Peace in the Middle East has always been a function of the role that external powers have wielded, most profoundly that of the US. Once again, the Gaza peace plan enforced by a Board of Peace (BoP) has the US writ large over it. Except this time, it is more of an unpredictable US president looming large, as opposed to a predictable US foreign policy doctrine which can be sustained. The BoP's executive structure effectively places Donald Trump as its chair, vested with sweeping powers. The jury is still out on how effective such an arrangement will be. Critics argue that with a hard deadline of 2027, the BoP is unlikely to usher in a transition that is both effective and sustainable. Others contend that in a historically and culturally fraught conflict such as Gaza, especially in the aftermath of a devastating war between Israel and Hamas, an overarching and externally imposed framework may be essential to resolving the conflict and enforcing peace.
India is among several countries invited by Trump to join the proposed BoP. While 22 nations have already signed on as members, India's decision to pause and think strategically before committing to a quasi-international body may be prudent. Although the BoP charter describes it as an international organisation, there appears to be a broad but tacit consensus that it does not fully meet that definition.
The "pay-to-stay" provision, which requires a contribution of $1 billion for inclusion in the BoP, is perhaps its most problematic feature, raising fundamental questions about legitimacy versus urgency, particularly for countries that place a premium on the UN Charter-based international order. Nevertheless, the temptation for India to join the BoP may be strong for several reasons, foremost among them timing. India-US relations are currently experiencing a winter of sorts: a fraught trade deal remains under negotiation, the Quad leaders' summit under India's chairship has been postponed, and India continues to face some of the highest tariff burdens globally.
Structurally, it can be argued that this could also be India's moment to step up on global governance, especially against the backdrop of New Delhi's long-standing call for reform of the UN Security Council. Another factor that may strongly nudge India toward joining the BoP is its deep stakes in the Middle East, ranging from a large and vulnerable diaspora to robust bilateral relationships that often override fractured regional politics, as well as the broader promise that linking the Middle East with the Indo-Pacific holds for the future of the Global South.
The arguments against India joining the BoP largely stem from the lack of clarity surrounding the body itself. While the efforts behind the BoP flows from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 of November 2025 which created it to ensure the implementation of the second phase of the Gaza peace plan. In principle, the Trump presidency's plan for ushering peace in Gaza rides both on urgency and legitimacy, with the former eclipsing the latter. Questions persist about the BoP's future relevance, the absence of any explicit reference to Gaza in its charter, and the sweeping authority vested in the President of the United States and the possibility that this body could extend its mandate in the future to other conflicts of the world. Additionally, ambiguity surrounding the BoP's sunset clause, the proposed conclusion in 2027, may also weigh heavily on India's calculus. Finally, two unanswered questions loom large in the current scenario. First, if the BoP were to be extended beyond 2027 given that two years appear insufficient to stabilise and reconstruct Gaza it would inevitably raise questions about future leadership, especially in the period after Trump's tenure ends in 2028. Second, the optics of joining the BoP may be less than ideal for India as the body already includes countries such as Pakistan and Turkey, while notable Global South powers such as China, South Africa, and Brazil remain outside its membership.
New Delhi should be in no hurry to take this call as there will be long term implications of the choices it would be making at this juncture. India's future strategic autonomy in the Middle East will be contingent on the decision it makes.
(Harsh V Pant is Vice President, Observer Research foundation, New Delhi. Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director and Fellow, Americas, at ORF.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
