Pakistan's reported deployment of nearly 250 Chinese-made SH-15 wheeled self-propelled howitzers along sectors facing India is less a standalone military development than another marker of the deepening strategic convergence between Beijing and Islamabad. If accurate, the deployment reflects a broader pattern that has gathered pace over the last decade: Pakistan's determined effort to modernise its conventional military capabilities through Chinese technology, financing, and industrial cooperation, while China increasingly treats Pakistan as both a strategic partner and a laboratory for the operational validation of its defence systems.
The SH-15, the export version of China's PCL-181 155mm/52-calibre wheeled self-propelled howitzer, represents a significant qualitative improvement in Pakistan's artillery arm. Islamabad reportedly contracted for around 236 systems from China's NORINCO in 2019, with deliveries beginning in 2022 and continuing into 2023. The agreement reportedly included technology transfer provisions that enable local assembly at Heavy Industries Taxila, suggesting that Pakistan's objective extends beyond procurement to the gradual development of indigenous sustainment and production capacity. Reports indicating that approximately 250 systems have now been deployed imply that multiple artillery regiments have already been equipped.
Why The SH-15 Is A Major Upgrade
Operationally, the SH-15 offers Pakistan greater mobility and responsiveness than many of its legacy artillery systems. Mounted on a 6x6 Shaanxi armoured truck chassis, the system combines strategic mobility with the ability to execute rapid "shoot-and-scoot" operations, thereby reducing vulnerability to counter-battery fire. Firing NATO-standard 155 mm ammunition, it reportedly achieves conventional ranges of 30-40 kilometres, while extended-range projectiles can reach beyond 50 kilometres. Automated fire-control systems, hydraulic stabilisation, compatibility with guided munitions, and a relatively high rate of fire provide Pakistan with a more agile and survivable long-range fires capability.
Reports suggest that these systems have been positioned across strategically sensitive sectors, including Gujranwala, Sialkot and Jalalpur Jattan, areas that overlook the Shakargarh Bulge and remain central to India's operational planning in the western theatre. Additional deployments have reportedly been observed in northern Punjab and along sectors of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) facing the Line of Control. Some assessments further indicate that the SH-15 saw operational employment during the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis following India's Operation Sindoor, providing Pakistan with an opportunity to test its newest artillery capabilities under combat conditions.
From India's perspective, the deployment is important not because it fundamentally alters the military balance but because it incrementally strengthens Pakistan's conventional deterrent. The combination of greater mobility, longer engagement ranges, and improved precision complicates Indian operational planning by enhancing Pakistan's ability to conduct counter-battery operations, threaten logistical nodes, and sustain stand-off fires across multiple sectors. Integrated with Pakistan's growing inventory of rocket artillery and precision-strike systems, the SH-15 contributes to a more capable conventional force that could compress decision-making timelines during periods of crisis and increase the risks of escalation through miscalculation.
It's Not Just About The Guns
More significantly, the deployment must be understood within the larger trajectory of China-Pakistan defence cooperation. Over the past decade, China has emerged as Pakistan's overwhelmingly dominant supplier of military hardware, accounting for roughly three-quarters of Pakistan's major arms imports, according to various estimates. Yet, the relationship has evolved far beyond a traditional buyer-seller arrangement. It increasingly rests upon technology transfer, licensed production, industrial collaboration, regular joint exercises, and expanding operational interoperability across all three services.
This transformation is evident across domains. In the air, the JF-17 Thunder programme has matured into one of the most extensive examples of Sino-Pakistani defence co-production, complemented by the induction of J-10CE fighters, advanced air-to-air missiles such as the PL-15, armed unmanned aerial systems, and layered air defence systems, including the HQ-9/P and LY-80. At sea, the acquisition of Type 054A/P frigates and the ambitious Hangor-class submarine programme point towards a long-term restructuring of Pakistan's naval capabilities. On land, Chinese-origin VT-4 tanks, SH-15 artillery systems, missiles, helicopters, and armoured vehicles have steadily replaced ageing Western equipment.
Beijing's New Test Lab
For Beijing, this partnership serves multiple strategic purposes. Pakistan offers China a dependable geopolitical partner on India's western flank, an expanding market for its defence industry, greater influence in the northern Indian Ocean through projects linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and, increasingly, valuable operational feedback from real-world military contingencies. Reports that Chinese-origin systems employed during the 2025 India-Pakistan confrontation generated useful combat data underline an aspect of the relationship that is often overlooked: Pakistan has become an important platform through which Chinese military technologies are tested and refined under operational conditions.
For Pakistan, the benefits are equally clear. Chinese equipment offers relatively affordable modernisation, favourable financing arrangements, and reduced dependence on increasingly uncertain Western suppliers. The availability of technology transfer and local production further strengthens Pakistan's defence industrial base, even though sustaining a large inventory of sophisticated systems will continue to impose significant financial and logistical burdens.
For India, the implications extend beyond the induction of a single artillery system. The challenge remains one of managing simultaneous military competition with both China and Pakistan. The prospect of sustained pressure across the northern and western fronts inevitably complicates force allocation, procurement priorities, and operational readiness.
What India Should Do
New Delhi's response has thus combined diplomatic restraint with continued emphasis on military preparedness. Official statements have reiterated India's determination to safeguard its national interests while underscoring that cross-border terrorism remains the central source of instability. At the same time, India has accelerated the implementation of its long-delayed Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan.
The induction of the K9 Vajra-T tracked self-propelled howitzer continues, with follow-on acquisitions expected to substantially expand fleet strength for both western and northern theatres. Indigenous capability is also advancing through the ATAGS programme, with more than 300 guns contracted and operational induction expected to begin around 2027. The Dhanush programme remains in production, while the M777 ultra-light howitzer provides specialised capability for mountain formations. Alongside artillery platforms, India is investing in extended-range Pinaka rocket systems, counter-battery radars, surveillance assets, precision-guided munitions, and increasingly networked command-and-control systems that seek to integrate sensors and shooters more effectively.
Nevertheless, familiar structural challenges persist. Procurement delays, the need to fill longstanding artillery shortages, adaptation for diverse terrain ranging from deserts to high-altitude environments, and the integration of new systems into a modern C4ISR architecture continue to shape India's force modernisation agenda. The strategic imperative is not merely acquiring more guns but ensuring that surveillance, targeting, logistics, and command systems evolve in parallel.
The reported SH-15 deployment represents another step in the steady consolidation of the China-Pakistan partnership and Pakistan's broader effort to strengthen its conventional military capabilities. For India, the development reinforces an already familiar reality: sustaining credible deterrence in an increasingly contested regional security environment will depend not on reacting to individual acquisitions but on maintaining the momentum of indigenous modernisation, strengthening network-centric warfare capabilities, and preserving readiness across an enduring two-front challenge.
(Harsh V Pant is Vice President for Studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
