through unlimited liability, but through supervision, audits, penalties, and loss of licence. Nuclear energy is no different, except that the oversight is even more stringent.
Time Limits and Access to Justice
Another concern raised by critics is about time limits for claims, particularly for radiation-induced illnesses. This is perhaps the most emotionally compelling criticism. It is also an area where continued refinement and vigilance will be necessary. That said, time-bound claims are not unique to nuclear law; they exist across environmental, occupational health, and tort regimes worldwide.
Here again, international practice suggests that long-term health monitoring, mandatory medical registries, and state-supported compensation mechanisms often serve victims better than indefinite litigation. Courts alone are blunt instruments for complex, probabilistic harms.
Similarly, specialised claims authorities are not designed to deny justice. In my experience observing dispute-resolution mechanisms across sectors, they exist to bring technical expertise, faster adjudication, and consistency - provided they are transparent and subject to judicial review.
Learning From Others
Criticism of regulatory independence is not without basis. India must continue strengthening the autonomy and capacity of its nuclear regulator. But freezing reform until a perfect regulator emerges is neither realistic nor responsible. This is one area where we must see what other countries have done.
Having lived for many years in Switzerland - a country known for its rigorous safety culture and institutional caution - I have seen how high-risk technologies are governed not by fear but by layered regulation, transparency, and public trust.
Swiss debates on nuclear energy have always been intense yet grounded in the recognition that absolute risk elimination is neither possible nor desirable. Instead, the focus has consistently been on strong regulators, clear liability frameworks, mandatory insurance, and long-term state responsibility.
That balance, between realism and responsibility, is what allows advanced societies to manage risk while still enabling progress - and, it offers a useful perspective as India debates the SHANTI Bill.
Nuclear vs Renewables: A False Choice
Perhaps the most misleading criticism is that nuclear energy competes with renewables. It does not. The future energy system will require both. Solar and wind are indispensable, but they are intermittent. Batteries are improving, but they remain costly and resource-intensive at the grid scale.
Countries that take climate commitments seriously, including many in Europe, are expanding nuclear alongside renewables. India, with its scale, developmental needs, and climate vulnerability, has even less room for false choices.
A Question Of National Interest
No law is perfect. Some provisions of the SHANTI Bill will warrant review, oversight, and refinement as implementation unfolds. But rejecting the Bill outright would mean accepting stagnation, higher fossil fuel dependence, and continued underperformance in a strategic sector.
After decades of working in multilateral systems, one lesson stands out: countries that succeed are those that reform institutions to meet reality, not those that wait for theoretical perfection. Nuclear reform is not about ideology; it is about national capability.
In this domain, more than most, we must look beyond fear and partisanship to the larger national interest. The SHANTI Bill, for all its imperfections, is a serious, necessary step towards energy security, climate responsibility, and long-term growth -and it deserves to be judged in that light.
(The author is President, Chintan Research Foundation and a former Director of the World Trade Organization)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
