The war in West Asia has accelerated the unravelling of the post-Cold War order. For all its contradictions, this was an order that generated unprecedented wealth and lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. But it struggled to reconcile power with principle and universality with diversity. It also produced shifts in the global distribution of power that it has been unable to adapt to. The question, therefore, is not whether the old order will endure. It will not. The real question is what comes next.
This is a difficult question because it asks us to imagine the future. In doing so, one must try to be both optimistic and idealistic, and not let the brutishness of the current environment, or even the inherent nature of international relations, undermine that imagination. At the same time, ignoring the realities of the world, the enduring role of states, and the historical experiences of violence that have marked the transition of orders would do a disservice to the inquiry. Feasibility, therefore, becomes the parameter that mediates between idealism and the realities of current times.
Before outlining what the contours of the next global order should or are likely to be, it is important to identify the tensions that such an order must contend with.
First, there is a tension among three forces. On the one hand are the norms of the Westphalian system, such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, and the legal equality of states. On the other hand is the enduring impulse of great powers to pursue absolute advantage, remain above constraining rules, and shape spheres of influence or even empire. Overlaying this is a third force, that is, overreach based on a particular ideological zeitgeist about how global civilisation should be organised: be it liberal internationalism or the rejuvenation of nativism and even fascism today. Any sustainable order will have to balance and contend with these competing impulses.
Second, there is a tension between the ideas underpinning the liberal international order, such as open markets, free trade, global capitalism, democracy, human rights, rule of law, and collective security, and the realities of cultural and civilisational pluralism. The aspiration to identify shared values is a noble one. It is possible to imagine a baseline of common principles. But the challenge lies in how those values translate into policy across different societies. Even something as foundational as individual liberty, which many would consider universal, is mediated through varying balances between the individual and the collective. There are no uniform templates for managing these tensions. Any future order must, therefore, accommodate pluralism rather than seek to erase it.
Third, there is a tension between rhetoric and delivery. An order is sustainable only when it aligns not just with the aspirations of its participants but also with the actual distribution of power. Today, that distribution is uneven and volatile. In many ways, the world is simultaneously unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, and non-polar. Moreover, the drivers of future power, such as compute, algorithms, data, network infrastructure, and skilled talent, are evolving rapidly, even as traditional sources such as territory, population, and natural resources remain significant. Accounting for this dynamic mix is an enormous challenge for order builders.
What, then, does this mean for the next global order?
First, it must be rules-based; otherwise, it cannot meaningfully be called an order. A critical mass of actors must agree on shared codes of behaviour. But these rules need not replicate those of the past. They will evolve, reflecting both shifting power balances and the realities of pluralism.
Second, the emerging order is likely to be unevenly multipolar, more plurilateral than multilateral, more regional than global, and more pluralistic than universalistic. Power will not be evenly distributed, nor will institutions be universally binding. Instead, clusters of states will likely coalesce around specific issues, interests, and geographies, producing overlapping and sometimes competing frameworks of cooperation.
Third, this order will likely be more state-centric and less individual-centric. The post-Cold War flowering of civil society is already under severe strain. This is most evident in the collapse of trust in news media around the world and crackdowns on non-profits and development organisations in various countries. Going ahead, private actors and transnational corporations, once seen as relatively autonomous, will find themselves increasingly subordinate to state priorities and geopolitical imperatives.
Will such an order be stable and peaceful? Perhaps. It may produce pockets of stability within regions or issue-specific arrangements. But will it generate the same degree of prosperity as the post-Cold War era? That seems unlikely. Fragmentation, strategic competition, and the prioritisation of security over efficiency will impose costs on global growth.
For India, this emerging order presents both opportunities and constraints. A more multipolar and plurilateral world aligns with India's long-standing preference for strategic autonomy. It opens space for New Delhi to shape regional arrangements, deepen partnerships across different poles, and play a more active role in norm-setting in different domains. At the same time, the very features that create these opportunities also complicate India's developmental ambitions. A more fragmented global economy, characterised by weakened multilateralism and heightened geopolitical risk, creates a more transactional world that is less conducive to rapid growth. Greater state control over technology, capital, and supply chains globally could also limit access to the very drivers of future power that India needs to accelerate its growth trajectory.
In other words, India may find itself potentially more influential, but not necessarily more prosperous at the pace it desires. This is a critical challenge because one's influence is linked to the material capabilities one brings to the table.
(Manoj Kewalramani is the Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
