- Pakistan aimed to mediate US-Iran peace talks but Iran rejected US terms on nuclear disarmament
- US Vice President JD Vance led talks in Islamabad, which ended without agreement or further rounds
- Pakistan vows to keep facilitating dialogue but faces limits without backing from US or Iran
April 11 was supposed to be Pakistan's big moment. It was to play the 'peacemaker' between the United States and Iran, to bring bitter rivals together and end a war that has killed over 5,000 people, caused billions of dollars in damages to public and energy infrastructure, and scared oil prices past US$110 a barrel, leading to soaring fuel prices and runaway inflation fears.
Successful peace talks, coming after it acted as a US-Iran backchannel to help broker a 14-day ceasefire, would have lifted Islamabad to the role of a key regional player, a leg-up over India.
But 21 hours later those dreams were shattered.
JD Vance stood grim-faced and disapproving; Iran, the US Vice President - handpicked by Tehran to deal with in these talks because he was seen as a 'moderate' White House voice - had rejected a "final and best offer" to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes and re-open the Strait of Hormuz to all oil tanker and cargo ship traffic.
JD Vance at the Serena Hotel in Pakistan's Islamabad for the peace talks (File)
"We've made very clear what our red lines are," he said at the Serena Hotel, the venue of the talks, "(and) what things we're willing to accommodate them on. They have chosen not to accept our terms."
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The Iranians - who said the Americans presented "untrustworthy" proposals - flew back home teasing sly reminders about the 2015 Barack Obama-era JCPOA nuclear deal.
So what now for Pakistan?
Pak Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stressed his country will continue to "facilitate engagement and dialogue between the US and Iran". But there is no Round 2 of talks scheduled, and even if there were, there is no guarantee Pak will be involved.
And, even if they are, there is no guarantee Donald Trump will send his top-notch negotiators back to the table to try and bury decades of distrust and talk peace.
British broadcaster BBC indicated Vance continues to have 'some conversations', though it is unclear whether these are with the Pakistanis or the Iranians, or another party altogether.
So that suggests Islamabad might still be in the mix.
Guests at the Serena were todl vacate their rooms for the peace talks (File)
But experts cited by The New York Times think otherwise.
Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, a professor at Jerusalem's Hebrew University said, "Pak cannot overcome this on short notice or coerce both parties".
And Pak's former national security advisor Moeed Yusuf, said: "China may be important to nudge Iran in the next phase…", which is a significant possibility given Beijing carries more global heft and is a majority purchase of Iranian crude oil, which gives it leverage Pak did not have.
Pak's options in US-Iran peacemaker role
The first option is for Islamabad could stay the course but downshift risk, i.e., scale down the level of diplomatic engagement to behind-closed-door sessions involving either one of the US or Iran.
A slow-and-steady approach, it would allow for consensus-building without drama, without the pressure of news headlines, and, crucially, without tensions flaring from US-Iran reps in the same room.
The emphasis would be on technical details - how to de-escalate the Hormuz situation, points of law surrounding Iran's claim to collect tolls, nuclear programme caps, etc.
Option 2 could be to try and cobble together a regional response, not aimed at resolving the war but containing and managing spillovers, such as energy supply crises and shipping bottlenecks.
The groundwork is there.
In early March, soon after the war broke out, Dar flew to Beijing to meet his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. This was while Islamabad was still pushing its role as the primary peacemaker. The two released a five-part peace initiative that never took off.
But that, or its framework, could be dusted off and re-cast into something more usable.
What that could do (and this is critical from a Pak perspective) is focus on keeping oil shipping lanes clear of military action, though that has maybe become harder with Trump ordering a Hormuz blockade of his own.
This means Pak will retain a voice in the larger peace process but allow it to resolve the war by, potentially, defusing the economic tension it has kicked up. Framing it as a regional energy and security problem also means Islamabad can try and wriggle free from the US-Iran binary.
The flip side is, of course, having to balance China against the US.
The final option is likely the least possible one, for it involves leaning into these failed talks.
The argument would be that despite the failure Islamabad remains the only viable non-belligerent actor in this conflict that can host successful peace talks, though such a stance can certainly be challenged if Gulf states - the UAE, for example, or Egypt - step up to the table.
And India?
The logical choice for a peacemaker, many will feel, given the country's economic importance, its history of non-alignment, and close ties with both the US and Iran.
But the Indian government has made it clear it will not be a go-between in this case, framing Pak's involvement as that of a 'broker' rather than a true peacemaker and choosing instead to work diplomatically with each side in an effort to resolve this war.
On the war Delhi said "de-escalation, dialogue, and diplomacy" are key to ending any conflict, while it also called for unimpeded freedom of navigation through the Hormuz and urged all sides to be mindful of the safety of civilian populations, critical given the large Indian diaspora.
