Increase in JD(S) votes hurts Congress more than it hurts BJP in North and Central Karnataka. File
In the 2018 Karnataka election, the incumbent Siddaramaiah-led Congress party lost power, but its performance in terms of vote share was "historic". For the first time in nearly four decades, an incumbent political party had increased its vote share.
The Congress's vote share increased from 36.59% in 2013 to 38.14% in 2018. However, in terms of seats won - the Congress saw a major decline - from 122 seats in 2013 to just 80. It revealed how skewed the vote share-to-seat arithmetic is in the state and exposed a major dilemma for Congress.
To win a clear majority in 2023, Congress not only has to increase its own vote share, but it also needs the Janata Dal (Secular) to weaken in some places and go stronger in a few seats. The explanation is complex, but evident from past data.
While Karnataka is considered a three-way fight between the Congress, BJP, and the regional party JD(S), a close analysis of vote share data reveals that a majority of the 224 assembly segments are split into either a Congress versus BJP battle or a Congress versus JD(S) battle. There are some three-way fight seats, but there are very few BJP versus JD(S) seats.
*A party is a significant player in a constituency when its candidate polls more than 20% of the votes. For 2018, the vote share of JD(S) and BSP are considered together because they were in a pre-poll alliance; for 2013, the vote shares of BJP are added with their break-away factions of KJP and BSRCP. BQ-Prime's analysis considers elections only after 2008 when delimitation took place and constituencies were redrawn.
Direct Fights
The Congress and BJP went head-to-head in 110 out of the 222 constituencies that voted in April 2018. (Elections in two constituencies in Bengaluru City were deferred and were eventually contested by a Congress-JD(S) alliance). In these constituencies, Congress and BJP candidates polled more than 80% of the votes combined - leaving the JD(S) as a distant third.
The JD(S) is not a significant player in North and Coastal Karnataka; an overwhelming majority of their votes come from Southern Karnataka.
In 29 constituencies - primarily in the Old Mysore Region in Southern Karnataka, which is the BJP's weak link in the state - the electoral battle was between the Congress and JD(S). In just nine constituencies, the contest is between the BJP and JD(S), the Congress being a marginal player.
*Head-to-head is defined here as two parties getting more than 80% of the votes in a constituency. For 2018, the vote share of JD(S) and BSP are considered together because they were in an alliance; for 2013, the vote shares of BJP are added with their break-away factions of KJP and BSRCP.
The broad takeaways are:
- While the JD(S) vote share has remained near consistent (between 18-20% since 2008), these votes are being obtained from fewer and fewer seats. They are increasing their votes in their strongholds (South Karnataka) while losing votes in the rest of the state.
- Nearly half the seats feature a direct fight between Congress and BJP, with the JD(S) as a minor figure.
- An increase in JD(S) votes hurts the Congress more than it hurts the BJP in North and Central Karnataka. So, for the Congress to get a full majority, it not only has to rely on anti-incumbency sentiments to take away BJP votes, but also has to eat into JD(S) vote shares.
The JD(S) Damper For Congress
This doesn't mean the JD(S) can't throw a spanner in the works for the Congress in constituencies outside Karnataka's Old Mysore Region.
Like most elections, the results can be tight - coming down to a few thousand votes. By taking even a 5% vote share in these seats, the JD(S) can determine the fate of Congress and BJP candidates in many constituencies. The JD(S) is a kingmaker not only for the state government but in many constituencies.
An analysis of all election results in Congress vs BJP constituencies since 2008 shows that JD(S) polled more votes than the margin of loss for candidates of major parties in 61 constituencies. In these constituencies, JD(S) polled anywhere between 1% to 14% of the total votes. A majority of these seats are in North and Central Karnataka, where JD(S) has little presence.
*Only constituencies where JD(S) polled less than 15% of the votes are considered. For 2018, the vote share of JD(S) and BSP are considered together because they were in an alliance; for 2013, the vote share of BJP is added with their break-away factions of KJP and BSRCP.
While the numbers show that BJP loses more seats by narrower margins than the Congress, political experience shows that the presence of the JD(S) candidate helps the BJP more than the Congress. That is, the BJP is not losing narrowly because their votes were cut - but rather, Congress' victory margin is lowered because JD(S) takes their votes.
This is because of the JD(S) strategy of candidate selection in constituencies where they do not have a base. In these places, JD(S) waits for the Congress and BJP to announce their candidates. The announcement usually causes some sort of local dissidence. JD(S), which is nearly always the last to announce candidates, offers tickets to these disgruntled Congress or BJP leaders.
The BJP, a cadre-based party, is less likely to see disgruntled leaders leave. Moreover, its core voters are likely to vote on ideology, and not for their preferred local leader. Much more likely than not, the disgruntled leaders or local community leaders who join the JD(S) seek votes from the same base as the Congress - religious minorities and certain marginalised castes.
A stark example of this is Badami constituency in Central Karnataka. In 2018, the constituency was the site of a high-profile clash between incumbent Chief Minister Siddaramaiah from the Congress and the influential BJP leader B Sriramulu. Siddaramaiah scraped through by a margin of just 1,696 votes.
What is forgotten in this clash is the role of the JD(S). The party had fielded a leader who had quit the Congress just a few months before the election. The former Congress leader had clout and even a few disgruntled Congress workers on his side. He managed to get 24,484 votes in the constituency. The Congress' victory margin reduced from nearly 15,000 in 2013 to just 1,696 - and it can be argued that the JD(S) was a significant factor.
Another instance is the Kungol constituency in Dharwad where the BJP lost by a margin of just 634 votes in 2018.
In the 2013 election, the Congress's victory margin was over 20,000 votes - primarily due to a split in the BJP, and anti-incumbency. The Congress, BJP and JD(S) had then put up Lingayat candidates, hoping to win over the numerically sizeable community.
In 2018, while the Congress and BJP fielded Lingayat candidates, JD(S) fielded a Muslim community leader. JD(S) polled 6,280 votes here, which are more likely to have come from the Congress's vote base rather than the BJP. If the JD(S) had not fielded a candidate, the Congress would have likely won by a much higher margin.
Frenemies
The complexities of Karnataka's politics are perhaps best explained by the dilemma the Congress faces. The JD(S) may be cutting into Congress votes in North and Central Karnataka. But, in South Karnataka, the presence of JD(S) significantly helps the Congress. If JD(S) declines in this region, the BJP benefits greatly, as it can build a strong base in a region where it is currently the weakest.
This is apparent from the results of the Lok Sabha elections held a year after the Karnataka state polls. The JD(S)'s vote share reduces to just 10% in the state - and their votes come only from Southern Karnataka.
*In 2019, INC and JD(S) fought the general election as pre-poll alliance partners. For the 2018 Karnataka election, the vote share of JD(S) and BSP are considered together because they were in an alliance; for 2013, the vote shares of BJP are added with their break-away factions of KJP and BSRCP.
The JD(S), being a regional party, does not have the spread to win many parliamentary seats. In Lok Sabha elections, many JD(S) supporters do not vote for their candidate as they know it is unlikely for the regional party to win a parliamentary seat.
But these voters are more likely to vote for the BJP than the Congress in Lok Sabha elections. This is not just the "Modi effect". It's been happening before Narendra Modi was ever in the national political landscape. As seen before, the Congress-JD(S) are rivals in 29 assembly constituencies in South Karnataka - and this political rivalry has seeped into grassroots JD(S) workers who prefer voting for the BJP over their 'archenemy' Congress.
This was apparent in 2019 when the JD(S) and Congress, who were in a coalition government, formed a pre-poll alliance for the Lok Sabha elections. Despite the alliance, JD(S) voters did not vote for the Congress candidate and instead voted for the BJP candidate. The BJP got a remarkable 25 out of 28 seats in Karnataka.
In nine parliamentary constituencies that usually see a three-way contest, the Congress's vote share reduced by 12.5 percentage points and the JD(S) vote share reduced by 7.76 percentage points in 2019. Many Congress workers refused to vote for the JD(S) candidate, and many JD(S) workers refused to vote for the Congress.
This is all to say that if the JD(S) weakens in Southern Karnataka, then the voters are more likely to vote for the BJP than Congress. Without the JD(S), the BJP, which has never won a majority on its own in Karnataka, could become the dominant party in the state.
Mohit M Rao is an independent journalist based out of Bengaluru.