The debate surrounding the United States' decision to revert from "Indo-Pacific Command" to "Pacific Command" has generated considerable speculation. Some view it as signalling a diminished American commitment to the Indo-Pacific, while others dismiss it as little more than a bureaucratic adjustment.
Both interpretations miss the larger point.
The decision is perhaps best understood within the broader context of the United States' own search for strategic and national identity. President Donald Trump and the Make America Great Again movement have consistently sought to reconnect America with what they regard as the country's post-Second World War golden age-a period when the United States projected unparalleled military strength, economic confidence and global leadership. Other symbolic initiatives, including proposals to revive the title "Department of War" and restore historical military base names, reflect a wider effort to recover an earlier understanding of America's purpose in the world.
Whether one agrees with this project or not is secondary. Great powers periodically revisit their history in order to shape their future. America is doing so today.
Rather than becoming absorbed in debating the title of an American military command, India and Japan should draw a different conclusion. If Washington is redefining its strategic narrative, the time has come for the original architects of the Indo-Pacific idea to reaffirm and refresh their own.
The modern Indo-Pacific concept did not originate in Washington.
It was articulated most powerfully by the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose vision of the "confluence of the two seas" brought together the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a single strategic and civilizational space. Prime Minister Narendra Modi embraced and developed that vision, giving it practical expression through initiatives ranging from maritime cooperation to the Quad.
As the Indo-Pacific gained international prominence, however, its meaning gradually narrowed. Increasingly, it came to be understood primarily through the prism of military alliances, strategic competition and the challenge posed by China's rise. These issues remain important, but they were never intended to define the Indo-Pacific in its entirety.
The original vision was broader and deeper.
The Indo-Pacific is not simply a geopolitical theatre. It is one of the world's oldest interconnected civilizational spaces. For over two millennia, the seas linking India, Southeast Asia, China and Japan carried not only goods but also ideas, religions, technologies, artistic traditions and systems of knowledge. Buddhism travelled from India across Asia. Hindu cultural influences shaped kingdoms throughout Southeast Asia. Chinese civilisation enriched the region through commerce, scholarship, innovation and maritime exchange. Together, these interactions created an enduring Asian community long before the emergence of modern nation states.
This shared heritage remains one of Asia's greatest strategic assets.
No meaningful civilizational conception of the Indo-Pacific can overlook China. Contemporary strategic differences are real and, in some cases, profound. They must be managed with clarity and realism. Yet China has also been an integral participant in the historical exchanges that shaped Asia for centuries. Recognising this heritage does not require overlooking present-day disagreements. Rather, it acknowledges that a durable regional order cannot be built solely around rivalry. Strategic competition may persist, but it need not become the organising principle of the Indo-Pacific.
Today, both America and Europe are engaged in searching debates about their own civilizational identity. Questions of history, culture, national purpose and strategic direction increasingly shape both domestic politics and foreign policy. Such introspection is neither unusual nor undesirable. Great powers periodically redefine themselves.
India and Japan should undertake a similar exercise-but in a characteristically Asian way.
Rather than constructing a civilizational narrative based on exclusion, they should build one based on connection. The Indo-Pacific should be understood as a region linked by centuries of interaction and capable of accommodating diversity while respecting national sovereignty. Such an approach would restore Southeast Asia to its rightful place at the heart of the Indo-Pacific conversation-not as an arena of great-power competition, but as the historic bridge between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
A renewed Indo-Pacific vision should therefore rest on multiple pillars. Security cooperation will remain indispensable. Economic integration must continue. Technological collaboration will become increasingly important. But these should be reinforced by deeper cooperation in education, maritime heritage, cultural exchanges, Buddhist and historical networks, scientific research, digital connectivity and sustainable development. Civilization should not replace strategy; it should enrich it.
The ongoing visit of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to New Delhi offers an ideal opportunity to begin this conversation. While defence, technology and economic cooperation have rightly dominated the bilateral agenda, the two leaders should also consider how India and Japan can jointly restore the broader intellectual and civilizational foundations of the Indo-Pacific concept they did so much to shape.
The subsequent G20 Summit in Florida could provide an international platform for advancing this complementary vision. India and Japan need not distance themselves from the United States. On the contrary, they should continue working closely with Washington in promoting regional stability. But they should also ensure that the Indo-Pacific is not defined solely by American strategic vocabulary or by the changing priorities of successive administrations.
America will continue to redefine its place in the world according to its own history and political choices. That is both natural and inevitable. India and Japan should do the same. Their task, however, is not to recreate an earlier age but to shape a new one-an Indo-Pacific that is strategically secure, economically dynamic and civilizationally confident.
The debate over Pacific Command will eventually fade. The opportunity to renew the Indo-Pacific idea should not. The concept was born in Asia. Its next chapter should also be written in Asia.
(Milinda Moragoda is a former Sri Lankan Cabinet Minister, diplomat, and Founder, Pathfinder Foundation)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
