Opinion | A '45%' Problem: The Troubling Reason Trump Is Avoiding Another Strike On Iran

On April 21, President Trump unilaterally extended the ceasefire with Iran just a few hours before the deadline was supposed to end. This is the second time that Trump announced a ceasefire this month, the first one being on April 7, when he, like this time, unilaterally announced a 15-day ceasefire mere 90 minutes before the deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz was to expire.

Irrespective of the rationale presented by the US behind the announcement of a ceasefire each time, it is quite clear that the US wants an early end to the war and possibly on terms that it can dictate. Is it because the US has realised that Iran cannot be defeated militarily? Or, is it because the US does not have the wherewithal to fight Iran in an attritional battle for a prolonged period? To find possible answers to these, there is a need to examine two critical issues in this: the combat stamina and options for further military operations in this war by the US and Israel.

Combat Stamina

All inputs indicate that the US is looking at an early off-ramp in the war. In the current circumstances, if Iran were to unconditionally agree to open the Strait of Hormuz, the US is likely to take it as a win immediately and wind up its war commitment. Among other reasons, the primary reason is that the US is finding it difficult to replenish the essential stock of weaponry required to fight a prolonged war.

For the kind of war that the US is fighting in Iran, it essentially requires two types of munitions to fight. One is the stand-off ground attack munitions, which require aircraft, ships, artillery and missile systems to engage the targets. These munitions allow platforms to launch at a long, standoff distance from adversary air defences. The US has already engaged about 13,000 targets over the first 39 days before the ceasefire took effect on April 7. The second category is the air and missile defence system. It consists of systems like the Patriot missiles, the THAAD system, etc.

As per a recent report by CNN, the US has depleted nearly half of its key missile stockpiles in the Iran war, and replacing these systems will take three to five years, even with expanded production contracts already signed. It adds that the US has expended at least:

• 45% of its Precision Strike Missiles
• Roughly 50% of its THAAD interceptors
• Nearly 50% of its Patriot air defence missiles
• The U.S. has also used around 30% of its Tomahawk stockpile
• Over 20% of its long-range JASSM and SM-3/SM-6 missiles.

Ground Attack Munitions

There are three primary munitions in this category that the US has used. First among these is the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), which is a long-range missile fired from sea at ground targets. As per estimates, the US Navy has expended more than 1,000 TLAMs so far in the Iran war. This could account for nearly all available Tomahawks in the region, assuming two guided missile submarines (SSGNs) are deployed in the war theatre, which can carry up to 154 TLAM each, along with other destroyers and cruises that can typically carry around 10-50 TLAMs. The scheduled production of TLAMs in 2026 falls grossly short of the replenishment requirements, and despite commitment by the defence industry to scale up production to 1,000 per year, the earliest replenishment can arrive only in 2027-28. In fact, Japan has been reportedly told that its deliveries of 400 Tomahawks may be delayed because of the Iran war. There is another significant limiting factor to this: most warships and submarines need to go back to their home bases to replenish the TLAMs, which involves time delays.

The second munition is the Joint Air-to-Air surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), a stealth munition, air-launched and long-range. In the current conflict, more than 1,000 JASSMs have been used, delivered mainly through the B-52 bombers. However, against a reported inventory of more than 3,000 missiles and a production of over 500 in a year, this missile may not be a limiting factor in operations.

The third munition in this category is the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), which is launched by field artillery units - Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) - and has a range of around 500 kilometres. As per reports, most of the PrSM inventory has been expended. The inventory is also limited, given that it's a relatively new system with deliveries starting only in 2023. However, Lockheed Martin has scaled up its PrSM production, with an annual target of 400 units and some scope of further increase, if required. Also, in the absence of PrSMs, a shorter-range version, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), could be used, which is adequate in inventory but has shorter ranges (up to 300 kilometres).

Other munitions required to engage ground targets are various kinds of bombs and rockets, which are adequately available and easily replaceable with alternate munitions in case a particular variety is in short supply.

The Air and Missile Defence System

The success of the military campaign of the US and Israel depends not only on the suppression and destruction of Iran's military and economic capabilities but also on the ability to intercept and stop everything that Iran fires at them. With a success rate of interception around 95%, it was expected that the ballistic missile threat from Iran would be neutralised in two stages: destruction of missile silos and launchers in Iran by air campaign and successful interception of missiles fired by Iran by the air defence system. Key to the second part was the strong, technologically strong, layered and highly lethal air and missile defence shield. This shield was premised on the availability of some critical missiles.

The first among these is the Patriot missile, which is used to intercept and target aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. The version being used in the war is the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile with upgraded rockets and guidance technology. For any incoming missile from Iran, two to four interceptors are fired. As the war has progressed, Iran has used advanced missiles with hypersonic glide technology as well as missiles that disperse cluster munitions well before reaching the terminal phase, which has meant that more than the usual numbers of Patriot missiles had to be fired to intercept incoming missiles. As a result, most of the American bases in the Gulf (except the UAE) have run out of interceptors. With a production rate of six to eight missiles a month - or almost 100 annually - this missile is fast becoming one of the biggest limiting factors in continuing the war. Despite assurances by Lockheed Martin to ramp up production to 600 now and up to 2,000 annually by 2030, it is unlikely the replenishment rate can match the expenditure rate. There were reports that the US is contemplating shifting some Patriot missiles from Japan and Korea to augment the inventory, which would create huge gaps in the defensive architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

The next important munition is the Terminal High Altitude Areas Defence (THAAD), which is ground-launched against ballistic missiles, with a longer range and higher intercept altitudes than the Patriot. There are only eight THAAD batteries globally. With two in the Indo-Pacific region and two hosted by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the US has only four other batteries globally. Each battery has six launchers with eight interceptors each, totalling up to 48 missiles in each battery. Plus, each battery has one AN/TPY-2 radar. With such limited numbers, the fact that almost 150 were fired during the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 against its annual production capability of only 96, this missile, too, has become critical. Estimates suggest that the US has expended its THAAD missiles almost completely in the region. The destruction of three AN/TPY-2 radars, which are virtually irreplaceable, adds to the conundrum. Although Lockheed Martin has assured to ramp up annual production to 400, with no expected deliveries in 2026, the deficiency of the THAAD system could blow a big hole in the US-Israel air defence.

Further Military Options

Much against what the US claims, its military options in the war are severely eroded. A continuation of the stand-off military campaign by air and missiles has not achieved the desired effect in 39 days. On the other hand, missile strikes by Iran into US bases in the Gulf region and its oil and gas fields, and cities and ports in Israel, have inflicted unacceptable damage. Plus, in a renewed campaign, the probability of more Iranian missiles hitting targets in Israel and the Gulf is higher, given the depleted American inventories of interceptors pitted against better and more lethal Iranian missiles.

The next option is a ground offensive. A number of analysts have clearly concluded that a ground offensive is unlikely to succeed against Iran, given its geographical advantages, fortified positions and close proximity to possible launch locations from its mainland. Owing to its formidable mountain ranges that virtually form a wall to its North, West and South, Iran is often called 'Fortress Iran'.

To counter the naval blockade, there was some talk about launching operations on the Kharg Island as well as the three islands in the Strait of Hormuz - Qeshm, Hormuz Island, and Larak. These are the gateways or 'toll gate' of the Strait of Hormuz, and anyone who controls them has significant leverage over keeping the Strait open or closed. With very strong fortifications, close proximity to Iran's coastline and lack of natural cover, any sustained operations on it too are likely to be met with stiff resistance.

America Is Running Out Of Options

With depleting inventories and diminishing support back home, the US faces tough options in the war. It is no surprise, therefore, that President Trump has opted for a unilateral declaration of ceasefire twice now. The large number of high-ranking officers being retired in the US, too, is a clear indication that there is a huge mismatch between what the Pentagon thinks can be done and what the political leadership wants to achieve. Iran, on the other hand, is not backing down, sensing victory.

Iran continues to enforce control over transit through the Strait of Hormuz. It has also published a detailed map of targets that it could engage in the Gulf region and Israel if its energy infrastructure is targeted. It has threatened to cut undersea cables that are the backbone of high-speed data connectivity in the region and around. Plus, the Houthis are threatening to shut down Bab-al-Mandeb in the Red Sea, through which 12% of global trade transits. A recent report by NBC News gives details of the extensive damage suffered by the US bases in the Gulf region due to Iranian strikes.

America's options are, therefore, limited for any kind of recommencement of hostilities. An early off-ramp through a neatly created narrative is the best way out. Else, a prolonged conflict and a blocked Strait of Hormuz could end in the biggest global economic crisis ever. 

(The author is a retired Army officer and a senior research consultant at Chintan Research Foundation)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author