Explained: Why India, Pak Never Target Each Other's Nuclear Installations

"Attacking nuclear installations should be a taboo," says Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, Austria, the global nuclear guardian or watchdog, capturing a growing global concern as civilian nuclear facilities face unprecedented risks in modern conflicts.

Across the world, that taboo is increasingly under strain. Nuclear power plants and installations, once considered off limits even in wartime, are now being drawn into the arc of conflict. From the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in Ukraine to facilities in Iran such as Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, the spectre of attack or damage to nuclear infrastructure has triggered alarm among experts and policymakers alike. There have also been concerns around the Bushehr Nuclear Plant in Iran and Barakah Atomic Reactors in the United Arab Emirates, reflecting a wider anxiety that civilian nuclear energy infrastructure is no longer immune from strategic targeting.

The pattern has a history. Israel famously targeted nuclear installations in Iraq and Syria in earlier decades. More recently, the United States and Israel have struck multiple nuclear-related sites in Iran and even used bunker buster bombs. These developments have introduced a dangerous new dimension to global security.

Civilian nuclear facilities, designed for energy and research, now risk becoming nodes of confrontation. The implications are vast because any damage to such facilities carries the risk of radiation release that does not respect borders.

Grossi underscores that the concern is real and immediate. He says attacks on nuclear facilities worry the agency deeply and that the IAEA does not merely raise alarms but acts on the ground. Its experts are deployed in sensitive areas such as Ukraine to prevent accidents and contain risks. At the same time, he stresses that there exists a body of international law indicating that nuclear facilities should not be attacked and that this principle must be upheld.

This evolving global landscape makes the case of India and Pakistan particularly striking.

The two countries are hostile nuclear-armed neighbours with a long history of conflict. They have fought multiple wars and remain adversarial on several fronts with no diplomatic talks for a while. Most recently, they were engaged in a four-day military confrontation known as Operation Sindoor in 2025. Yet, even in moments of sharp tension and active hostilities, there has been one area of restraint that has held firm. Neither India nor Pakistan has targeted the other's nuclear installations.

This restraint is not accidental. It is rooted in a formal bilateral agreement that stands as one of the most durable confidence-building measures in the fragile South Asian region.

India and Pakistan are not signatories to the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, they are bound by the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, signed on December 31, 1988. The agreement, associated with the leadership of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, came into force in January 1991. Its core commitment is clear. Both sides pledge that they will not undertake, encourage, or participate in any action aimed at causing damage to or destruction of nuclear installations in the other country.

One of the most significant operational elements of this agreement is the annual exchange of lists of nuclear installations. Every year on January 1, India and Pakistan simultaneously exchange these lists through diplomatic channels in New Delhi and Islamabad. This practice began in 1992 and has continued without interruption. In 2026, the two countries completed the 35th consecutive exchange of such lists.

These lists cover civilian nuclear facilities, including power reactors, research facilities, fuel fabrication units, and other listed atomic installations. The lists are shared with sufficient clarity for each side to identify and avoid these installations in any conflict scenario. This mechanism has built predictability and trust in an otherwise fraught relationship.

Former Ambassador Mr D B Venkatesh Varma, member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), New Delhi, captures its significance succinctly. "On nuclear non-attack, this Indo-Pak agreement is unique in the world," he says, underlining how rare such a commitment is in the global nuclear order.

Former Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin, who has represented India at the United Nations and worked at the IAEA, reinforces this assessment. "Bilaterally that is unique," he says.

Akbaruddin places the agreement in a broader global context. He points out that the world is witnessing dangerous trends with nuclear installations being placed at risk, whether directly or indirectly. Against this backdrop, the India-Pakistan arrangement stands out as an exception that has worked across decades.

The agreement held even during periods of intense crisis; the commitment has held. The agreement obliges both countries to refrain from the use of force against listed nuclear facilities and ensures that the annual exchange of information reinforces that commitment in a practical way.

Akbaruddin recalls that during his time in Islamabad in the late 1990s, he personally participated in the annual exchange. At the time it seemed routine, but in hindsight its significance is clear. It has created a stable and reliable mechanism that prevents escalation into the nuclear domain.

Even during Operation Sindoor, when tensions were high and military action was underway, this principle of non-targeting of nuclear installations remained intact.

Akbaruddin sees a potential lesson for the world. He suggests that such bilateral arrangements could, in principle, be expanded into wider frameworks. Nuclear risks are not confined by geography. Radiation does not recognise borders. What happens in one country can affect entire regions.

He argues that a global approach may be necessary, one that builds on existing examples of restraint. The India-Pakistan agreement, he says, shows that even adversaries can find common ground when the stakes are high enough.

Grossi offers a cautious but supportive perspective. While he acknowledges the value of arrangements that enhance predictability and reduce risks, he cautions that they cannot be automatically transplanted across different regions. Each region has its own dynamics, security considerations, and technological landscape.

However, he reiterates a fundamental point. There is an established norm and legal framework that nuclear facilities should not be attacked. Upholding this norm is essential for global security.

Grossi points out that the IAEA plays an active role in mitigating risks through monitoring, mediation, and on-ground presence in conflict zones. This technical role is critical in ensuring that incidents do not escalate into nuclear accidents. IAEA teams are stationed in the Zaporizhzhya atomic reactors even as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues, with each harassing the other by occasionally attacking the nearly $40 billion facility with an installed capacity of 6000 megawatts.

Yet, the broader concern remains. As more countries turn to nuclear energy for reasons of energy security and technological advancement, the vulnerability of civilian nuclear infrastructure becomes a pressing issue.

Ironically, while global trends point to growing nuclear capacity, they also highlight growing risks.

In this uncertain environment, the India-Pakistan model offers a rare note of stability.

Despite being described as difficult neighbors, the two countries have demonstrated that sustained restraint is possible. The annual exchange of lists, the clear non-attack commitment, and the absence of violations of the nuclear non-aggression agreement over more than three decades all point to a functioning system.

As India looks to expand its nuclear energy capacity significantly in the coming years to 100 gigawatts of atomic power, such safeguards gain even greater importance. They reduce the perception of risk, ease concerns of investors and insurers, and ensure that critical infrastructure is not undermined by conflict.

Akbaruddin also highlights a broader point. He notes that in their conduct, India and Pakistan have avoided targeting civilian centres as well. While acknowledging the wider complexities of their relationship, he points to the nuclear domain as an area where positive lessons can be drawn.

In a world where nuclear facilities are increasingly at risk, the idea of restraint takes on renewed importance.

The India-Pakistan agreement does not resolve all issues between the two countries. It does not erase conflict or eliminate tensions. But it demonstrates that even in adversarial relationships, specific and focused agreements can deliver lasting stability.

As nuclear risks rise globally, that lesson may prove invaluable.

The taboo that Grossi speaks of is under pressure. Yet in South Asia, two nuclear-armed rivals continue to uphold it, offering a reminder that restraint, once institutionalised, can endure even in the most difficult circumstances.