President Donald Trump's decision to pull the United States out of a key Asian maritime security initiative earlier this month comes at a sensitive moment for the Indo-Pacific.
At a time when piracy, armed robbery, and maritime smuggling are once again rising across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), Washington is stepping back from a framework where its intelligence and operational support had strengthened regional security for more than a decade.
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was among 66 international organisations the US announced it would withdraw from on January 7. The exit raises questions not only about maritime stability, but also about the future of coast guard and naval coordination in a region where chokepoints, shipping routes, and smuggling corridors are already under strain.
Implications for the Indian Ocean Region
The timing of the withdrawal is critical. The IOR has recorded a renewed surge in piracy, armed robbery and maritime crime. According to the Indian Navy's Information Fusion Centre, the region logged 207 incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in 2025, up from 168 incidents five years earlier. The rise is visible not only in absolute numbers but also in the geographic spread of incidents, with hotspots emerging near key shipping lanes.
More worrying is the spike in maritime smuggling. In 2021, the IOR saw 757 cases of narcotics and contraband smuggling via sea routes. By 2025, this had climbed to 1,156 incidents, underscoring how criminal networks have expanded operations in the absence of uniform enforcement capacity across littoral states.
Against this backdrop, the US withdrawal leaves a visible gap in shared awareness, coordinated responses, and maritime intelligence dissemination.
US Role in ReCAAP
The United States joined ReCAAP in 2014 under President Barack Obama, becoming the framework's 20th member. Though its financial contribution was modest - around $50,000 annually, roughly half of India's average yearly contribution - its strategic input was disproportionately significant.
For more than a decade, the US provided:
* Maritime intelligence, including satellite and surveillance inputs.
* Operational expertise in counter-piracy missions.
* Participation in capacity building programmes, including multi-country maritime security and law enforcement training.
These contributions strengthened interoperability among member states and helped create standardised reporting and response practices across Asia's maritime zones.
With Washington now stepping back, regional navies and coast guards lose a key source of intelligence that previously enabled quicker detection, shared alerts, and coordinated interdiction operations.
What Is ReCAAP?
Established in 2004, ReCAAP is a government-to-government, non-legally binding maritime cooperation framework with 21 member countries, including India, China, Australia, Bangladesh, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the UK-and until now-the United States.
Its framework promotes:
* Voluntary cooperation
* Information sharing
* Requests for assistance in detection, pursuit and investigation
* Capacity building through joint training and exercises
* Protective measures aligned with International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards
All of this functions under the umbrella of UNCLOS or United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea principles.
At the core of the arrangement is the Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in Singapore, which reviews reports, analyses emerging threats, issues alerts to member states, and maintains a common operational picture for the region. The ISC is currently headed by VD Chafekar, a former Additional Director General of the Indian Coast Guard.
With the US pulling out, the ISC loses a participant that provided both situational awareness and operational perspectives unmatched by most regional navies.
What Comes Next?
The immediate impact will be felt in early warning and intelligence-sharing. In the medium term, the withdrawal may push Asian countries to rely more heavily on their own surveillance networks, or to deepen cooperation with other major players such as India, Japan, or Australia.
