The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed on September 19, 1960, between India and Pakistan, has long been a contentious issue in India's geopolitical and domestic discourse. Brokered by the World Bank, the treaty was intended to equitably distribute the waters of the Indus River system between the two nations, which had been divided by the 1947 partition. However, the treaty's lopsided terms, its unilateral signing by India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru without taking even his Cabinet into confidence and its long-term implications, resulted in it compromising India's national interests, particularly those of its farmers. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's decision in April 2025 to place the IWT in abeyance marks a historic course correction, propelled by Pakistan's persistent support for cross-border terrorism and the treaty's skewed provisions.
The Circumstances
The partition of erstwhile Bharat in 1947 created two sovereign nations-India and Pakistan-and split the Indus River system, a vital lifeline for agriculture and livelihoods in the region. The six main rivers of the Indus basin-Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej-flowed through both countries, with their sources in India. This geographical reality placed India in the upstream position, giving it significant control over the rivers' flow. The partition disrupted the intricate canal systems built by the British, leading to immediate tensions over water sharing. In 1948, when the Standstill Agreement expired, India briefly halted water flow to Pakistan, underscoring the need for a formal agreement. Negotiations began in 1951, following a suggestion by David Lilienthal, former head of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, who proposed joint development of the Indus system with World Bank assistance. After nearly a decade of talks, mediated by the World Bank, the IWT was signed in 1960 by India's PM Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. The treaty allocated the waters of the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, with provisions for limited use of each other's rivers. While the agreement was then hailed as a diplomatic success, surviving three wars and decades of hostility, but its terms have increasingly been seen as detrimental to India's interests.
Nehru's Unilateral Decision
One of the most criticised aspects of the IWT is the manner in which it was signed. Nehru, driven by his vision of fostering peace and cooperation with Pakistan, signed the treaty without consulting India's Parliament or his own cabinet. The treaty was presented to Parliament only two months after its signing, and even then, it was subjected to a mere two-hour discussion, described as a "token" exercise. This lack of parliamentary scrutiny. Marked a betrayal of democratic principles, as it sidelined the voices of Indian stakeholders, particularly farmers in states like Punjab, Haryana, and Jammu and Kashmir, who relied heavily on the Indus waters. Nehru's unilateral approach is said to have been motivated by personal idealism rather than pragmatic statecraft. He reportedly believed the treaty would pave the way for broader India-Pakistan cooperation, a hope he later acknowledged as misguided. Nehru subsequently admitted to his secretary that the treaty brought no tangible benefits to India and was a mistake. This admission, coupled with the transfer of Rs 80 crore to Pakistan as part of the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement, can only be viewed as a financial and strategic capitulation, further undermining India's interests. Thus, Nehru encouraged Pakistan's 'blackmail and play victim' tactics, which went on to become a vile character trait of our neighbour in the years to come.
Clauses Skewed
The IWT's provisions have long been criticised for disproportionately favouring Pakistan, particularly at the expense of Indian farmers. The treaty allocates approximately 80% of the Indus system's waters to Pakistan, leaving India with just 20%. This allocation severely limits India's ability to utilise the waters of the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) for irrigation, a critical need for the agrarian states of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Haryana. While India is permitted to build run-of-river (RoR) hydroelectric projects on these rivers, the treaty imposes strict constraints on storage capacity, requiring Pakistan's consent for desilting operations to maintain reservoir functionality. Prime Minister Modi has highlighted a particularly egregious clause, alleging that Nehru agreed to Pakistan's demand to weld shut the desilting gate of one Indian dam, preventing maintenance and reducing its capacity-a decision that can aptly be described as "anti-farmer". The treaty's lack of an exit clause further complicates India's position, as unilateral abrogation is not legally permissible without consensus. The requirement for Pakistan's approval for desilting and other infrastructure activities has been seen as an infringement on India's sovereignty over its own resources. For instance, India's construction of the Kishanganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers faced objections from Pakistan, despite compliance with treaty provisions, leading to prolonged disputes mediated by the World Bank. These restrictions have hindered India's capability to meet the irrigation and hydropower needs of its farmers, exacerbating water scarcity in regions like Jammu and Kashmir, where the treaty permits only meagre water allocations for agriculture.
An Untenable Treaty
Pakistan's continued support for cross-border terrorism eventually became a major factor in India's decision to reconsider the IWT. Over the decades, Pakistan has kept unleashing terror attacks on Indian soil with attacks like the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2016 Uri attack. The tipping point came in April 2025, when a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, killed 26 civilians, compelling Prime Minister Modi to declare the treaty's suspension, stating that it would remain in abeyance until Pakistan "credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism." This stance echoes PM Modi's earlier remarks in 2016, following the Uri attack, when he declared, "blood and water cannot flow together." Pakistan's refusal to address India's concerns about terrorism, coupled with its objections to India's infrastructure projects, has rendered the IWT untenable for India. The treaty's suspension reflects a broader shift in India's foreign policy under PM Modi, prioritising national security and sovereignty over diplomatic concessions. Besides, the Modi government stands committed to protecting the interests of our farmers in the border states, who have long suffered due to the IWT.
A Course Correction
The suspension of the IWT in April 2025 marks a long-overdue course correction, aimed at reclaiming India's water resources for its farmers and addressing historical imbalances. Modi's government has emphasised redirecting water to water-scarce regions like Rajasthan and Gujarat through canal networks and interlinking river projects, such as the Ken-Betwa and Parvati-Kalisindh-Chambal initiatives. These projects aim to enhance irrigation and agricultural productivity, addressing the needs of millions of farmers who have been disadvantaged by the treaty's restrictive clauses. Post-suspension, India has begun desilting its dams to restore their capacity, a process previously hindered by the treaty's clauses. The government is also exploring ways to modify existing infrastructure or build new projects to optimise water use on the western rivers, without the obligation to share project details with Pakistan. By withholding hydrological data, such as flood warnings and river flow information, India aims to assert greater control over its water resources, though this could exacerbate tensions with Pakistan, particularly during the dry season when water scarcity is acute. The suspension also serves as a strategic signal to Pakistan, leveraging India's upstream position to pressure Islamabad into addressing terrorism.
Prime Minister Modi's decision to suspend the IWT in 2025, prompted by Pakistan's persistent support for terrorism, marks a bold step toward correcting these historical wrongs. By prioritising India's farmers and national security, the suspension opens the door to redirecting water resources to underserved regions and optimising infrastructure.
(The writer is a national spokesperson of the BJP and an author)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
