From Drones To New Battle Formations: The Legacy Of General Upendra Dwivedi

General Upendra Dwivedi's tenure as Chief of Army Staff, concluding on June 30, 2026, will be studied by military historians as a period of deliberate and accelerated doctrinal transformation. 

Within strategic circles, his legacy has already been captured in an informal designation: the "Drone General." Yet the full architecture of what he built extends well beyond the aerial domain, encompassing new warfighting formations, a reconstituted doctrine framework, and a fundamental shift in how the Indian Army understands the character of future conflict.

The quantitative expansion of drone assets, from a few hundred to over 50,000, with 25-plus Drone and Counter-Drone Hubs established across the country, represents only the most visible layer. More consequential was the corresponding shift in operational philosophy. 

General Dwivedi pursued capability-centric warfare as a successor to the platform-centric models that had long defined Indian military thinking. The creation of Bhairav Battalions, Ashni Platoons, Rudra All-Arms Brigades, Shaktibaan Regiments, Divyastra Batteries, and the ongoing evolution of Integrated Battle Groups reflects this repositioning at the structural level, building formations designed for multi-domain warfare rather than for single-domain dominance.

The intellectual architecture supporting this transformation was equally significant. During his tenure, nearly 25 doctrines, strategic guidelines, standard operating procedures, and policy documents were issued. These covered land warfare, strategic security, red teaming, physical standards and emerging domains including space. Taken together, they represent an institutional framework designed to survive beyond any single tenure and to give the Army a shared vocabulary for the next generation of conflict.

Operation Sindoor provided the operational validation that doctrine alone cannot supply. The integrated execution of drone strikes, loitering munitions, electronic warfare and intelligence fusion in a single, coordinated campaign offered a proof of concept for genuine multi-domain operations. Within strategic circles, the operation is increasingly referenced as a template for India's future way of war, one in which speed, transparency, real-time data and precision fires are decisive rather than supplementary.

Along the northern borders, Eastern Ladakh evolved into a laboratory for technological and operational adaptation. Surveillance grids were strengthened, logistics resilience improved, and rapid mobilisation capabilities deepened in terrain that demands both innovation and endurance. Military planners now openly acknowledge that future confrontations with peer competitors are likely to begin in the cyber, information and drone domains, with conventional forces committed only after the preliminary battle has already shaped the operational environment.

The Atmanirbharta dimension of this transformation carried its own strategic logic. Indigenous drone and counter-drone development, accelerated through partnerships with DRDO, private industry and start-ups, reduced dependence on foreign supply chains in precisely the capability area most likely to determine the opening exchanges of a future conflict. The domestic sourcing of special clothing and a substantial share of ammunition requirements reinforced a broader posture of logistical self-reliance.

General Dwivedi's tenure may ultimately be remembered most for changing the Army's institutional appetite for adaptation itself. Large military organisations resist change structurally. 

His most enduring contribution was persuading one of the world's largest land forces to embrace technology, experimentation and innovation, not as a threat to its identity, but as a condition of its continued relevance. That shift in institutional culture is the foundation on which all future transformation will be built.