Earlier this week, as US President Donald Trump expressed his outright anger towards Israel - perhaps for the first time in such an explicit and public manner - Iran announced its subscription to a ceasefire agreement. Amidst the whole saga, while Trump expected to add another ceasefire to his kitty and Israel sought final blows against the Iranian military, Tehran preserved its theological and political systems that have governed the state since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
The current hold of the ceasefire is fragile. From an Israeli point of view, dragging the US into combat against Iran's nuclear programme was a significant victory. However, Trump also wanted to draw red lines and not expand the American role beyond the strikes, something he has propagated over the past many years to make sure Iran does not go nuclear.
Shaken Up
Contrarily, for Iran, the events of the past few months and Israel's application of outright military dominance over its skies may shake up and reshape the way in which the state's polity has functioned over the past 46 years. Even though Iranian retaliation, despite its meek nature, was able to dent Israel's perceived indestructible air defence shield, the long-term state of its power and deterrence, along with its military competence, stands exposed.
More than Israel's impunity in the air, installing an unchallenged air power supremacy - one that may be utilised at will, considering Iran's depleted air defence - it is the penetration on the ground by their intelligence that would raise urgent alarms within the system. For long, Israel has managed to build capacities within Iran's polity and military, mobilised during war to take out the crème of the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), intelligence, and defence leadership. As a response, Iran has reportedly arrested more than 700 people already, accusing them of colluding with the enemy. Three of them have already been executed.
How Power Is Maintained
The war was also marketed as a direct challenge to the Islamic Revolution's veracity and longevity. The seat of power for Shia Islam has had its share of internal crises and inflexion points over the years, ranging from protests led by women to consistent dissent by a largely young population. However, the regime has maintained its position of power utilising its own support base - not meagre in numbers - and suppressive tactics. The power centres have, on occasion, also allowed the easing of their own diktats to manage these pressures. Scholar Vali Nasr notes how hijab patrols by the state's moral police, known as the Gasht-e-Ershad (Guidance Patrol), have loosened their enforcement of mandatory hijab for women. Often, they have allowed the police to look the other way if they encounter such a situation in some parts, such as northern Tehran, a young, affluent area of the capital.
On a more political and military front, it is almost certain that the framework of the Ayatollah, the IRGC, and the elected representation of the government, currently under the moderate leadership of President Masoud Pezeshkian, may change for good. The Supreme Leader is already in his late 80s, and it is expected that succession plans for his replacement are in place. There was heavy debate a few years ago over his son Mojtaba Khamenei's eligibility as the next Supreme Leader; concerned voices back then had expressed unease over the idea of a nepotistic transfer of power rather than one underpinned by theology and consensus between the clerical leadership.
Choosing The Next Supreme Leader
Iran's Assembly of Experts, led by Mohavedi Kermani, who was also the Supreme Leader in the IRGC between 1992 and 2006, is tasked with leading the process of choosing a successor. The selection of Kermani, himself older than Khamenei at 93, arguably highlights that the oldest representative of the Revolution's ideology remains the most trustworthy entity for deciding any future course. Notably, the other name that had featured along with Mojtaba was that of Ebrahim Raisi, Iran's former conservative president who died in a helicopter crash in May 2024.
Other viewpoints abound, too. One such is the increased power of the IRGC with regard to that of the Ayatollah. Iran has had a long-running 'reformists vs. conservatives' discourse. It is also one of the few states in the Middle East that has some kind of democratic process and elections (albeit orchestrated under the auspices of the Supreme Leader) - ironically, along with Israel. An outcome of this juxtaposition was the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 nations beginning in 2006, culminating into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in 2015. Its demise in 2018, when the US under Trump unilaterally exited the deal, emboldened the anti-negotiations ecosystem, the outcome of which was reflected in Raisi's election as president in 2021.
Whatever the speculations, the natural next step for Iranian power centres would now likely be to hunker down, re-strategise and rebuild conventional power, cleanse their compromised internal security dynamics, and rally public opinion around the fervour of nationalism. The unanswered question is, given what the regime has suffered over the last few weeks, will the intrinsic circles of power in Iran hand the next phase of the country's history to the same players, or will they demand a fresh take on power, politics and people?
(Kabir Taneja is Deputy Director and Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
