The 27th Constitutional Amendment Bill, tabled by Pakistan's federal government and passed by the Senate on November 10, is far from a routine procedural adjustment. It represents a structural reconfiguration of the Pakistani state. The provisions, now awaiting final approval from the National Assembly, will effectively formalise Pakistan's foundational transition from a de facto hybrid military system to a constitutional framework in which the military establishment holds a legally codified and dominant position.
Among its key amendments pertaining to the judicial and security design, the bill critically proposes revisions to Article 243 of the Pakistani Constitution. Amendments to this article would establish the new position of Chief of Defence Forces while abolishing the existing office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC). This article defines the relationship between the prime minister, as head of government, and the President, as head of states in matters relating to the command and control of the defence forces. An alteration to this clause will trigger implications for civilian government in the country and a power shift to Pakistan's constitutional order.
Key amendments proposed under Article 243 would entail:
- Abolishing the Office of CJCSC, effective from November 27
- Establishing a new post of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), a position that will be held concurrently by the serving Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
- The amendments institute a Commander of National Strategic Command, who will be an army official appointed by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the CDF
- The bill extends life-long constitutional protection to 5-star rank officers, including Field Marshal. This entails privileges, lifetime tenure, and legal immunity granted under Article 248 and protection from removal under Article 47 of Pakistan's Constitution
In essence, the amendment charters a new civil-military dynamic, heavily inclined to accommodate the whims, fancies, and megalomaniacal tendencies of one individual: General Asim Munir. Under the mechanisms, the sitting COAS, Munir, will automatically absorb the new powerful post of CDF, enabling his exclusive constitutional authority to recommend who controls the nuclear arsenal, besides command over all three forces. The bill legitimises his recent promotion to Field Marshal, a rank that previously lacked constitutional basis. The most crucial of them all, this permanence is then fortified with unprecedented, lifelong immunity from all legal proceedings and protection from removal.
Prior to these constitutional alterations, the Pakistani military's influence in the country's politics, economy, and national psyche could not be overstated. But with the latest changes, the time-worn metaphor that 'Pakistan is not a country with an army; it is an army with a country', has found a new, more palpable meaning.
Echoes of Military Dictatorship?
There can't be any debate on claims that the entire Pakistani military institution already commands unprecedented power in the country. As such, the current move further fortifies the borrowed legacies of former military rulers like Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf.
In its preliminary form, this resembles the personalist ambitions of General Ayub Khan, who was Pakistan's first Field Marshal, only to be followed by Munir. Following his 1958 coup, Khan anointed himself Field Marshal and subsequently amended the constitution in 1962. The new provisions were included to legitimise his autocratic rule by establishing a presidential system tailored for his personal power. In the creation of a lifetime Field Marshal post, Munir exhibits his desire to build a constitutional structure that concentrates power in one single officer rather than the institution.
Second, the bill follows the legalist route taken by General Zia-ul-Haq. After his coup in 1977, Zia faced pressure to 'restore democracy' in the country. He responded by holding a controversial 1984 referendum to secure a five-year presidential term, followed by non-party polls in 1985. A compliant parliament was also forced to pass the 8th amendment for lifting martial law; the amendment fundamentally legalised his past coup and installed measures to control future governments. Eventually, a parliamentary system was restored in 1997 by the 13th amendment, and the presidential system was definitively abolished by the 18th Amendment passed in 2010.
Finally, the 27th amendment further imitates the 'dual-hat' structure of General Pervez Musharraf, who controversially held the posts of COAS and President. While Musharraf's dual arrangement was brief and constitutionally ambiguous, the 27th Amendment permanently fuses the COAS with the new CDF post, establishing a constitutionally protected command structure.
Internal Gamble, International Attention
As this bill moves toward its vote, there has been no alarm in Western capitals, particularly in the White House. This should come as no surprise. The US has long been comfortable engaging with Pakistan's military dictators - from Ayub Khan to Zia‑ul‑Haq to Pervez Musharraf - including the recent lunch between Asim Munir and US President Donald Trump at the White House in June. The unstated US policy has been one of pragmatism where Washington acknowledges the military as the true centre of power, capable of ensuring security cooperation.
The far more critical question is how this move will be perceived within the military establishment. The Pakistan Army's influence has not been in one-man rule but institutional in nature. Both Khan and Musharraf's power collapsed when their own corps commanders acknowledged that the individual became a liability to the institution.
This formalisation of military power is unlikely to alter New Delhi's Pakistan policy, which is already viewed through a highly securitised lens. Given that India considers the 'Military-Jihadi Complex', treating the Pakistani military and its proxy groups as a single entity, its official response will most certainly remain a quiet game of 'wait and watch'.
(Aishwaria Sonavane is a research analyst at the Takshashila Institution)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
