A Potential Bangladesh-Pakistan-China Axis: Why India Has Its Eye On Dhaka

The February 12 general election in Bangladesh – the first since violence in July 2024 ended then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's long tenure and forced her to flee – will be monitored by India for shifts in regional geopolitics that could affect national security and alter the balance of power in South Asia.

From India's perspective there are three inter-connected issues, the biggest of which is a potential Pakistan-China-Bangladesh axis - a possibility if the incoming administration is less kindly disposed to Delhi than Hasina. A Pak-China-Bangladesh nexus could weaken Delhi's hold on South Asia.

Also in play are border and internal security implications, arising from concerns like illegal migration (and the fallout on domestic politics, particularly before the Bengal and Assam elections), and continuing anti-Hindu sentiments that erupted after the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government.

The basline

Delhi and Dhaka were seen as having a stable relationship with Hasina in power.

The Awami League boss - barred from this election and facing a death penalty - ran a 'pro-India' government that focused on trade, transport, border security, and water-sharing agreements.

Political analysts agree Delhi would prefer to deal with a Bangladeshi government led by Sheikh Hasina and her 'India-friendly' Awami League, but also recognises the changing of the guard, if for the foreseeable future, in Dhaka.

The Bangladesh National Party in power, therefore, will not unduly worry India, particularly as new BNP boss Tarique Rahman, who returned from exile after his mother, ex-Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, died in December 2025, has said his administration will respect India's interests.

But Zia is no more and the question will be 'how might the BNP really function under Rahman', whose critics label him the 'dark prince' and accuse him of, among other things, having run an audacious weapons smuggling network supplied guns to the ULFA separatist group in Assam.

However, handling the BNP – which has been seen as taking 'anti-India' positions under Zia, such as 2002, when Dhaka snubbed Delhi to sign a defence deal with Beijing – could be complicated if hardline Islamic outfit Jamaat-e-Islami enters the equation.

Once the BNP's ally, the Jamaat now leads a coalition that includes a new, Gen-Z-driven party set up after the country's youth failed to translate the anti-Hasina movement into an electoral base. This party, and Hasina's now-banned Awami League, will play a key swing vote role.

Voting across 299 parliamentary constituencies began at 7.30 am and will end at 4.30 pm, with the counting of votes expected immediately after polling closes. The majority target is 151 seats.

Why India is watching: the Pak-China link

For India, an election won by Bangladesh's hardline Islamic party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, or even a scenario in which the Jamaat is part of a ruling coalition, has the potential to destabilise already shaky bilateral ties. More significantly, it could pivot Bangladesh closer to Pakistan and China, effectively trapping India in a three-point axis that may weaken Delhi's hold on South Asia.

China's footprint is already visible in Bangladesh courtesy investment in big-ticket infrastructure projects like the modernisation of the Mongla Port, the country's second-largest sea port, for which Beijing might receive dual-use permission, i.e., offer commercial and military use.

That China is already seen as having such dual-use facilities in Sri Lanka and Pakistan is part of what must be a larger security concern for the Indian government, linked to incremental Chinese access to enhanced logistical and surveillance capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region.

Meanwhile, if Dhaka simultaneously also shifts to Islamabad, Bangladesh could become a launchpad for Pakistan-linked or supported terrorist groups to also strike India from the east, adding to the dual security load – i.e., Pak and China – that Delhi already faces in the west.

The concern here is less about an open alliance with Pakistan, unlike with China, and more about facilitation backstage, including land access to India's eastern regions for terrorists.

The knock-on effect of a Pakistan nosing around India's northeast is that any resulting destabilisation could play into China's hands as it looks to illegally claim Arunachal Pradesh.

US engagement, including a visa for Rahman, is seen by political analysts as Washington's effort to encourage democratic participation and counter China's growing influence.

Why India is watching: the border issue

The election could also impact India's border equation with Bangladesh and internal politics too, with Bengal and Assam – both of which share that border – voting this year. Illegal migration is a core campaign issue in both states; the Trinamool is under fire for 'shielding' foreign migrants in Bengal and the BJP has vowed an almost militant crackdown if voted back in Assam.

India and Bangladesh share a 4,100-km border that is densely populated and politically sensitive. Under Hasina, Dhaka was seen as more open to enforcing hard checks on its India borders. But post-Hasina, i.e., after July 2024, data indicates over 1,000 infiltration attempts.

Why India is watching: the Hindu concern

After Hasina was deposed attacks on Bangladesh's Hindu communities – which account for about eight per cent of the population – escalated sharply; some reports suggest there were over 2,000 that targeted homes, businesses, and temples, and prompted thousands to flee.

There are varying reports of how many Hindus were killed; the Bangladeshi interim administration led by Nobel laureate Mohd Yunus acknowledged the deaths but said most were related to non-religious and non-communal issues, such as land disputes and personal enmity.

India has said at least 23 Hindus have been killed in Bangladesh since Hasina fled.

India has flagged these deaths via diplomatic channels and also issued travel advisories, and also stepped up security along a nearly 4,100-km border with Bangladesh.

India has made strong public demands in this context, including visible policing and protection for Hindus and other minority communities in that country.

Why India is watching: Trade disruptions

Bilateral trade is worth US$14 billion annually with India recording a nearly US$10 billion trade surplus in FY24 and FY25. That large number offsets 3.4 per cent of India's overall trade deficit.

A nearly US$10 billion trade surplus in India's favour means Bangladesh is structurally depending on Delhi and its imports, the biggest of which is cotton yarn for its readymade garments sector. Indian cotton yarn accounts for over 80 per cent of Bangladesh's imports.

An unfriendly Dhaka could turn away from Delhi (and to Beijing) under the guise of supplier diversification and that could impact India's export gains, particularly for cotton growers.

But Bangladesh's RMG sector is a key driver of the national economy and post-election the new government might prefer stability and assured supply over immediately shaking things up, which could even mean a boost for Indian exports as Dhaka looks to rebuild its economy.

Why India is watching: The bottom line India's focus is on capability and intent, specifically on the new Bangladesh government cooperating on issues like border control and infiltration and maintaining the balance of power in the South Asia region. In an ideal world, Delhi will want Dhaka to remain as it was under Sheikh Hasina – a reliable partner to help offset China and Pakistan and, in doing so, stop military friction with Beijing and Islamabad from becoming a security issue on its eastern side.

Why India is watching: The bottom line

India's focus is on capability and intent, specifically on the new Bangladesh government cooperating on issues like border control and infiltration and maintaining the balance of power in the South Asia region.

In an ideal world, Delhi will want Dhaka to remain as it was under Sheikh Hasina – a reliable partner to help offset China and Pakistan and, in doing so, stop military friction with Beijing and Islamabad from becoming a security issue on its eastern side.