Opinion | Why China's 'Assured Retaliation' Nuclear Doctrine Has Sent Others Into A Spiral

On September 3, 2025, after flexing its diplomatic muscle at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Tianjin, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was ready to flex its military muscle at Tiananmen Square, Beijing. With much pomp and pageantry, it displayed its impressive military armada to the world on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of Japan's surrender in World War II, which China refers to as Victory Day. The Chang'an street was buzzing with the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) 45 parade formations, including foot units, armoured equipment echelons, and aerial components. Most notably, for the first time, China displayed its complete nuclear triad architecture, highlighting its land, sea, and air-based nuclear delivery options. Although Chinese capabilities are aimed at deterring the United States, it has the potential to start a South Asian nuclear arms race.

Chinese Modernisation Pathways and Ambiguities

China subscribes to the No First Use nuclear policy, whereby it pledged not to be the first country to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in the nuclear-weapon-free zones. Developing advanced delivery systems, such as those displayed at the military parade, enables China to establish a minimum credible deterrence against the continental United States through assured retaliation capabilities. Other measures that China is pursuing to achieve this include increasing the number of warheads, building newer missile silos, improving communications infrastructure, and partly moving a part of its nuclear inventory to the launch-on-warning posture (LOW). Under LOW, it mates some of its warheads and delivery systems and keeps them on an alert posture for launch before an adversary destroys China's nuclear infrastructure in the first strike.

Its investment in long-range delivery systems, such as the DF-41s, the DF-31s, and the DF-61s, is understandably directed towards the continental United States. However, its continuous investment in medium and intermediate-range delivery systems, like the medium-range DF-21 variant, dual-swap capable intermediate-ranged DF-26, and hypersonic glide vehicle capable, longer-ranged DF-27, which are primarily aimed at regional contingencies in the Western Pacific, sends South Asia into a destabilising security spiral and deepens the structural security dilemma between regional powers. Furthermore, its investment in the submarine-launched JL-2 and JL-3 missiles, and the operationalisation of air legs with the existing H-6 N and incoming H-20 stealth aircraft, complicates the regional security matrix even more. China reportedly already has 500-600 warheads, with the count possibly reaching 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035.

It is criminal to look at the delivery systems and assume that China's capabilities are directed towards its adversaries in the region. But it creates deliberate nuclear ambiguity by abandoning its minimum deterrent strategy, developing dual-capable delivery systems, commingling conventional and nuclear forces, ensuring limited transparency on command-control, putting partial force on increased alert levels, rapid introduction of re-entry vehicles and hypersonic technologies, avoiding sustained institutional dialogues with regional actors, and probably seeking the lower yield nuclear warhead capabilities. This ambiguity spirals regional insecurity, sending South Asia into an accelerated arms race and deepening the nuclear security dilemma.

The South Asian Arms Race

It is an open secret that India's nuclear programme has always been based on deterring China. However, like China, India also maintains a no-first-use nuclear doctrine. It has continued to improve its delivery systems while trying to operationalise its nascent nuclear triad. India primarily relies on its short-range Prithvi series and medium, intermediate, and long-range Agni series of ballistic missiles for establishing deterrence. Furthermore, with Agni V, India has reportedly developed MIRVed technology and has also recently successfully fired Agni-Premium from a rail-based mobile launcher system. Similarly, the introduction of 36 Rafales is a compensation for the phasing out of the old Mirage 2000H Vajra, which were most likely responsible for India's aerial nuclear delivery alongside Jaguars. Regarding its sea legs, India has two active SSBNs and two more under construction, equipped with intercontinental-range missiles armed with MIRV technology. It maintains a stockpile of approximately 170 warheads.

There is no denying the fact that Pakistan's nuclear strategy is primarily aimed at deterring India from launching a full-scale conventional war, acting as an equaliser against its superior conventional military capabilities. It has deliberately maintained an ambiguous nuclear doctrine, including through refusal to endorse or reject a no-first-use policy. It maintains three ranges of delivery systems, broadly dividing them into strategic, operational, and tactical. Its newer medium-range Shaheen III land-based ICBM is capable of covering most parts of the Indian mainland. Notably, the United States has raised concerns over Pakistan's alleged pursuit of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile capable delivery system. It maintains 170 warheads, but some authoritative scholars estimate it to grow to 200.

Reasons for Arms Race in the Region

Beijing's pursuit of dual-use swap-capable delivery systems, rapid silo construction, investment in advanced re-entry vehicles, and a potential shift toward a launch-on-warning posture collectively signal a move away from its earlier minimalist deterrence posture. While these developments might be aimed at increasing the survivability of its arsenal against a potential American first strike, the acquisition of such capabilities heightens regional anxieties. India sees these Chinese advances as a direct threat. It has responded by upgrading its nuclear triad through investments in MIRVed technologies, diversifying its land-based delivery systems, introducing Rafale aircraft, and expanding its SSBN fleet. Although intended as defensive and deterrence measures, these developments are perceived by Pakistan as widening the strategic gap, thereby intensifying its sense of vulnerability and potentially carrying destabilising repercussions in the event of a conventional conflict. In response, Islamabad's continued refusal to adopt a No First Use (NFU) policy, combined with its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons such as the Nasr and its reported interest in longer-ranged systems, effectively lowers the threshold for nuclear use and heightens the risks of miscalculation. This posture not only reinforces crisis instability but also fuels India's hedging behaviour, thereby sustaining and deepening the regional nuclear spiral.

Most importantly, this ambiguity, coupled with the absence of sustained nuclear dialogues or confidence-building measures, magnifies worst-case assumptions, sending the region into a nuclear arms race.

(Suyash Desai is a Political Scientist and a Non-Resident Fellow with Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author