The Jan Suraaj, led by political strategist-turned-activist Prashant Kishor, made its electoral debut in the Bihar assembly elections with considerable fanfare but failed to translate its social media buzz into electoral success. The party's performance, while disappointing for its supporters, offers valuable insights into the challenges of building a political movement from scratch in India's complex electoral landscape.
The Numbers Tell a Sobering Story
The Jan Suraaj contested 238 seats across Bihar but failed to open its account, securing zero seats while garnering 3.5% of the total vote share. This performance was remarkably close to predictions made by Votevibe, which had forecast 0-2 seats and a 5.2% vote share for the fledgling party due to its limited organisational strength and electoral appeal. It secured 16.77 lakh votes, around 7,000 per seat. In by-polls on four seats in 2024, it had bagged a 10% vote share. It could get more than 10% votes in just eight seats, and anywhere from 5-10% in 31 seats.
The results were stark in their consistency. The Jan Suraaj candidates forfeited their deposits in 236 out of 238 contested seats, a humiliating outcome that reflects the party's inability to mobilise even a modest base of support in most constituencies. The party managed to finish as runner-up in only one seat and secured third place in 115 constituencies, demonstrating scattered pockets of influence but no concentrated strength anywhere in the state. Other smaller parties such as the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) continued to hold onto their 2020 seat tallies of five and one, respectively, weakening the Jan Suraaj's prospects of making a dent in their support base.
Pockets of Performance and the Spoiler Effect
Despite the overall poor showing, the party did demonstrate some electoral presence in select areas. The Jan Suraaj secured more than 5% of votes in 39 seats and crossed the 10,000-vote mark in 35 constituencies. However, only one candidate - in Marhaura - managed to poll more than 30,000 votes, highlighting the party's failure to create any strong local bastions.
On 18 seats it scored 10,000-15,000 votes, on 11 seats between 15,000 and 20,000 votes, on three seats 20,000 to 25,000 votes, on two seats 35,000 to 40,000 votes, and on one seat 58,000 votes, that, perhaps, too, because the NDA candidate's nomination was rejected. On its top four candidate seats, two had either the NDA or the Mhagathbandhan candidate's nomination being rejected, making the Jan Suraaj the default beneficiary.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Jan Suraaj's performance was its potential role as a spoiler in closely contested races. The party polled more votes than the victory margin in 34 seats, suggesting it may have influenced the final outcome in these constituencies. Analysis of these 34 seats reveals interesting patterns in candidate selection and vote distribution.
The party had fielded candidates from diverse social backgrounds in these crucial seats: six from the Muslim-Yadav (MY) coalition, 14 from upper castes, five from the Mallah community, two from Ravidas samaj, three from Dusadh samaj, one from Pasi samaj, and three from Kurmi/Kushwaha communities.
Impact on Alliance Politics
The victories on these 35 seats where the Jan Suraaj potentially played spoiler is revealing. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) won 19 of these seats, the Mahagathbandhan (MGB) secured 13, and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) won one each. On seven seats, the Jan Suraaj fielded candidates from the same caste as both Mahagathbandhan and NDA candidates, directly competing for the same vote banks.
Electoral analysis suggests that the Jan Suraaj drew votes primarily from the NDA in 20 seats, inadvertently helping the Mahagathbandhan win eight of these while merely denting the NDA's margin in the remaining 12. Conversely, the party appears to have cut into the Mahagathbandhan's vote share in 10 seats, helping the NDA secure a victory in seven and reducing the opposition alliance's winning margins in three. In four seats, the Jan Suraaj seemed to have attracted votes from both major alliances, with Mahagathbandhan winning two and the BSP and the AIMIM taking one each.
Why Jan Suraaj Failed to Make an Impact
Several factors contributed to the Jan Suraaj's electoral debacle. First and foremost was the complete absence of organisational infrastructure. Unlike established parties with decades of grassroots presence, the Jan Suraaj lacked booth-level workers, district networks, and mobilisation machinery essential for electoral success in India.
The party also suffered from a timing problem. Three years is simply too small a window to build a viable political alternative in a state as politically mature as Bihar. The comparison with the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) is instructive - AAP emerged from the anti-corruption movement and had years of grassroots activism before its electoral breakthrough. The Jan Suraaj attempted to fast-track this process without the underlying social movement with help of a professional network instead of party cadre.
Prashant Kishor's decision not to contest elections himself sent a negative signal. Many interpreted this as a lack of confidence in his own creation, raising questions about the seriousness of the political project. His much-publicised "padyatra" (foot march) across Bihar, while generating media attention, failed to translate into organisational building at the grassroots level.
The party's messaging also proved problematic. The slogan "arsh pe ya farsh pe" (from throne to ground) lacked the conviction and clarity needed to inspire voters. Moreover, persistent allegations that the Jan Suraaj was the "B-team" of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) damaged its credibility as an alternative force, particularly among opposition-leaning voters.
Organisational weaknesses extended to ticket distribution. Like the established parties it sought to replace, the Jan Suraaj fielded 43 candidates with criminal records as per an Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) study, undermining its claims of heralding clean politics. The absence of a manifesto, despite there being a professional team, suggested a lack of serious policy preparation. During television interviews, Kishor's perceived arrogance alienated potential supporters who might have been drawn to a more humble, grassroots-oriented approach.
Perhaps most tellingly, the JSP appeared to confuse social media metrics with electoral support. High viewership of videos and reels did not translate into votes at the polling booth, exposing the gap between online visibility and real-world political organisation. The Jan Suraaj was also seen as a one-man army without other prominent faces. His Brahmin antecedents also may have stopped Muslim-Yadav voters from flocking to his party in a caste-ridden society. On many seats, there were allegations that tickets were being sold - just like in established parties. The Jan Suraaj also faced rebellion in a few seats.
With both Mahagathbandhan and the NDA increasing their vote shares in 2025 compared to 2020, the Jan Suraaj gained votes at the expense of Others. However, it was not able to make a significant dent in the youth vote of Mahagathbandhan and the upper caste vote of the NDA, with voters adopting a cautious wait-and-watch approach. The Rs 10,000 cash income support for women also seems to have neutralised whatever traction the Jan Suraaj gained amongst the poor on issues of health and education.
Silver Linings and Future Possibilities
Despite the comprehensive defeat, all is not lost for the Jan Suraaj experiment. Bihar's political landscape does have space for a third alternative. The Janata Dal (United) (JD-U) faces an uncertain future in a post-Nitish Kumar era, whenever that arrives. Similarly, the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) is grappling with internal family feuds that could weaken Tejashwi Yadav's position in the long term.
The Jan Suraaj did succeed in raising important issues during the campaign and demonstrated that there is some appetite for fresh political voices in Bihar. If Prashant Kishor and his team learn from this electoral setback, build their ground-level presence, improve their grassroots organisation, and stay committed to the political project beyond electoral cycles, they could potentially carve out a meaningful space in Bihar's future political landscape.
The 2024 Bihar election may have been a false start for the Jan Suraaj, but whether it becomes a footnote in Bihar's political history or the foundation for a future force will depend entirely on how its leadership responds to this sobering reality check. And yes, PK needs to shrug off his arrogance.
(Amitabh Tiwari is a political strategist and commentator. In his earlier avatar, he was a corporate and investment banker)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
