Full transcript of Pervez Musharraf's interview to NDTV

London: Once the all-powerful President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf is now wanted by the law there as he looks to return to his homeland early next year. In a free-wheeling interview with NDTV's Barkha Dutt, he talks about the imminent arrest that he faces on his return, Benazir Bhutto, the elusive Dawood Ibrahim and a lot more.

Here is the full transcript of the interview:

Barkha: General Musharraf, let me start by asking you about your own plans. Your political plans as it were. The last time we met here in London you had set a date for your return to Pakistan. That date, in subsequent interviews, is something you have committed yourself to. Are you absolutely categorical that come March next year, you will be flying back to your homeland?

General Musharraf: Absolutely. And, in fact, maybe earlier, it can't be later.

Barkha: Maybe earlier?

General Musharraf: Yes.

Barkha: What would determine the timing?

General Musharraf: Well, my discussions with my people, my supporters, which I am going to have very soon in Dubai. And also a lot of developments are taking place in Pakistan.

Barkha: Yes.

General Musharraf: There are winds of change in Pakistan. To the better, I would say. So one has to, I think, capitalize on that. I think military has taught me correct timings. The time is now. Therefore I may take a decision. I have to take a decision myself.

Barkha: Sir, you must be aware that as you fly back into Pakistan, there is a chance, and there is every chance, that you could be arrested. Because there is, after all, an arrest warrant out for you in the Benazir assassination case. It is a non-bailable arrest warrant. So when you weigh this consideration, are you ready to go to jail, if that situation should arise?

General Musharraf: That is the, that is the worst-case scenario. I only hope it doesn't happen because I know that as far the legalities of the case are concerned, it doesn't stand on any solid legs at all. These are politicised cases and I have no responsibility in the two major cases

Barkha: Which is Benazir and Bugti's killing. Yes?

General Musharraf: The President of Pakistan doesn't provide security to anyone. And the government is not run by the President. In a parliamentary system, it is the Prime Minister who runs the government, takes decisions, not the President. So I know that these have no, no foundation at all. However, if there is some kind of action, which is on political basis, which is very unfair, I am prepared to face the worst and face the trial. And may I say that more support I have politically, the more will these things be moderated, I think. Let the people of Pakistan decide. If, after doing so much for Pakistan, if any part of the judiciary thinks that I need to be punished, well, let me face it.

Barkha: General Musharraf, you say that it was not the President who was responsible, in a sense, for any security plans when it came to Benazir Bhutto, or even when it comes to the Bugti case. But most people would say that's a disingenuous argument because when you were President the power rested with you. It did not rest with the Prime Minister. So, in a sense, are you passing on the buck?

General Musharraf: No, no. I am not doing that. The problem is that people don't understand what is power. You see, what is power? What do you mean by that? Whose power is running the government?

Barkha: It was your power that was running Pakistan when you were President.

General Musharraf: No. Not even once have I chaired a Cabinet meeting. How is government run? Through the Cabinet. Through the ministers. Through the secretaries. Not once have I done that. Now, what was my power then? My power was that I had great influence on the Assembly members. If I wanted I could change the Prime Minister. Not through force, because the people would have voted as I told them. So I could have initiated that. And secondly, it is because of the respect that I enjoyed and the popularity that I enjoyed, whenever there was an issue which I felt I can contribute to, or I had some ideas to teach the government or tell the government, guide the government, I used to call a conference. And generally the Prime Minister, who was the chief executive, and the relevant ministers or the secretaries used to attend that and I used to give them my views. So, it was a very democratic way of functioning. But the power of running the government and running the country, which means issues relating to the country, issues relating to the people, had all to be decided during Cabinet meetings and the Prime Minister was chairing it. So I think we need to be very clear, what is power? I had the power of dissolving the Assembly also. Yes. But that power, see I am differentiating between, if you think that I was running Pakistan, no I was not. I was guiding all right. I was watching. And if at all I thought that somebody is going wrong or if there is some corruption somewhere, people are not in line with Pakistan's idea, Pakistan's direction, I would step in to correct things.

Barkha: Weren't all the major policy initiatives yours and not the Prime Minister's?

General Musharraf: Well, many were. Because I had run Pakistan the first three years, yes indeed, I learnt. I didn't know in 1999, frankly, frankly I didn't know anything about economy. Let me admit here in front of you. It was on-job training that I acquired through learning, through asking, through teaching myself. So, for the first three years I was the Prime Minister, I was the President, I was the Army Chief, was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. So I was doing a, I was running between four offices and taking decisions, analysing. So I learnt the hard way. And when I learnt the hard way, and I did, I stabilized Pakistan in three years. I stabilized Pakistan. From a failed and defaulted state we stabilized the economy, we carried out many developmental issues, we looked at the welfare of people and took many actions. So I learnt. And now, after 2002, when political government was there after the elections, they needed to be guided. And here I was with all my experience of three years. I used to guide them. But that doesn't mean that I was really running. I never asked them, 'Okay, the whole Cabinet, gather them and I am dictating terms to them', no, never. Never once did I do that.

Barkha: The prosecution's argument in the Benazir case is that as President you knew about the threat to her, but you, in a sense, deliberately chose to not provide her the security that she needed. Do you feel any moral responsibility? Do you accept a degree of moral responsibility for Benazir's death?

General Musharraf: No. Not at all, not at all. Zero. I mean I was the one who got information. I was told by some leaders in the Gulf. Myself I was told. An emissary was sent to tell me that there is a threat to her. I personally rang her up. I personally rang her up and I told her that, "There is a threat on you. You must understand. And if you don't believe me, believe this" and I named the person. "There is a threat. Go slow." She didn't listen to me. In Karachi and then later on when she was in Rawalpindi, the first time that she wanted to go to this very place, Liaquat Bagh, where she was then assassinated, I stopped her from going there the first time. And the hue and cry that her party and she made all over the media that, "I am under arrest, they are not allowing me to move", this and that. There was total chaos she created. That is what I did for her. But next time she went, I said let her go. She wants to go. Let her go.

Barkha: Could you not have provided her better security?

General Musharraf: No

Barkha: I know you say it's not the President's job, but, looking back, could you have done anything differently?

General Musharraf: Could. First of all, not my job. Secondly, whether others could have done better or I could have guided them to do better?

Barkha: Yes, yes.

General Musharraf: Okay? Let us put it like that. I was seeing everything. Obviously. Could I have? If I had come to know of some way of ensuring better security, I would certainly have done that. I would have certainly told the Prime Minister to do it like this or arrange it, given my own view, having my own background of military and etc. But I know that the amount of guards she was provided, the amount of police, the amount of police, special forces that she was provided all around her, at the stage. But the problem was that, first of all their own people took over the security. The inner security was taken over by their own people, by the People's Party people. You see the photographs of her addressing the jalsa. All around her are how these characters of their own People's Party standing around. But, however, I would like to still give credit to all of them, whether it was the People's Party people or the police, that she comes to the jalsa, she addresses them. She stays there for over one and a half hours. She is safe, isn't it? She is totally safe. She leaves the jalsa, she is absolutely safe. Gets in the car, she is absolutely safe. But then, getting out of the car.

Barkha: Through the sunroof

General Musharraf: Is this, now that is her personal, totally personal decision. Had she been inside the car, there were five other people inside the car. They are all very safe, not even a minor injury. So wasn't that a success of security? So her standing

Barkha: Whom do you blame, in a sense, for her assassination?

General Musharraf: I would blame herself, frankly. That she decided to, but that is, why blame anyone? I mean there was a euphoria. There were a lot of people receiving her. Though a leader does get carried away and certainly she would like to wave and people, they all like her.

Barkha: That is politics after all.

General Musharraf: Yes. That is politics. So she did get up and get out of the car. She shouldn't have done that but nobody at that time knew what is going to happen. Then it happened. Of course, Baitullah Mehsud, who I know that it is his group who carried out the attack. It was most unfortunate. There is no doubt about it.

Barkha: Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik has given a statement saying that he will now get in touch with Interpol to execute the warrant in this particular case. Do you believe that the Interpol could now arrest you?

General Musharraf: Not at all, this they have been saying, I think, for the last eight months or 10 months. No, Interpol is not a blind organisation. They also see and they don't. Rehman Malik's statement is absolutely, I don't think anything is going to happen of that sort. There is no question.

Barkha: But you do know that as you head back to Pakistan next year, not just do you have a hostile political opposition, you also have a hostile judiciary, which may not have forgiven you, in a sense, for your decision vis-a-vis them to sack the then Chief Justice. Are you aware of the risks you are taking when you go back? Are you aware of how many enemies you have back in your own home country?

General Musharraf: I have been fighting a lot of enemies so enemies are there. We'll fight them again.

Barkha: So if you're jailed you are jailed?

General Musharraf: Well, yes. Bad luck if that happens. But I am not scared, the point is that if I am scared, then I shouldn't have joined politics. I shouldn't have created this party. When I decided to create the party, I knew the risks involved. So the first question I asked was "Am I prepared to take risks?" Yes indeed, I am. So what do they want to do? Throw me in jail, for what, for doing so much for Pakistan? In seven years that I changed the situation entirely for Pakistan? And when I say changed the situation, people unfortunately don't understand what running a country is? Running a country means only two things - welfare of the people and development of the state. Period. Now, welfare of the people includes, obviously, poverty alleviation, job creation, education, health and development of the state. Certainly, economic turnaround, industry, agriculture, water management from Pakistan's point of view, telecommunication, IT and even things like human rights, independence of the media, democracy. Matlab, what didn't I do? Tell me one thing on these two issues, development of the state, welfare of the people. Tell me one item and I can give a one-hour lecture on what we managed and what we did, where we took Pakistan. So, people get bogged down in peripheral issues, which do not really, which, I mean you have to understand what is the gauge of deciding what is the quality or standard of a leader. How well or how badly someone has governed. We just pass remarks on one odd incident, whether it is Bugti, or Red Mosque, or any assassination. These are one issue. You don't judge eight years performance on one issue, even if that has gone wrong. You don't judge a person on one issue. You judge a person on welfare of a state and development of the country. This is what he is supposed to do and judge him on what he or she has done.

Barkha: As your tenure is being judged now, looking back...

General Musharraf: Sorry?

Barkha: As your tenure as President is being judged, and commented on, and analysed on by so many commentators across the world, some of your critics, many of them American commentators, some of them have previously worked with the CIA, some of them have been part of the Obama administration till recently, are now suggesting that the fact that Osama bin Laden was able to hide in Abbottabad, was to some measure, your failure. They are saying "We don't know if it was complicity, but it was certainly your failure as President". Because you were alerted, as some reports have suggested, in 2006, by the former Afghan Intelligence chief that Osama bin Laden is hiding in Abbottabad.

General Musharraf: Now, you see, when you say these things, now you have spoken about Amarullah Saleh

Barkha: Yes.

General Musharraf: He hates Pakistan and he hates me. And I know why he hates me. Because...

Barkha: And you hate him too, as you have said many times on record.

General Musharraf: Yes, yes. I do, I do. Absolutely. You are right. Because of what he was doing, because of this thing. He is telling lies. He is a liar if he said that he informed us about anything. He is a liar. That is what I can say. Now I can't say anything more than that. So the man is lying. He has always been bluffing everyone. They've been talking about me having a, playing a double game. This was, what was the double game that I was playing? Isn't it madness, there are people attacking me? They want to kill me. Who wanted to kill me, the same people? And I am supposed to be abetting with them. Am I a mad man? And is my view of religion, is my view on life, I am talking about enlightened moderation and all that, the same as these obscurantist views? So how am I with them? The issue was their own blunders. Unfortunately, between 2002 and 2004 - this is extremely important - Taliban and Al Qaeda were militarily defeated after 9/11. In 2002, there was no Taliban, Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. They all ran into Pakistan. And I moved against them. And dozens of people, other than number one and two - which is Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri - who caught them? Each one of the people in Guantanamo? Who has caught them? Each one of them has been caught by Pakistan and under my orders. So what are we talking? We always keep seeing the glass a little portion empty. Well, we are very sorry that this damn Osama bin Laden was there and he got killed. But what about the dozens that we caught? Osama and Zawahiri and, sorry, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Galidi and Abu Zubaydah, all these characters, who caught them? We caught them. So, therefore, I think unfortunately, what I was doing was a strategy. A strategy where I said there is a void in Afghanistan. We must not treat, all Taliban were Pakhtoons, but all Pakhtoons are not Taliban. Let us wean away Pakhtoons from the Taliban. Let us convert the military success into a political success now. Military has delivered. We have to use now the political instrument. And what is political success. Put an ethnically-balanced, proportionally-balanced government in Kabul. And what is that? Obviously, with Pakhtoon domination, because 50% people are Pakhtoons. Can you run Afghanistan with Panjshiri domination, which is 8%, which they are doing even till now? So, now this window of opportunity was available for two years, because the resurgence of the Taliban started in 2004. For these two years what did I do? I started, I thought I must wean away Pakhtoons. How? I started a Jirga. This is a very age-old...

Barkha: Tradition

General Musharraf: Tribal tradition of Jirga. Jirga is elders. 100 to 150 of them depending on the size of the tribe. Hold a Jirga and reach an agreement with the Jirga. That is what I tried. Now, people started in the media. People started saying I am double-crossing. Yes, indeed, they may have been some Taliban sitting in the Jirga. Each one of them has a beard, each one is carrying a weapon. Now I don't know which one is Taliban, which one is not. So therefore, the idea, the strategy was absolutely correct. We could have gone wrong. Okay, 50% were good people, Pakhtoon. 50% were Taliban. We take this 50% and then we work on the others. We at least use them to our advantage against those people because they are all, they believe in fighting. They are all fighters. So let's get 50% on our side. This was a good strategy, but unfortunately, it was the Western media who started saying that I am double-crossing. That I am dealing with the Taliban. I was not dealing with Taliban. And all that I would like to say is I had excellent relations with President Bush and Colin Powell. Even now when I went, Colin Powell invited me for a cup of coffee. I went to his house. I must say he is a very, very poor judge of people. If I was double-crossing them all along, for eight years, and I was hiding Osama bin Laden, I must say that President Bush and Colin Powell are very poor judges of people.

Barkha: You say that Amarullah Saleh hated you and you reciprocate that feeling as it were. So this meeting that he describes, where he brings up the fact that Osama bin Laden is hiding, he claims that President Karzai and you were at the meeting. He says that you got so angry, you brought your fist crashing down on the table and you said "Nonsense. This is complete nonsense." And you refused to follow the lead.

General Musharraf: I never get so emotional. I know how to control my emotions. But at the same time, I know how to be. I was harsh with him. It was not on this issue, not at all. He is, again, lying.

Barkha: He didn't bring up Osama bin Laden hiding in Abbottabad?

General Musharraf: He actually, what happened was, to be exact, we were all the time complaining that this issue, that ISI is training Taliban and sending them into Afghanistan, was being said by their own operatives on the border and being fed to their intelligence, Ministry of Interior. And Amarullah Saleh used to spread it to the President and to the Americans etc. This we have complained many times. When Karzai came, he comes and declares that there were 25 Taliban who crossed into the border and they were all trained by ISI. He made this statement. Now I, I don't know what, I quickly asked him, "Have you caught anyone?" Though his blunder because he was, he said, "No, we haven't." I said "Okay. Now I got him." I said, "You haven't caught any one of them and you are saying that they were trained by ISI. Who told you that they have been trained by the ISI." And he didn't have an answer. Obviously, because I caught him off balance. And I said, "This is, it is because of people like you, it is you who pollute the mind of the President, pollute the mind of the Coalition against Pakistan. And you tell lies to them." I told him on his face. And if he has anything, any character in him, let him challenge what I have said. Exactly this is what happened.

Barkha: So he never brought up information about Osama hiding in Abbottabad?

General Musharraf: Never, never. It was only one incident that I think took place in 2005 or 2006, and not by him. CIA people, some CIA people coming from Chitral, they were coming by road, and they were filming everything. They have sophisticated gadgets. ISI was given a photograph of a jeep coming from, crossing them. And two people, the driver and the person sitting next to him, they said this chap is Osama bin Laden. Now this photograph was shown to me also by ISI, that this photograph, which this jeep took when they crossed. And it was really, the man was really like Osama bin Laden. And I also thought that yes, very much so. Luckily the number of the jeep was also visible in the photograph. So the ISI and the CIA got launched. Now, this vehicle was coming from, we came from Afghanistan, turned into the border from Afghanistan and it was in this Chitral area. Because there was, Chitral is cut off from the Frontier Province if you know.

Barkha: Yes.

General Musharraf: We have made the Lowari Tunnel now. I have got it made. Now it is open throughout or otherwise you have to go to Afghanistan and then back. So then we jointly, now I don't know the operation, how jointly it was done. But I know that they caught the jeep. They got the two people sitting. And CIA was involved and he was not the man. It was a look-alike kind of a thing and we were mistaken. It ended in a joke. So this is what happened. One of the only incident that happened. Now, nothing to do with Amarullah Saleh telling us anything. Absolutely nothing.

Barkha: You have been saying categorically that Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, is not
in Pakistan in your estimation. Aren't you worried, that given that Osama bin Laden showed up in Abbottabad, that the same could happen with Mullah Omar? That has been the claim made by many Americans now as well.

General Musharraf: Well, yes. They make claims without information. They've been talking about Osama bin Laden. I have never said that he is not in Pakistan. I always used to start, whoever asked me, I always used to say that I don't know. But when anyone said that he must be, he is in Pakistan, that is what I used to challenge. Why is he in Pakistan? Why can't he be in Afghanistan? Who has told you that he is in Pakistan? Without any information one shouldn't speak and I never speak out of. Now, as far as Osama bin Laden is concerned, yes, indeed, it is terrible that he was there. But take Mullah Omar. Now, Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are two different people. Osama bin Laden is a foreigner here. He was an Arab sitting in Afghanistan. Mullah Omar is a local Afghan, Taliban, who was the leader of 95% of Afghanistan from 1996 to 9/11. For five years he was the leader. And now he is one of the main Taliban leaders against the coalition, and supposedly controlling the rural areas, the countryside of east Afghanistan, south-east Afghanistan, Kandahar region. Now, from any logical point of view, he would be mad to be in Pakistan. I mean, if I have my own people around me and I am dominating the countryside then why would I be mad to go to Pakistan?

Barkha: You are saying he doesn't need to hide in Pakistan?

General Musharraf: Yes, no, I mean from one point of view what I think he doesn't need to. He will have to hide in Pakistan. Because he can be detected, he can be detected by the intelligence.

Barkha: No, what I mean is that, logically he would hide among his own people. That's what you are saying.

General Musharraf: Yes, of course. That is much more logical. He is more secure. He will be insecure in Pakistan because we keep tracking off and on, here and there, people do get caught. Although in Pakistan side we keep talking of Quettashura, there is a refugee camp of about hundred thousand people just outside Quetta. I have flown over this refugee camp in a helicopter and I feel, because I thought one needs to know what are the ground realities, this is a village-like condition of any, like Pakistan and India, where small alleys which, maybe, two people can't cross. It is that kind of a place and anyone can hide there, anyone who crosses the border, and if the border is quite porous, can come and hide there. So somebody certainly can come and hide there. But coming and going means crossing borders and it means encountering somebody or the other. So why would Mullah Omar be so stupid as to do that where he has all the support and he has the power in Kandahar region and also he has never been in Pakistan? What is the idea of being in Pakistan then and hiding in Pakistan?

Barkha: You have said often that the fact that Osama bin Laden was hiding, there was an embarrassment and you also made the argument that the American operation was a violation of Pakistani sovereignty. I want to ask you what impact you believe this has had, domestically on Pakistan. Because since then we have had, in a rather unprecedented way, you have had the head of ISI appearing before the Parliamentary Committee, you have had the Army Chief General Kayani now appearing before the political establishment. Do you believe that, in a sense, this has caused a great deal of embarrassment and to some extent, to weakening of the clout that the Pakistani army in the Pakistani intelligence used to enjoy?

General Musharraf: Yes I agree. But the issue was not, not really the finding of Osama bin Laden in Abottabad, as much as much as the violation of our sovereignty.

Barkha: Do you think that has embarrassed the Pakistani military more?

General Musharraf: Yes, yes, in Pakistan, in the public eye it was, how is it that the American force came, killed him, went back and the Army didn't know, couldn't react? This has caused more embarrassment. Not Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden has been forgotten now. But this issue of American forces coming in and going out without knowing, that has caused the embarrassment. But however, from a military point of view, purely from military point of view, like me, I understand radar at night. If somebody has night capability and somebody has radar-gaining capability, it is easy to come across the border. And especially on our western border, radar coverage as a military man would know, radar coverage is high-level radar coverage and low-level radar coverage. If you have only high-level coverage, anything can sneak down under. And if we have low-level, in the mountains there are dead zones even the low-level radar is not going to cover. So western region, western border of Pakistan certainly doesn't have the kind of radar coverage that we have on the eastern border. Eastern border, nobody can sneak in. On the western border, it is very possible. And the mountains, and then this, I know that the helicopter was using special paint, I know that they had electronic suppression devices. So therefore, anyone can come in, and at night, in an area where so many helicopters are flying around the place. So I think, from a military point of view, it is very much possible.

Barkha: But is the Army, therefore subsequently, even though you understand that as a military man, is the Army in Pakistan now weaker than before in terms of how the public perceives it?

General Musharraf: Yes, I think Army has suffered, unfortunately, without their being at fault that much.

Barkha: You don't think that they need to take any part of the blame?

General Musharraf: Well, no, they should. They should take, they have to take their part of the blame as far as Osama bin Laden being there is concerned. The intelligence should have known. Why didn't they know? I think that was a serious issue and we need to, we are answerable to the world on this issue. And we must do that.

Barkha: General Musharraf, you have been saying that Pakistan and America's relationship is perhaps at the lowest ebb that it has ever been. Yet, many people think that this is like a bad marriage where no partner can walk out. Is that how you see it?

General Musharraf: Yes, I would like to put it in a more interesting way. One of the ladies in Pakistan asked this question to, or gave a statement to Secretary Hillary Clinton when she was in Pakistan.

Barkha: The mother-in-law?

General Musharraf: Yes, I think.

Barkha: You think that America is really behaving as a mother-in-law?
General Musharraf: I think so, because continuously badgering Pakistan, that you are not doing enough, you need to do more. 35,000 people have died in Pakistan. More than 3,000 soldiers have died in Pakistan, laid down their lives. More than 300 ISI operatives have been killed. A number of generals have been attacked and killed in Rawalpindi - the Lieutenant, Lieutenant General - during prayers in a mosque, generals and their children killed. And we are not doing enough. This statement has become a joke in Pakistan. It annoys every man in the streets. You are not doing enough? What more do you want? You want to run away with few hundred people dead. Literally want to run away when 8 men have died? So what are we talking? I think lets be fair to Pakistan.

Barkha: But given that Pakistan is so dependent on Washington for aid, military aid and so on, can Pakistan afford, in a sense, to take a position against America?

General Musharraf: Absolutely. And I think this is another misperception as if all that Pakistan has is, all is given by United States. United States put sanctions on us in 1989-90 through the Pressler amendment. We didn't finish, the military continued. We were under sanctions. But that didn't happen. If anyone thinks that United States, if I take my time, people keep talking of 10 billion dollars given in my time which is also nonsense. Five billion out of those ten billion were reimbursements. The title is 'reimbursements for services provided'. Now I always used to laugh at that, who says this is your money? You are returning our money. So now, how can you take that 5 billion now? Out of 5 billion, half was socio-economic and half was military aid. That means 250, 2.5 billion for 6 years. So if your mathematics is as good as mine, 400 million dollars per annum? If anyone thinks that  Pakistan military of about 600,000 with all the aircraft, tanks, helicopters, guns, navy ships are being managed with 400 million dollars from US, that's a joke. Therefore that is not the case.

Barkha: So if America withdraws its aid?

General Musharraf: Then we will suffer a little, but not, all the military will be there.

Barkha: Stephen Cohen, who has written many books on Pakistan, had an interesting line to describe the relationship between Pakistan and America. He says Pakistan and the United States of America are allies but not friends and he said India and America are friends but not allies. Is this how you see it?

General Musharraf: Well unfortunately, again, I would like to put the blame on US. In 1948, Pakistan took a deliberate decision to join the western camp when India took a decision to join the eastern camp with the Soviet Union. We were with the United States. And all around we joined organisations like SEATO, CENRO, RCD, so all, all this we joined and we had a total strategic alliance with the West and the United States. All our military aid was coming from the United States. Now this continued for 42 years till 1989. In the last ten years, we fought a war against Soviet Union. The US, Pakistan assisted Afghan Mujahideen in Afghanistan to defeat Soviets. India was again pro-Soviet Union. Now, after 42 years, suddenly US decided to ditch Pakistan and change policy towards India.

Barkha: But history is dynamic. Geopolitics changes.

General Musharraf: Well, if this is dynamism, then Pakistan is also very dynamic. We also review our relationships obviously. But the blame on this change lies with the US. There is a change and now in 1989 there was a change. We were ditched and people of Pakistan started thinking that we have been betrayed but then comes 9/11 after 12 years. Now again, we are very important. So now when we are very important, may be Pakistan leadership in Pakistan and people of Pakistan are thinking how to deal with this United States, who may be again deciding to betray us by leaving in 2014. So this is also dynamism of policy Pakistan also thinks, must be thinking.

Barkha: One of the big areas of friction between Washington and Islamabad right now is the Haqqani network. And Mike Mullen has described it as literally one wing of the ISI. Now you have said, that while you do not agree, you also believe that Pakistan has reasons to continue its support, strategic reasons to continue to support the Haqqani network. General Musharraf, don't you think that this is the virtual justification for supporting a known terror group?

General Musharraf: No, I have never said this.

Barkha: How do you believe that Pakistan should handle the Haqqani network?

General Musharraf: Well, I have never said that there is a reason to keep supporting...

Barkha: You accept that there is a support to the Haqqani network?

General Musharraf: No, I never.

Barkha: Do you accept that there is enough action against it?

General Musharraf: No, there is no action. They have not taken action against them.

Barkha: Okay

General Musharraf: So what I may say in many lectures in the United States, the onus of other than Osama bin Laden proving that it was negligence, not complicity, the justification of why we're not acting against Haqqani network in north Waziristan also lies with Pakistan. I have been saying this very clearly. But that doesn't mean that we support them. I don't believe that we support them. I don't believe ISI or the Army, as a policy, is supportive of Taliban. As a policy I am very, very sure. And the army and ISI is anti, against Taliban, Al-Qaeda, are there to defeat terrorism and extremism.  But how they do it? Now this is at the strategic stage. But you do it in dealing with, there are many Talibans I mean. Taliban, Haqqani's Taliban, Mullah Omar's Taliban, Gulbuddin's Taliban, TTE, TNSM. So what Taliban are we talking of? So dealing with somebody or the other or at least having ingress in some, for certain, may be because the issue is not military alone. Issue is military, political, socio-economic. Even now you see America wants to talk to Taliban. So who, why are they talking to Taliban? If they are talking to some Taliban which I don't know who, why can't Pakistan be talking to Taliban?

Barkha: So how do you believe Pakistan should deal with the Haqqani network?

General Musharraf: Yes, we need to quite clearly, because it is the sensitivity of United States and Afghanistan that these people go across the border and attack coalition forces. We should either disallow them, not allow them to go, take stronger action. Obviously, they must be taking action to seal the border but they haven't been successful. Pakistan hasn't been successful in doing that because it's a mountainous region and however I, and my time has said let us mine the border. Let us fence the border like India has fenced the border on Pakistan border. Why can't we fence it? Why can't we mine it?

Barkha: So why do you believe this has not happened?

General Musharraf: This has not happened because of Afghanistan again. They think that it will give a permanent status of the boundaries, which they don't accept. So these are many issues. Whereas I had all the intention, let's mine border and stop the infiltration. But at the same time, I used to say unfortunately, for everything, every failing Pakistan is the rogue. Why shouldn't we say that Afghanistan and coalition and United States is also the rogue, for allowing the, let's take, let them take 50% of the blame for allowing this Haqqani group to come and cross the border. Why?

Barkha: You think that they are also responsible for it partially?

General Musharraf: They are also. Aren't they? There is one border they go across. They are responsible for their side. We are responsible for ours. So why are they not responsible in people going and coming back? Just like we are responsible for people going across on our side. So this is terrible that, I don't understand these logic. It appears most illogical.

Barkha: Do you foresee another unilateral American operation as we saw in Abottabad. What do you believe the consequences of that would be?

General Musharraf: Well, it will. I, possibility is there, a hit-and-run operation. Otherwise major forces coming, it will be the folly of the biggest order, the blunder of the biggest order because the military, whenever you apply force to any place, you always talk of troop-to-space ratio. A military man understands that you have to have optimum ratio between troops to space. If you have less troops, too much space, it's called dilution, you are diluted in space. And if it is too much force and less space then you are saturated in space. Both are bad from a military point of view. Here, they are diluted in space. Do you want to add more territory and get more diluted in space? And, that too, that mountainous territory? It would be a blunder of the highest order.

Barkha: What about hit-and-run? As you say.

General Musharraf: But hit-and-run, like Osama bin Laden issue, yes that is a possibility. But I would say that again, it will be a big blunder, because I think they will suffer a lot of casualties. Number two, there is no pin point. There are many people there. If Mir Ali supposedly has a lot of Taliban, I don't have access to full intelligence now but supposedly that is the case. Now what is there? Is there one house in Mir Ali which they are going to attack because Haqqani is sitting there? I don't think they know that. So what are they going to do? They are going to suffer casualties. But on the Pakistan side, yes indeed, it will have terrible repercussions and maybe the Pakistan military or the forces on ground, whether it is FC, Frontier FC NWFP, they will, I think react. So it will be very dangerous.

Barkha: Do you think there will be a military conflagration if there was another unilateral operation?

General Musharraf: Possibility. Possibility. Yes.

Barkha: President Hamid Karzai said that if there was an attack by the United States of America, then Afghanistan would support Pakistan and you said that "This is the first pro-Pakistan statement that he has ever made."

General Musharraf: Yes.

Barkha: Is something changing there, do you think?

General Musharraf: No, no. I don't think so. I think he is just, he is...

Barkha: Trying to please both Pakistan and?

General Musharraf: He speaks from his tongue. Once I told him on his face. He speaks from his tongue and doesn't think the same in his mind and heart. So he just made a statement. But in any case, this is a most preposterous statement. I said that also, that Pakistan and the United States going to war. It is preposterous, it is unthinkable, and I think he should focus on whatever he is doing, Taliban and Al Qaeda, and stop aiding Pakistan.

Barkha: You clearly don't like President Karzai.

General Musharraf: Ya. I think you are right. Ya.

Barkha: You are being blunt as ever, General Musharraf. Gets you into a lot of trouble quite often, doesn't it?

General Musharraf: Yes, it has. Even when I was a young officer, yes, it used to get me in trouble. But I think that I have been gaining also from this. Somehow, I don't believe in mincing words. I don't believe in bluffing with anyone. I would like to talk straight because I really mean straight. I really mean it because I think like that in my mind and in my heart. And I am not a politician or a diplomat that way who bluffs his way around.

Barkha: Well, you are a politician now. In your new avatar you are a politician.

General Musharraf: Yes, yes. But I would like to be a different politician.

Barkha: You spoke about winds of change in Pakistan. We've seen some very interesting political developments happening, most recently, a rally by Imran Khan, whom everybody had earlier written off as a cricketer who could not, you know, really win seats in Punjab, the lair, in a sense, earlier of the PML (N), drawing huge crowds. What do you make of this development?

General Musharraf: Certainly, PML (N) has gone down. There is no doubt. There was no doubt in my mind even before this rally, that because of the misgovernance of Punjab being done by this party and the irrational attitudes of Nawaz Sharif, its leader, their popularity had been going down continuously over the past many, over the past two years. It was only in the first year, 2008, that when he returned, gained. And since then, it has been dropping. So that drop is continuing. Imran Khan's popularity, yes, has increased. There is no doubt. But, however, one shouldn't be misled that one jalsa is what really, entirely means that he will get all the seats. Organizing a party is a different issue. Your candidates in each constituency, winning candidates, electable candidates in each constituency. How good are they to muster support? Jalsas are these public gatherings. One public gathering should not indicate victory all over Pakistan. Each province has different dynamics. And then, of course, I would like to also say that running Pakistan is not running an eleven-man cricket team.

Barkha: That's quite acerbic.

General Musharraf: Yes.

Barkha: But yet, there are reports that your party could consider supporting him, Imran.

General Musharraf: No, when?

Barkha: Or at least beginning some talks with him. Opening up possibilities. Do you believe that you relate to him, in a sense, more than the other political groups at this point?

General Musharraf: Yes. I believe in Pakistan and for Pakistan's sake I personally think that we have to break the political status quo. If we are able to do anything for Pakistan, we have to break the political status quo. And the elections are coming now, in another year. Unless we break this political status quo and create another political alternative, I think Pakistan will continue on this downward trend as we are going. Everything, whether it is the dysfunctional government, the issue of failure against terrorism and extremism, the issue of a failing economy, political chaos, everything will continue going down. So, therefore, for the sake of Pakistan, we have to come up with a viable political alternative, seen by the people and the world.

Barkha: Do you see Imran Khan as part of that political alternative? And yourself as part of that political alternative? And do you see yourself, both, ever being on the same side?

General Musharraf: Possible. Yes. Because he has not tested, he has never been tested, and one positive certainly is that he is an honest man. He means what he says. Maybe, although at times, one sees some variations in statements but, however, I think he means well. He is a patriotic man. So, since he has not been tested, he is, out of the lot, the best of the lot to be given a chance. And, in that, my belief is, first of all my own party, I would like to win alone. Yes, indeed. But, if at all, that is not possible or if at all there is even a 25% - 30% chance of that not being possible, I would still like to get into a coalition with people who can serve the purposes of Pakistan in the future. In breaking the political status quo, in creating a new political dynamic, I see a wind, a changing wind. The winds are changing in Pakistan. I think what Imran Khan achieved was to show that the winds are changing in Pakistan.

Barkha: Although he believes that the Americans should get out of the region as soon as possible. And you sound concerned that the Americans are now leaving Pakistan, in a sense, to mend the damage.

General Musharraf: I think he hasn't. As I said, running Pakistan is not running an eleven-man cricket team. There are many complications in many things of the world. Afghanistan is not a simple situation. We have seen. I don't think he has analysed the situation fully. I talk only from Pakistan's point of view. If, in 2014, United States leaves and they leave an unstable Afghanistan, meaning thereby, militarily unstable, politically unstable, Afghanistan will go back either to 1989, when there were about ten ethnic groups, four ethnic groups, but Pakhtoons were divided into about six different groups. Then there were Uzbeks, Hazaras, Tajiks, separate, fighting amongst themselves, ravaging, destroying Afghanistan and Kabul. Either this, or 1996, when Taliban emerged. It was Taliban on one side versus Northern Alliance, of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, on the other side, fighting among themselves. Who is the first victim? Pakistan. We have faced this for twelve years. Now, if that happens again, the first impact will be on Pakistan. And I know that with these people, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, even the Mujahideen, whose orientation was Kashmir, they are developing a nexus. Even the extremists in India are developing a nexus. So the next target, next effective, would be India. I am reasonably sure of that. So, therefore, Pakistan needs to take stock of how Pakistan will be affected in 2014. It's not a very simple issue of, this is a popular slogan "America should leave, America should leave", it's very popular with the people. But people sometimes...

Barkha: They are not understanding the complexities.

General Musharraf: They don't understand the complexity. Leadership demands to explain complexities to them. We have to protect Pakistan as far as I am concerned. And we have to understand all the possible dynamics.

Barkha: Talk a little bit about what you think is happening within Pakistan because you regarded your tenure as standing for enlightened modern issues. Many people believe and worry and even Imran Khan in an interview to me said that there are fanatics today out there and radicalism is a real big problem within Pakistan. You saw what happened with the assassination of Salman Taseer, and in fact, when I was talking to Imran Khan he said that you know, now is not the time when anyone can talk honestly about the issue of  blasphemy because there are fanatics out there. Do you accept, General Musharraf, that fanaticism of a certain kind has made an honest discussion and let's say, blasphemy law is impossible today in Pakistan?

General Musharraf: No, again, I mean if Imran Khan has said that, I have a totally different view. I have been speaking about blasphemy many times. Lot of people have asked me this question and let me say what my thoughts are.

Barkha: What are your views?

General Musharraf: There are about 40 countries of the world which have blasphemy laws. So first, number one, point number one, do not single out Pakistan, we have a blasphemy law and it should be there. It has to be there for what reason? Because the people of Pakistan are extremely sensitive to any desecration of the Quran or blasphemy against the Prophet. So, they are so sensitive that we can't declare it a black law and do away with it. But now having said that, we have to come to the issue, let us with, as intelligent people let's understand what is the problem of the blasphemy. Is the law the problem as I said or its application the problem? It is the application that is the problem, not the law. As I said there are 40 countries which have blasphemy law. So applications, what is the problem in the application?

Barkha: Sir, in this case, Sir...

General Musharraf: Now may I complete?

Barkha: Yes, yes Sir.

General Musharraf: Now, in the application it was very convenient for anyone, for me, God forbid to put a case against you,  that you have carried out a blasphemy tag, I go to the police station and launch an FIR against you and it's as simple as that and you are hauled up. And this application, and this was, this miscarriage of justice, as I say, was done mostly by people being vindictive against, their enmity against people. They used to put this blasphemy case and put them behind bars. So it was the miscarriage of justice through this law and mostly done against Muslims, not against minorities at all. I found the figures out. 80%-90% are against Muslims, it's not against minorities. But then what we did was, what I had done was through an administrative order, we had decided that the cases will be lodged in a court first. And it's the court which will investigate and then allow its FIR to be lodged. So we created an obstacle in a miscarriage of justice. So this is what needs to be done. We need to stop its wrong application for vendetta or for enmities to be resolved. That is what needs to be stopped, that is the problem.

Barkha: Now when you saw the killer of Salman Taseer, lawyers, in a sense, refusing to take on that case, the judge who has delivered a verdict in that case had to leave on Haj. Many people think he will not be able to return to Pakistan for a long time. Mumtaz Qadri being celebrated on Facebook pages. Did that not concern you as somebody who describes yourself as a moderate?

General Musharraf: Yes, yes. It does. It did concern me. And it is terrible. I don't think we can declare a person who has assassinated the Chief Minister...

Barkha: The Governor...

General Musharraf: The Governor, as a hero. This is unfortunate. But again, I would say that even in that, right in the beginning when his namaz janaza was being held, I am told that the Maulvi who was supposed to deliver the sermon, conducted the namaz janaza, refused to do that and nobody seems to have done anything about it. I think that is where appease, this I call appeasement. Now, as a government, as a government function, we should have acted strongly against that Maulvi who is refusing to read the namaz janaza. And nobody does that. And everyone is scared to attend the namaz janaza. Everyone is scared to pray for the departed soul. So...

Barkha: What would you have done if you were in power?

General Musharraf: I would certainly have acted against anyone not having namaz janaza. I would certainly have allowed. We must pray for the departed soul. Why not? He was a very good man. But, may be, he was a little indiscreet. Indiscreet in calling this as a black law. Unfortunately you see, we must understand. That's what I say when Imran Khan is saying that we can't talk against blasphemy. Why can't we? We must understand the problem. The problem is not the law. The problem is its application. Why can't I speak against it? I can convince any Maulvi. Bring them in front of me. The blasphemy law must stay but we must correct it. Its application has to be corrected. We must do it and we will do it. I will do it. I did it, I'll do it again.

Barkha: But is there a fanaticism taking over public discourse in Pak? An intolerance of a certain kind?

General Musharraf: Yes. Again, yes, because I think there is a scare, there is appeasement by government functionaries. I personally believe that most people are against Taliban. After all, the bomb blasts that they've carried out, people are against these extremists. And in Pakistan, by the way, more than 70% to 75% people are Barelvis, who are moderates.

Barkha: But in this particular case, the assassin was a Barelvi, if I am not wrong.

General Musharraf: Well. He was? Frankly, lack of knowledge, I didn't know that. But, anyway, as I said, everything has a reason. If some indiscretion on his part of calling it a black law, I mean that one a little too much for this man to grasp. So while the moderates are much more, it is the extremists and terrorists who are very harsh. They can slaughter. They can kill. They fight. They have weapons. Toh who should be on the side of the silent majority? The majority who is moderate and who are peace-loving? The government. The government has to be on their side. Now, if the government is very scared and doesn't act, then this majority is at the disposal, at the mercy of the minority. So I personally believe that it is the government's responsibility to be strong, to act strongly with determination against extremism and terrorism in the society other than Al Qaeda, Taliban. Leave them aside. Extremism in our society, this is extremism within the society. We must act against it.

Barkha: Let me ask you in the end to talk a little bit about India and Pakistan. Even till today, what has come to be known as the Musharraf four-point formula gets quoted all the time when we talk about Kashmir. Are you able to talk more openly today about what stopped it from going through?

General Musharraf: From going through? Yes, I thought it was, we were, moving forward all right. And I must give equal credit to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for being very sincere, for being very flexible, in accommodating points of views from my side and me accommodating his points of view. But then time came, and I had been to India, and the back channel was operative and we were moving forward on both Sir Creek and Siachen. We had done everything. Sir Creek, where the survey of the points was carried out jointly by two Navies, so we knew exactly where is the problem area, how does it extend to the sea. Now the only decision is, okay, this is the problem area, this is the disputed area. Are we dividing it into half? Are we having it as a common area? Are we having it as a no-go area? I mean I was absolutely open to, okay, take a decision and let's sign it. Whatever it is. Also Siachen. We had decided what are the troops to move behind which lines. So we were just stuck on some minor SD, in the military we call it SD issues, staff duty issues, which could very well just be resolved anytime.

Barkha: And notes had been exchanged on both sides? Because the present government says there is nothing in writing.

General Musharraf: Yes, I think, that was on Kashmir mainly. On these two also. Yes, indeed, whatever we carried out is on paper. On Kashmir also, we were trying to move forward in drafting the deal. Now, in 2007, it was Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's turn to come to Pakistan to seal the deals.

Barkha: Including Kashmir?

General Musharraf: Possibly. I won't say certainly, because we hadn't reached that stage where the final paper had been drafted. We were drafting. There were disagreements but we were trying to resolve them with an open mind. But the other two, and I had said that whenever you come, we have to sign some deal, otherwise it will be totally a failed visit.

Barkha: Ya.

General Musharraf: And he agreed. That whenever we come, and it is his turn to come, we will sign some deal. Whether it is only Siachen and Sir Creek or Kashmir also. But unfortunately he didn't come. You ask him why didn't he come. Did he think that I've got weaker because...

Barkha: Unrest had started within Pakistan?

General Musharraf: 2007 some unrest started. Is that why he didn't come? But I feel he should have come.

Barkha: And you believe if he had come in 2007, the history of our countries, in a sense, could have been different today?

General Musharraf: True. To quite an extent, yes. I was prepared to sign deals.

Barkha: So the Army was fully on board? Your Army was fully on board? 

General Musharraf: Absolutely. This is another, Barkha, I think this is another, really a misperception, which must be corrected. This is an old misperception that the Army is the rogue which doesn't want a Kashmir solution, which doesn't want any solution, peace with India. This is absolute, you take it from me, if you believe that I speak the truth, this is absolutely wrong. We have been carrying out assessments in Pakistan. Pakistan Army is for resolution of Kashmir dispute, Siachen, Sir Creek, everything. We are all always, every general that I know, my predecessors, chiefs, have always been in favour of peace. But unfortunately, that is the misperception. And the rationale given by Pakistan's opponents, or whoever, is that Pakistan Army's importance will go. Negative. It will never go till the time that India has all its forces massed against Pakistan's borders. And we know that. Its Air Force's all forward air bases are on the Pakistan eastern border, India's forward air bases. All your offensive forces, the armoured division and mechanised division, all have locations against Pakistan. All infantry divisions, out of 31, 23 are arrayed against Pakistan. Your Navy is mostly on the west coast. So till such time that this does not go, Pakistan's military will always have to stay. So it's not the Kashmir dispute. So this is a total misperception which everyone keeps spreading. And a lot of Indians keep saying this to malign the Pakistan Army. Pakistan Army is for peace.

Barkha: Talk a little bit about the two bugbears that come up in every India-Pakistan debate. One is the Lashkar-e-Taiba. The other, quite different, is Dawood Ibrahim. Let's talk about the Lashkar first. We have seen Rehman Malik making a statement at the SAARC Summit saying "Ajmal Kasab should hang but there isn't enough evidence yet against the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which is of course the group that Hafiz Saeed leads."  Now, when Indians hear this, they get very perturbed. They see the JuD as a front, or an affiliate group, associated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba. What is the Lashkar-e-Taiba for you General Musharraf? What does it represent?

General Musharraf: It has its history. Unfortunately, after 1989 when the Kashmir freedom struggle started, as far as we, we call it a freedom struggle. There were a number of, dozens of Mujahideen groups which sprang up in Pakistan, within our society. And these people had tremendous public support. All this Jaish-e-Mohammed and Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba, later on Jamaat-ud-Dawa, they are all products of the '90s. Against people volunteering massively, even now, to go and to...

Barkha: But Sir, the Lashkar was behind the Mumbai attacks. Today, do you see them as a terrorist group?

General Musharraf: Now, yes, now they gradually, initially they had their own orientation towards Kashmir. And this is, I am talking of the '90s, and we have changed governments and all governments were following a certain policy as far as these people were concerned. And these people were, certainly, recruiting from Pakistan. These people were going across. It didn't need any military support. They all were doing it themselves. They were volunteers, thousands of them volunteering to go. And this was the reality. Now they kept growing and then this 9/11 comes in. And then Taliban and Al Qaeda and now their nexus developing with Taliban and Al Qaeda and their turning their guns even on Pakistan. Even attack on me. There were elements of these Mujahideen groups from Kashmir.

Barkha: So why is Pakistan not cracking down on groups like the Lashkar?

General Musharraf: It's not that easy.

Barkha: But why?

General Musharraf: Because they are very well entrenched.

Barkha: Are they regarded, in some ways, as a strategic asset to be used against India?

General Musharraf: No, no, no. They are not regarded as a strategic asset but they have a popularity in the public. Now Jamaat-ud-Dawa, when we had the earthquake in Kashmir and northern areas, the best NGO, or can I say one of the best NGOs, was Jamaat-ud-Dawa. It was very popular. It did so much for the people. Now, when that happens they have a certain popularity in the people, in the masses. So cracking down on somebody who has mass popularity is not that simple and not that easy.

Barkha: Even if they are the perpetrators of something like the Bombay attacks?

General Musharraf: Now, I don't know about Bombay attacks. If there was abetment or perpetration in that, yes indeed, one has to examine, one has to investigate, and culprits have to be brought to book. Yes indeed. That was bad. And we cannot do this. But, again, may I also say that unfortunately the relationship between both the intelligence organisations, the problem area is the intelligence organisations of both India and Pakistan. And, may I say that I have said this to the Prime Minister also, that we have to. It is these people who do harm to each other. Now, if we want peace, we have to resolve the disputes and stop these two, very strongly, to be on a confrontationist course against each other. We must have peace. We must stop their involvement in each other's countries. Both have been doing it. So anyone who calls ISI a rogue, I oppose it because I know that RAW is equally a rogue, because they also do this. They do similar things in Pakistan.

Barkha: So would you suggest an intelligence-to-intelligence dialogue or a military-to-military dialogue?

General Musharraf: Yes, why not? Provided we are moving forward on the peace initiative of resolving the dispute.

Barkha: Do you believe we are moving in that direction? I will come back to Dawood Ibrahim, but do you believe that things are better today?

General Musharraf: No. They are not better today. I won't say they are better today.

Barkha: The MFN status for example?

General Musharraf: Now the MFN status. The cause of dispute remains. And these are again Kashmir, Sir Creek, Siachen. Maybe even water.

Barkha: And India would say terrorism.

General Musharraf: Okay, whatever you call it. But that cause is there. That cause of conflict between the two countries remains. And we are going on MFN status. I think it's not, it is artificial. It's not permanent. It is certainly superficial.

Barkha: So it could erupt any moment again?

General Musharraf: Possibility, yes. In the future. Because the cause of the conflict is there. They remain. So, therefore, I have always been saying, "Let us resolve these conflicts." And certainly, in principle, I am for good economic relations between India and Pakistan. Certainly I am. Because there is so much to gain by both. Although again, since you've spoken of MFN, we have to. Pakistan remains more conscious than India to safeguard our fledgling industries. Even India, let me