Opinion | Three Things May Happen At The End Of The 14-Day Ceasefire (Or Earlier)

The two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, announced on April 7, 2026, has provided a temporary halt to what had become an accelerating cycle of escalation. US President Donald Trump framed it as a victory, claiming the US had met its military objectives and that a longer agreement was close to finalisation. Iran accepted the ceasefire on the condition that ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz would do so in coordination with its armed forces. Both sides had reasons to welcome an off-ramp. Neither side has fully stopped fighting. The ceasefire, as it stands, may be better understood as a pause rather than a settlement.

What Iran Wants From This Deal

After months of experiencing constant high-alerts, missile strikes, and assassinations, Iran's primary incentive for accepting a two-week pause for talks has been a promise of breathing space. Iran's agreement to the talks despite the temporary two-week window, countering the very first point of its 10-point proposal, only confirms this theory. In these two weeks, irrespective of the negotiation's outcome, Iran is looking to recover and regroup, in terms of military strength, public morale and broader political consolidation under the new leadership.

However, hours after the ceasefire announcement, Israel has reportedly continued its strikes on Iran, as confirmed by Israeli military officials. These Israeli strikes may derail US-Iran negotiations, as proven twice in the past. The IRGC may not observe a political agreement that does not address the core condition of a ceasefire. These reported ceasefire violations are not marginal complications. They suggest this deal rests on the assumption that US agreement ensures Israel's alignment. This assumption, however, might not hold true in reality.

The Hormuz Question

The ceasefire is conditional on Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz. This can be considered the primary point in Iran's proposal that incentivised the US to accept it as a framework for negotiations. 

Iran has agreed to allow passage, but emphasised that this will be under the supervision of its armed forces. This is not a full return to pre-war conditions. Iran's parliament has already passed legislation formally enshrining a toll system on Hormuz traffic. The IRGC has been operating a de facto vetting and fee arrangement since mid-March. The ceasefire does not appear to resolve either of these developments.

Splitting this transit fee between Iran and Oman might also draw criticism from other Gulf nations like the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are key US allies in the region. The UAE has already expressed opposition, stating that the waterway cannot be held hostage by any single country and that free navigation must be part of any final settlement. Their exclusion from the transit arrangements is likely to be a source of friction in the weeks ahead.

The broader stakes of Hormuz extend beyond the immediate conflict. Control and assured access to the sea lanes of communication has been a foundational pillar of US power projection for decades. Iran's ability to impose coordinated passage through the Strait represents a structural shift in the waterway's legal and strategic status. 

While the successful blockade has emerged as proof of Iran's dominance over the Strait of Hormuz at a military level, this transit fee is a step toward institutionalising control.  Should that arrangement become codified through any longer-term agreement, the US may find itself under pressure to counter it, regardless of the diplomatic framing around the current pause.

The Gaza-Lebanon Problem

Within hours of the announcement, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made clear that the ceasefire did not include Lebanon. Israel's strikes against Hamas have also continued despite a ceasefire in early 2025. Pakistani mediators had urged all warring parties to observe a ceasefire everywhere, and Islamabad initially indicated that Lebanon was covered. Netanyahu and US Vice-President JD Vance have directly rejected that reading. 

In mid-March, Israel launched a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, and its forces have remained in active combat with Hezbollah ever since. Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah is, therefore, expected to continue regardless of what is agreed between Washington and Tehran. Despite mentioning it in their proposal as a symbolic gesture, Iran does not expect Israel's attacks on Hamas and Hezbollah to end either.

The Three Outcomes

These challenges and conditions surrounding the ceasefire could result in three likely scenarios. The first scenario is where the ceasefire sustains in a meaningful way, becoming a means for advanced talks on contested topics of Strait of Hormuz, nuclear enrichment, the role of non-state actors, and sanctions against Iran. This ideal scenario would, however, need the full participation and compliance of the US and Iran, along with Israel and the GCC countries.

The second scenario is that, as was the case during June 2025 and February 2026, the talks are used by Israel and the US to launch another wave of surprise attacks. However, considering the statements by US and Israeli officials that their military objectives have been achieved and that Iran no longer poses an imminent threat, this scenario is less likely. Unlike June 2025, this confrontation has also considerably exhausted American and Israeli military resources while proving Iran's capability to survive, retaliate and retain control of the Strait of Hormuz. This substantially enhances the overall deterrence in the current talks as compared to the talks in June 2025 or February 2026. 

A War Without The US?

The third scenario to consider is one where Iran and Israel continue to engage militarily while the US exits direct conflict, maintaining support for Israel on an indirect basis. Israel's recent record with ceasefires, as seen in the case of Gaza since 2025 and Lebanon since 2024, are key indications in this direction. Reports of continued exchange of fire between Israel, Iran and the Gulf countries after the ceasefire announcement are also cases in point. Iran's sustained interest in the ceasefire and talks with the US despite Israel's strikes on Lebanon and the UAE's attacks on Iran's oil facilities further supports the likelihood of this scenario. Similarly, a stable US interest in continuing the talks despite Iran's reported strikes against Gulf countries, threats to renew the blockade of straits and bombing Tel Aviv is also an important point hinting at this direction. 
Beyond the control of Hormuz, the Trump administration's domestic pressures would be a key driver of an American exit. However, long-standing US commitments to Israel would ensure that the US continues to support it through military aid and equipment at least in the short-term. 

The ceasefire is a meaningful development. A pause at this level of escalation indicates that off-ramps remain available. Whether it translates into something more durable will depend on whether Lebanon, Hormuz and Iran's nuclear posture can be addressed in a framework acceptable to the Gulf states, Israel and the IRGC. That is a substantial set of conditions. The next two weeks are more likely to clarify the distance between the parties than to close it.

(Abhishek Kadiyala is a Research Analyst at the Takshashila Institution's Geostrategy programme with a focus on the United States and US-India relations. Views expressed in this article do not represent those of the institution.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author