A mere two months away from the second anniversary of Hamas's brutal terror strike against Israel, in which hundreds died while many others were taken hostage - and who continue to remain in captivity - Tel Aviv has used this war as an opportunity to reshape its strategic architecture for the long term. Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has called it his country's "seven-front war" and has mobilised militarily to reshape and re-stack the country's long-standing border infractions with not just the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah, but beyond as well, as highlighted by the joint US-Israel airstrikes against Iran's nuclear facilities.
The Three Main Fronts
Amongst these seven fronts, three are arguably more critical than the others. First, unsurprisingly, is Gaza, where Israel continues to be embroiled in a war against Hamas with a stated aim to eliminate the group. The second is Israel's northern border with Lebanon and a long-standing feud with Iran-backed Hezbollah. And, the third is the country's border with Syria, where the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime last year led to a suspension of the 1974 Agreement of Disengagement, followed by a military expansion beyond the contested Golan Heights to create an expanded buffer zone as an additional layer of security.
These three fronts have seen a variety of strategies being employed simultaneously, with varied levels of success and failures alike. Gaza remains a tinderbox strategically, politically, and militarily for Netanyahu. The stated aim of the elimination of Hamas has been backed by a ferocious military campaign that has left much of the strip in rubble and caused civilian casualties. As of today, Hamas continues to hold fort. But amidst this campaign, another reality persists - that of around 50 hostages remaining in Hamas captivity. The war against Hamas and the ensuing crisis in Gaza have also split Israeli society on what the best way forward is for the country. The fact that almost two years later, Hamas persists despite the elimination of leaders such as Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, is a sore point. The lack of a negotiated truce or a deal to allow a follow-up exchange of prisoners has led to a widening disparity of public opinion on the path forward. Humanitarian aid has also become a victim of politics and the global narrative war taking shape over the plight of the Palestinians vis-à-vis the Israeli hostages.
Divisions Within
There are further splits. The civil and military institutions of the state have at times publicly disagreed on the trajectory this conflict should take. This is a rare event in a heavily securitised state such as Israel, but it comes with reasonable scepticism. Israel is a small country, and mandatory military service means that almost all households know someone or the other today who was either directly impacted by the October 7 terror attack or has since been deployed in the military at one or more of the seven fronts. Over 890 Israeli soldiers have been killed since October 2023. While national security is a binding factor for Israelis, the viability of the Gaza war and the fact that Hamas continues to hold people hostage have, to an extent, bifurcated public support for the conflict's ultimate objectives. Netanyahu's own politics is also featured starkly in these conversations as regular public protests continue to take place.
When The 'Opportunity' Came
However, as contested as the Gaza war is domestically, regionally and internationally for Israeli perceptions, other theatres have fared much better tactically for Israel. Its actions against Hezbollah in Lebanon, much like other theatres, were offensive in nature. This included creating buffer zones inside Lebanese territories to push back Hezbollah rocket fire into the northern parts of the country. These actions were followed by the audacious pager attacks that targeted the group's rank and file and their communication methods. Additional aerial strikes then killed Hassan Nasrallah, the founding chief of Hezbollah. Israel clearly had planned these strategies long ago, but did not utilise them due to political restraints. The October 7 attack did away with these shackles for Netanyahu, who saw opportunities much beyond Hamas and Gaza to reshape how Israel has gamed regional risk assessments. Many of these operations conducted by the Israeli military and the country's infamous external intelligence arm, the Mossad, were clearly planned and kept on file over the years in preparation to be used if an opportunity was to present itself.
The Shift In Syria
Much like Hamas and Hezbollah, the collapse of Assad's rule in Damascus also pushed Israel to see it as an opportunity, rather than just a threat. Immediately after Assad's government dissolved, Israeli forces conducted a gamut of airstrikes across Syria, taking out a wide range of military equipment belonging to the erstwhile Syrian armed forces, such as Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems, tanks, and fighter aircraft, including Soviet-era Su-22 and Su-24s. Over 320 targets were hit in a 48-hour period, destroying around 80% of the state's military capability. According to some reports, this included storage facilities housing chemical weapons.
The flip side of the above actions has been that Israel is forced to deal with a new power broker in Damascus: Ahmed Al Sharaa, the founder of Hay'at Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) and self-declared lapsed jihadist who has previously spent time in Al Qaeda and the ecosystem that eventually became the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or 'Daesh' in Arabic). Propped up by regional Arab powers, the US, Turkey, and European capitals alike (largely with an aim to keep Iran and Russia at bay), Al Sharaa went from carrying Kalashnikovs to brandishing Cavalli suits. Wanting to save its already strenuous relations with Arab neighbours and the US from fracturing further, Israel has decided to conduct negotiations with Al Sharaa's government even though it continues to use force as a tool of messaging.
A Global Conflict
Finally, from Gaza to Lebanon to Syria, Israel, over the past two year,s has mobilised to establish itself as the core military power in the region, a strategic feat for what is a small country. However, long-term outcomes of these manoeuvres remain debatable. While many Arab states, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have normalised diplomatic ties with Israel as part of the 2020 Abraham Accords, both the return of the Palestinian crisis and now Israel's position as a primary military and sole regional nuclear power (although an unofficial one as Israel has never made its nuclear weapons public) is a source of unease in states that were mulling cooperation. And this is even when the weakening of the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah works for their Arab neighbours' own strategic interests.
For Israel, and more specifically Netanyahu, the situation is expected to remain difficult in the time to come. While Lebanon and Syria are points of regional and not necessarily international concern, Gaza is and remains a globalised conflict. The war against Hamas and the civilian casualties that have come with it have caused tremendous setbacks to Israel's global perception as it struggles to control a slide in narrative against its actions. The larger problem still is that even two years after the October 7 attack, Hamas continues to exist, and the probability of Israel being dragged into a long war of attrition remains palpable. For now, political brinkmanship is not a choice for Israel and Hamas.
(Kabir Taneja is Deputy Director and Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
