The sudden but vicious Afghanistan-Pakistan border clashes have fuelled speculation that at the heart of the conflict lies US President Donald Trump's desire to return the Bagram military base to US control. Such speculation is anchored in the timing of the clashes. The initiative was taken by Pakistan when it bombed Afghanistan earlier this month. The bombings coincided with the visit of the acting Taliban foreign minister of Afghanistan to India. But some days before that, Trump had warned that "bad things" could happen if the Taliban refused to give back Bagram. This has given grist to the mill, given Trump's tight embrace of Pakistan and especially its Army Chief Field Marshall Asim Munir, something that till now was thought to have been driven by crypto deals, promises of rare earth mineral mining rights, and the necessity of containing China.
There are several reasons for the US to want Bagram back, which had been deserted in the thick of night in 2021 by the US forces stationed there, prior to America's departure from Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban. Bagram would give the US a foothold in Eurasia, from where they could monitor China, Iran, Russia, Central Asian states, as well as Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal.
Why It Works For Pak, Too
Such an arrangement would serve Pakistan no less. A rentier state, it is always on the lookout for carrying out such services. Bagram is one of the world's biggest air bases, situated in Parwan province and located some 60 km from Kabul. Initially built in the 1950s by the Soviets, it was occupied by the US when it displaced the Taliban following the 9/11 attacks. They expanded the base, which now has one of the most powerful runways, constructed of heavy concrete and steel, and permanent barracks. It was the largest US military hub during America's 20-year war in Afghanistan. If Americans took hold of the base again, it would need Pakistan for logistics and for keeping up extensive supply chains. This would earn Pakistan handsome revenue.
An American presence there would also enable the US to rein in the Taliban, which from Pakistan's perspective has gone rogue. India deepening its ties with the Taliban and upgrading its technical mission in Kabul to a full-fledged embassy adds to Pakistan's spectre of a two-front war. That is the reason it has gone to great lengths to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan (the recently concluded Saudi-Pakistan defence pact did not seem to be impacted in the recent Af-Pak border skirmishes). Added to that now is Iran's current overtures to the Taliban. As Pakistan has accelerated the deportations of Afghan refugees from its territory to Afghanistan, Iran has offered to take in thousands of Afghan workers as migrant labour. Anyway, a fragile ceasefire is in place now and, as is known, so far it has been maintained, thanks in no small measure to the intervention of Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
But Pakistan may not be alone in wanting the US back in Afghanistan. Members, loyalists, and sympathisers of the earlier US-backed Afghan government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, many of whom live outside Afghanistan now, and the predominantly Tajik National Resistance Front, are equally interested.
The Supporters In Afghanistan
Writing in The National Interest, Abdullah Khenjani, the head of the Political Bureau of the National Resistance Front, argued recently that "If Trump truly wants to return an American presence to the Bagram Air Base, he might consider strengthening these resistance groups". Khejnani said, "The National Resistance Front (NRF), an anti-Taliban resistance movement devoted to democratic principles, is composed mainly of former Afghan soldiers who fought alongside US and coalition forces against the Taliban and have continued the struggle even after America's withdrawal and the fall of the republican government."
A month later, the same publication published an article in which Afghan journalist and activist Natiq Malikzada argued, "If America's long-term safety at a base depends on security assistance from the surrounding communities, the Taliban are the wrong guarantor. Anti-Taliban networks are the ones with social capital there. As an added bonus, many of these networks are pro-democratic in their outlook, and fought alongside the United States against the Taliban during the 20-year conflict. Any durable arrangement near Bagram ought to start with them."
History May Repeat Itself
The National Front continues to represent Afghanistan officially in nearby Tajikistan from where India, Iran and Russia had once extended military and other supplies to the front battling the Taliban in the late 1990s, before 9/11 and the "war on terror" began. No doubt, this route from Tajikistan is also kept in mind in all the arguments made for the Trump administration to seize Bagram in coordination with those opposing the Taliban. Yet, these arguments seem to be made in some kind of wonderland.
Because, if taken seriously, such advice would only lead to history repeating itself with another round of warfare and bloodshed. This is exactly what happened in 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom against the first Taliban administration was launched. Officially ending in 2014, it led to what is often billed as America's "longest war", only to end with the return of the Taliban.
Moreover, a US return to Bagram this time will be far more difficult.
The Taliban have, of course, rejected all such proposals from President Trump, citing that Afghan "sovereignty" is paramount.
US Just Has A Bad Rep
Another reason is that unlike today, when the US had launched its first war on terror in 2001, it had much goodwill both in the region and around the world. It was overtly and covertly supported in the war by its current foes - Russia, China, Iran, the Central Asian countries, many of whom like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan even hosted US bases. Pakistan was an active participant in the war, and India, of course, extended non-military support. Now, China, Iran, and Russia are the very countries that the US wants to monitor from Bagram. While the Central Asian countries may not be opposed to a US footprint in the region, they have at least tactically made peace with the Taliban, engaging with it in a sustained manner. They want to avoid any chaos in the region, and, moreover, are still aligned strategically with Russia to pursue any policy inimical to it.
After supporting the US-backed government in Afghanistan for over 20 years, India, too, has come around to an understanding that Taliban rule in Afghanistan was a reality, and it is better to engage rather than oppose the group. Growing US-Pakistan bonhomie in the wake of Operation Sindoor as well as the engineered chaos in Bangladesh has added to Indian unease.
The Statement In Moscow
This opposition to a US presence in Bagram was most starkly reflected in the joint statement that emerged earlier this month from the Moscow Format of consultations. The statement called "unacceptable" the "attempts by countries to deploy their military infrastructure in Afghanistan and neighboring states, since this does not serve the interests of regional peace and stability", a thinly veiled reference to the US. It was signed by India, Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan.
Moreover, matters are complicated by the fact that some of Taliban's own cadres oppose President Trump's proposition. The matter had first surfaced earlier this year in April, when it was reported that an American C-17 aircraft had landed at the base, bringing military vehicles, equipment, and senior intelligence officials, including some from the Deputy Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The trip that followed President Trump's first cabinet meeting, where he said his administration was going to "keep Bagram ... not because of Afghanistan but because of China".
Secret Deal?
The Taliban leadership, or some of it, may actually be amenable to the idea of US presence if it could get them sanctions relief, legitimacy, and unfreeze its foreign reserves of some $9 billion, mostly in US banks. Moreover, sources point out that Trump's demand may actually be accommodated in the secret annexures to the Doha Accords signed in 2020 between the first Trump administration and the Taliban, which facilitated US departure from Afghanistan and the Taliban's return to it. The same sources also say that it is not unusual for the Taliban to reject claims of US control over Bagram. After all, it waged war against the Republican government and US troops precisely because they did not want any "foreign troops" on Afghan soil.
Hence, even if the Taliban leadership accommodated American presence at Bagram or even elsewhere in the country, its cadres and soldiers are most likely going to oppose it. As had happened earlier, the Americans would be targeted again, the cadres may turn on the Taliban leadership, and the country may once more be plunged into chaos. There are also fears that such a presence and divisions within the Taliban would further strengthen the ISIS-KP and other terror groups still present on Afghan soil as it would weaken the Taliban; it could even encourage its disgruntled cadres to join their ranks.
This time around, the US would be dependent solely on Pakistan, a player whose duplicity in the war on terror America has already experienced earlier.
Much will depend on the Taliban leadership and how it negotiates this challenge. Much will also depend on its regional partners and the assistance they are willing to provide. For the Taliban, Bagram may be the ultimate litmus test of their leadership.
(The author is a journalist and political analyst)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
