Two developments in Bangladesh this August call for some attention, even as neither projects an immediate strategic consequence. A Bangladeshi government committee reportedly confirmed a draft agreement to negotiate the purchase of Chinese J-10CE fighters, per August 31 reports. In the same period, Bangladesh's foreign ministry expressed interest in joining the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan on August 7, stating that it views the pact "positively". As stated, neither of these statements influences the security architecture of the Indian subcontinent in the immediate period. The first remains a draft agreement rather than a conclusive defence deal, whereas the second is an expression of interest. And broadly, these events occur in the context of Bangladesh's broader foreign policy principle: friendship towards all, hostility towards none. That said, amid tense India-Bangladesh ties, the developments together exemplify Dhaka's deepening defence ties with China, willingness to open military links with Pakistan, and consideration of a broader security framework that extends beyond the Indian subcontinent. Not to forget, the last month also saw the abrupt stalling of Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's planned - but not 'confirmed' - visit to India.
None of this means that Bangladesh has picked sides. Nonetheless, it suggests that a country that has historically avoided military blocs is possibly testing how far it can extend that caution without abandoning it.
The China Deal
The existing deal, reportedly put together by a Bangladeshi negotiating committee, covers up to twenty J-10 CE fighter jets, attack helicopters, and other platforms estimated at 2.2-2.23 billion USD; the same deal was under discussion back in October 2025. The funding and delivery terms remain unconfirmed, as of writing. Bangladeshi officials have been explicit about their interest in the Chinese jets - the J-10 CE is considerably cheaper than European fighter jets, and Pakistan's claim that a J-10 CE brought down an Indian Rafale during May 2025, a claim that remains disputed by India, has been cited as a factor in their potential procurement. The defence deal with China itself holds little relevance in this case, since Beijing has remained Dhaka's principal military supplier, providing aircraft, naval vessels, tanks, missile systems, and other equipment for two decades. As such, the significance of this proposed purchase lies less in the identity of the supplier and more in the strategic role of the aircraft itself.
In drawing lessons from the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan, it would be reductive to state that the J-10C model purportedly performed better than a Rafale in combat. The four-day war demonstrated the cruciality of an integrated kill chain involving airborne early warning and control aircraft, electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, datalinks, ground-based systems, and long-range weapons, making the aircraft a component of the larger system.
In that context, Pakistan's use of the J-10CE acquired combat credibility. For years, Chinese military platforms were largely viewed through the lens of their price value, availability, and political accessibility rather than their operational performance. This opening of its defence market can also be evidenced by the fact that Uzbekistan, on August 28, became the second foreign country, after Pakistan, to operate China's export model J-10 CE aircraft as part of the country's Independence Day celebrations.
As a result, Bangladesh's plan to acquire the aircraft reflects the J-10 CE's rising commercial value, largely shaped by the demonstration effect of its operational performance in the India-Pakistan conflict. In this sense, Islamabad became a crucial intermediary between the Chinese defence system and its new potential customers. This development crucially runs parallel to the recovery of defence ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh after decades of estrangement. The improvement in ties is reflected through an increase in direct contacts between Pakistan's ISI and Bangladesh's DGFI, discussions around defence cooperation, including the possible sale of the jointly produced JF-17. The reset began after the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government in 2024, after which the interim Bangladeshi leadership moved towards thawing their relationship with Pakistan, which had been essentially frozen since 1971.
Dhaka's Interest In The Mecca Pact
Following the meeting between the member states of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, the establishment of a secretariat in Riyadh was announced, as well as the appointment of the first secretary-general from Pakistan. While the details of the pact remain under wraps, the discussions on August 31 reportedly covered interoperability of the militaries, joint drills, defence industrial cooperation - including research, joint production, and counter-terrorism coordination. Pakistani officials confirmed that any request would be considered "in consultation" with other member states. While the pact brings together a complementary set of capabilities, it still lacks a shared threat perception among its founding members. Currently, Saudi Arabia's immediate threats come from Iran and Yemen-based actors; Turkey's include Israel and Syria, as evidenced by an Israeli attack close to the Turkish border, days after the pact was signed; meanwhile, Pakistan's primary threats remain India on its eastern borders and non-state actors on its western borders in the restive provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
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The Baghdad Pact, and its successor CENTO, offered a useful precedent to understand an agreement of such nature, where the grouping collapsed not due to a lack of resources but a diverse set of adversaries. The Mecca Pact operates in a similar structure - however, on a much smaller scale currently. As a result, Bangladesh's potential joining of this framework, along with reports of other Arab nations demonstrating interest, such as Egypt, would further expand threat profiles for the bloc. Particularly for Bangladesh, this would include small-scale border disputes with India and instability along the border with Myanmar. This also likely explains why the language of Bangladeshi officials has remained short of commitment.
India's Threat Assessment
At present, Indian analysis must discern between commitment and rhetoric. Dhaka's positive gesturing towards the Mecca Pact can be seen as a hedging strategy, especially at a time when the domestic narrative around Sheikh Hasina's extradition from India has intensified. Therefore, New Delhi must resist the temptation of reading every instance of diplomatic outreach to Pakistan as evidence of anti-India positioning.
Overall, Bangladesh's own constitutional commitment to non-alignment under Article 25 will likely prevent any formal entanglement, regardless of how New Delhi views this development. Additionally, the remittance economy tied to the Gulf, economic dependence on India, energy routes running through West Asian waters, and security interests in the Bay of Bengal will potentially give Dhaka little incentive to risk participating in a defence bloc. For now, New Delhi must monitor whether this rhetoric even translates into any meaningful defence cooperation.
(Aishwaria Sonavane is a research analyst at the Takshashila Institution)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
