In its long modern history, Gilgit has always been a city inhabited by Shias, Sunnis, and Ismailis. These communities traded with each other, lived side-by-side, and even in some cases got married. Indeed, this social structure has not broken down instantly. Instead, for several decades, it had been deteriorating due to the deepening of sectarianism, according to numerous researchers and civil society organisations, which note that this division benefited the political elite, as the process of unification and joint fight against political oppression became impossible in such conditions.
The crucial turn happened in May 1988, when Gilgit-Baltistan witnessed one of the deadliest episodes of sectarianism in its modern history. The starting point of this process was the dispute related to the sighting of the moon marking the end of the month. However, it turned out to be only an occasion for something much bigger.
Thousands of armed men, who included tribal people from Pakistan's then Northwest Frontier Province and Afghanistan, entered Gilgit district using the Karakoram highway and began to attack the Shias' villages and neighbourhoods. There are several sources, including reports from Herald Magazine, and later studies, claiming that the operation was held in collaboration with the Pakistan Army and under the supervision of President Zia-ul-Haq.
Some of the sources, including Pakistani journalist Tahir Alvi and British researcher William Dalrymple, claim that Osama bin Laden, who would later become the infamous leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organisation, was among those who helped to organise this attack or led the troops. The number of people who died during these riots varies from low hundreds to significantly higher estimates. A precise death count was never established.
This incident became the starting point of what has happened again and again in the following decades. The outbreaks of sectarian violence in Gilgit-Baltistan have always appeared together with a period of political mobilisation of local communities, who tried to gain constitutional rights, control over natural resources, or political representation.
The aftermath of all these events had been much worse than the direct loss of life. Each outbreak made unification of communities impossible because it forced them to think about personal safety first and about politics secondly.
The presence of sectarian militant organisations in Gilgit-Baltistan was studied by researchers, including the Pak Institute for Peace Studies based in Islamabad. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is a Deobandi extremist organisation, which is banned in Pakistan and is involved in numerous attacks against Shias of Gilgit-Baltistan. As for analysts, the ability of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to conduct attacks at various periods of time means not the complete absence of state capacity, but just inconsistent enforcement and different priorities of the government at a certain time.
As for the period of 2000-2020s, there have been plenty of attacks against Shia professionals, teachers, and community leaders in Gilgit city and Chilas. Besides, there have still been attacks on travelers depending on their religious affiliation, including the December 2023 attack on a passenger bus near Chilas, where several Shias and Ismailis were killed.
The victims of these attacks included doctors, educators, and academics, whose deaths have worsened the situation, depriving Gilgit of specialists who could help in the development of institutions promoting social cohesion and community leaders. Thus, Human Rights Watch published a report on such targeted killings in 2012, stating that witnesses could identify suspects, but no prosecutions took place after that.
As for Ismailis, who mainly live in Hunza, Gojal, and parts of Gilgit city, they have been mostly saved from the most severe episodes of sectarian violence. It is possible to say that it is due to social cohesion and the effective development of these communities through the Aga Khan Development Network. Despite it, the growing sectarian atmosphere has influenced young generations of Ismailis, who grew up in a political situation characterised by Sunni-Shia confrontation.
The development of the education sector in Gilgit-Baltistan also played a significant part in the strengthening of sectarian identity. Thus, since the 1980s, the number of madrasas increased sharply, some of which received financing from Gulf countries affiliated with a certain religious tradition. At the same time, public schools in the region have always faced a lack of financing and remained underdeveloped. As a result, madrasas filled the gap in the education sector, though, as it is stated in the research, sometimes they reinforced the sectarian identity, instead of promoting coexistence.
Thus, civil society organisations, including Gilgit-Baltistan Civil Society Forum and several youth organizations, emphasise the impossibility of separating the issue of sectarianism from other problems in this region, such as constitutional uncertainty, economic marginalization, and repeated sectarian tensions.
The history of Gilgit-Baltistan showed that its division was not the result of unavoidable or centuries-long hostility. Instead, the process of its division was created by a chain of political events, violent episodes, and institutional failures that affected the relationship of communities.
