Vote Accelerators And Seat Shapers: How Alliances Win Or Lose

In Indian politics, stitching alliances is often as critical and complex as winning elections. The arithmetic of seat-sharing, the chemistry of leadership, and the psychology of voter transfer play a role in determining whether an alliance succeeds or stumbles.

One of the most illustrative examples of alliance management comes from the 2001 Tamil Nadu Assembly elections, when the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) quit the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government and joined hands with J Jayalalithaa's AIADMK. In a masterstroke, Jayalalithaa offered PMK the Chief Minister's post in Puducherry, but only for half a term. In return, PMK agreed to contest just 10 of the 30 seats in Puducherry, while AIADMK took the lion's share of 20.

The expectation was that PMK would transfer its Vanniyar caste votes to the alliance, boosting AIADMK's prospects in Tamil Nadu. But Jayalalithaa had a deeper strategy: she gave PMK a paltry seat share in Tamil Nadu, even conceding winnable seats to her own party. The result? AIADMK won 132 of the 141 seats it contested - a 94 per cent strike rate. PMK, meanwhile, won just 18 seats in Tamil Nadu and none in Puducherry.

Jayalalithaa's approach was clear - as the chief ministerial face, AIADMK was the vote accelerator, converting alliance votes into seats. She perfected the art of offering allies less viable seats, ensuring her party remained dominant.

Congress: A Tale Of Uneven Bargains

Contrast this with the Congress party's experience in Tamil Nadu. Despite having a 15 per cent vote share, including its offshoot Trinamool Congress, Congress was rarely allowed to contest more than 48 of 234 seats in alliances with DMK. Even in 2021, Congress contested 25 seats and won 18, a 72 per cent strike rate, the best among DMK allies.

Yet, in Bihar, where Congress has historically polled just 8-9 per cent of the votes, it has consistently secured 41 to 70 seats in alliances. In 2020, it contested 70 seats and won 19, a 27 per cent strike rate, the lowest among Mahagathbandhan partners.

In Uttar Pradesh (2017), Congress contested 117 seats in alliance with Samajwadi Party (SP) and won just 7, a strike rate of six per cent, compared to SP's 15 per cent.

This generosity from regional parties north of the Vindhyas contrasts sharply with the DMK's more calculated seat-sharing, despite Congress performing better in Tamil Nadu.

NDA's Strategic Seat Allocation

The NDA, particularly the BJP, has historically been more aggressive in managing allies. In the 2020 Bihar Assembly elections, the combined vote share of Hindustani Awam Morcha (HAM), Rashtriya Lok Samta Party (RLSP), and Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) was 8.32 per cent, similar to Congress. Yet, these parties got just 41 seats in the NDA, 20 fewer than Congress in the Mahagathbandhan.

This reflects the BJP's belief that it is the vote accelerator, and allies are beneficiaries. The BJP's strike rate in Bihar 2010 was 89 per cent, winning 91 of 102 seats, despite not having a pan-Bihar leader like Nitish Kumar.

In Maharashtra 2024, BJP contested 149 seats and won 132, an 89 per cent strike rate, outperforming its allies despite a smaller seat share.

In Kerala 2021, the LDF expanded its base by winning over Muslim and Christian communities, securing 99 of 140 seats with a 45.43 per cent vote share, breaking the state's anti-incumbency trend.

The Larger Pie: Suboptimal Or Strategic?

Alliances crossing the 45 per cent vote share threshold are often seen as suboptimal, as not all partners may get a fair seat share. But smart management and candidate selection can yield high strike rates and shared success.

The BJP has used its junior position in alliances to maximise conversion. In Maharashtra pre-2014, it contested fewer seats than Shiv Sena but often ended up with comparable seat tallies. In 2010 Bihar, despite Nitish Kumar's dominance, BJP had a higher strike rate.

Lessons For Tejashwi Yadav

As Bihar's opposition leader, Tejashwi Yadav must study these patterns. The Congress's inflated seat share, despite poor performance, and the NDA's strategic allocation offer valuable lessons.

The key lies in understanding who the vote accelerator is, and ensuring that seat allocation reflects electoral efficiency, not just legacy or goodwill.

In the end, alliance management is both art and arithmetic. The ability to make the most of the pie, while keeping all players in it, is what separates smart strategists from sentimental allies.

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