- MiG-21 fleet to retire from Indian Air Force in September after six decades of service
- About 300 of 800 to 1,000 MiG-21s were lost in accidents during their operational history
- MiG-21 was initially a high-altitude interceptor but roles expanded beyond original design
The Indian Air Force (IAF) is preparing to retire its fleet of Russian-origin MiG-21 fighter jets in September. The aircraft, which played a key role in India's military campaigns, including the 1971 war against Pakistan, has been both celebrated as a formidable war machine and stigmatised as the "flying coffin" due to its high accident rate.
With just two months until the final flight on September 19, historian and Indian Air Force expert Anchit Gupta joined NDTV to provide a detailed perspective on the MiG-21's legacy, dissecting its triumphs, challenges, and the reasons behind its controversial nickname.
The MiG-21's Entry Into India
Introduced to the IAF in 1963, the MiG-21 was initially acquired for a specific role: as a high-altitude interceptor designed to counter aircraft like the American U-2 spy plane. Mr Gupta, whose father flew the MiG-21 during his service, recalled the aircraft's distinct roar as a morning alarm at airbases.
"The MiG-21 is extremely close to my heart. And I saw my father fly it. We used to live at the bases. That was our alarm in the morning to wake up. I remember 1986 Operation Brasstacks. My father was in Bhuj, going into the trenches and counting the aircraft coming back to the base. So there is an emotion to MiG-21 for all of us," Mr Gupta told NDTV.
MiG-21F-13, designated Type 74 from 1963
The IAF operated around 800 to 1,000 MiG-21s over six decades, a scale unmatched by most air forces. Of these, approximately 300 were lost in accidents.
"That is a very sobering statistic. But there's no time lapse to that statistic, and therefore, people struggle to make sense of it. I think the answer very much lies in what we did with the aircraft. The aircraft was acquired for a very, very limited role, to be honest. It was a high-altitude interceptor. The original design of the MIG was to intercept the U-2," Mr Gupta said.
The aircraft's role evolved far beyond its original design, encompassing ground attack, fighter reconnaissance, air defence, and, critically, jet training -- a role, Mr Gupta said, it was never intended to fulfil.
"Flying Coffin" Label: A Misnomer?
The MiG-21's reputation as a "flying coffin" stems from its high crash rate. Mr Gupta challenged this label, arguing that the aircraft's accident record is less about inherent flaws and more about systemic issues in pilot training and aircraft acquisition.
"It's very much linked to our procurement. Our combat squadron strength went from eight squadrons in 1947 to nearly 40 squadrons in 1965. Now you have sanctioned it, how do you acquire? And so we were huffing and puffing to acquire more aircraft, and MiG-21 came out of nowhere with the USSR saying, 'Listen, I'll do technology transfer, you manufacture it locally.' It was something that really fell into our laps," Mr Gupta told NDTV.
The MiG-21
When the MiG-21 entered service, only the IAF's most experienced pilots were assigned to it due to its demanding flight characteristics. The aircraft's small size, limited cockpit visibility, and high landing speed of over 300 km/h made it unforgiving, particularly for novices.
The MiG-21U trainer variant was ill-suited for training. The IAF relied on subsonic trainers like the Kiran and Iskra, which were inadequate for preparing pilots for the MiG-21's supersonic performance. The gap between basic trainers and the MiG-21 widened as the fleet expanded from eight squadrons in 1963 to nearly half the IAF's strength by the 1980s.
"The biggest difference is speed. The speed at which you are performing the manoeuvres, the actions that you are doing, dramatically changes. That is the biggest difference, whether it is mid-air manoeuvres, whether it is landing or whether it is taking off,' Mr Gupta said.
The "Human Error" Factor
The IAF's attribution of many MiG-21 crashes to "human error" has often been misunderstood, he added. Mr Gupta explained that human error, in aviation terms, does not necessarily blame the pilot.
"Air Force doesn't mean 'human error' in the way people interpret it," Mr Gupta said. "In the simplest form it means that when you've done an accident investigation, you've realised that the accident happened because the pilot in control made a mistake. Now that mistake has a cause behind it. That cause could be training. You have not trained the pilot appropriately. That cause could be inexperience. "That cause could be psychological, that cause could be disorientation, tons of causes behind it."
For young pilots transitioning from subsonic trainers to the MiG-21, the lack of adequate preparation was a significant contributor. The stigma of "human error" often compounds the pain for families, who perceive it as blaming the pilot rather than acknowledging systemic issues.
"I haven't met a single MiG-21 pilot who said he didn't love the jet," Mr Gupta said.
"It's a big regret. They love the aircraft, but they love their colleagues more. And every life lost is a story that remains etched on the psyche forever. I think the human element is actually made worse off by how we categorise the loss. To the family or to a civilian, it sounds like we're blaming the pilot, and then the emotion comes out. The guy had barely started flying. This is an unforgiving aircraft, the aircraft has problems, and now you have the audacity to blame the pilot and say 'human error,'" he added.
The MiG-21's Combat Record
Despite its challenges, the MiG-21's combat record is formidable. During the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the MiG-21FL (Type 77) earned the moniker "runway buster" for its ground attack role, with 240 units manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The aircraft was instrumental in India's victory.
In 1999, during the Kargil conflict, MiG-21s performed admirably, though the war also saw the loss of Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja in a crash. Post-Kargil, Squadron Leader Prashant Kumar Bundela
shot down a Pakistani Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft. In 2019, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, flying a MiG-21 Bison, engaged Pakistani aircraft during the Balakot operation, downing an F-16 despite facing advanced adversaries like AMRAAM-armed F-16s and JF-17s.
The MiG-21 Bison
The Bison variant, introduced in the early 2000s, remains contemporary, equipped with an Israeli jammer, Russian R-77 and R-73 missiles, a partial glass cockpit, and a helmet-mounted sight. Its short scramble time makes it ideal for forward bases like Srinagar, where it outperformed alternatives like the MiG-29.
"There's a very interesting point around the 2019 incident. You know, there's a lens people wear which says, 'Why was the MiG-21 there? Why didn't we have the MiG-29? Why didn't we have the Su-30?' People don't know that there was no other aircraft capable of being at Srinagar at that time other than the MiG-21. It has the shortest scramble time to date," Mr Gupta said.
The MiG-29
"We have replaced it with a MiG-29 in Srinagar. I hate to say this, but it is not ideal for Srinagar, even today. A MiG-21 today is more ideal than the units we have there because you don't have a gyro, you have a single engine, light it, off you go, and therefore even today in the last 8 to 10 years or longer, MIG-21 has been our Operational Readiness Platform (ORP) guardian. It is the jet that scrambles. You put small detachments across all our forward bases. Imagine with the MIG-21 going away, who's supposed to fill that shoe? Who is supposed to fill that shoe? It's supposed to be the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). It is supposed to be the LCA. I hope it does," he added.
