Opinion | From Punjab To Karnataka, Congress Just Can't Stop Hitting Self-Goals

Indian politics has a habit of discovering national turning points in municipal wards, assembly by-elections, and stray remarks made outside Parliament. Sometimes, the instinct is justified. More often, a local rebuke is inflated into a national rebellion because the Opposition is hungry for hope, and television studios are hungry for narratives.

The Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) recent defeats in Bankipur and Datia deserve attention. Prashant Kishor has broken the party's three-decade hold over Bankipur, winning 64,151 votes and defeating the BJP by 19,324. In Madhya Pradesh, the Congress retained Datia by 6,016 votes. But on the same day, the BJP retained Manjalpur in Gujarat by more than 30,000 votes. The verdict was, therefore, a warning, not a collapse.

The temptation for the Congress will be to celebrate Datia and interpret Bankipur as evidence of a wider anti-BJP mood. It should, however, resist both impulses. Bankipur was not won by the Congress. It was won by a political entrepreneur who recognised a vacant space, invested himself in it, and convinced voters that neither the ruling alliance nor the established Opposition deserved their loyalty. That should worry the Congress more than it does the BJP.

In the immediate political future, the road to the 2029 Lok Sabha election will pass through Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand in 2027, and Karnataka in 2028. Together, these four states account for 126 Lok Sabha constituencies. They will test whether the Congress can manage leaders, choose winnable candidates, and preserve alliances - the three areas in which it remains most vulnerable.

Two Defeats Isn't A Wave

The 2024 Lok Sabha verdict altered the psychological balance of Indian politics. The BJP fell from 303 seats to 240 and lost its independent majority; the Congress rose from 52 to 99 and regained the status of the official Opposition party. The INDIA grouping demonstrated that Narendra Modi could be challenged when regional arithmetic, candidate selection, and local grievances worked together.

But the elections that followed have produced a far less reassuring picture for the Congress.

In Bihar in 2025, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) won 202 of 243 Assembly seats. The BJP became the largest party with 89 seats, the Janata Dal-United (JD-U) won 85, and the Congress was reduced to six. In the 2026 Assembly elections, the BJP captured West Bengal with 207 seats and secured 82 of 126 seats in Assam. The Congress's decisive Kerala victory, where it emerged as the largest party with 63 seats, demonstrated what it can achieve with an identifiable state leadership, a durable coalition, and an organisation that exists between elections. But its two seats in Bengal, 19 in Assam, and five in Tamil Nadu exposed the geographic narrowness of its recovery.

The BJP, in other words, is neither invincible nor remotely exhausted. It has lost important battles, but it continues to acquire territory. Congress leaders often speak as though anti-incumbency is a natural resource that will eventually flow towards them. Bankipur offers the opposite lesson. When the principal Opposition fails to provide an address for public dissatisfaction, voters may find another recipient.

Punjab, Uttarakhand, And The Missing 'Command'

Punjab should, on paper, offer the Congress its clearest opportunity in 2027. The party won seven of the state's 13 Lok Sabha seats in 2024. The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) government must defend its five years in office, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) remains diminished, and the BJP has yet to establish a statewide social coalition. Even then, the Congress appears determined to turn an opportunity into an internal referendum.

The leadership issue is nowhere near settled. Amarinder Singh Raja Warring continues as the Pradesh Congress chief, while Charanjit Singh Channi, Sukhjinder Singh Randhawa, and their supporters have demanded change. Partap Singh Bajwa has his own following and chief ministerial ambitions. Bhupesh Baghel, the All India Congress Committee (AICC) general secretary in charge of Punjab, has held repeated meetings, submitted reports to Delhi, and warned against indiscipline. His organisational tour has nevertheless been greeted by pro-Channi disruptions, anti-Baghel banners, and demonstrations of factional strength.

Congress factionalism is not new. It becomes fatal when every compromise is interpreted as a victory for one camp and a humiliation for another. Punjab does not merely require the high command to choose a leader. It requires a high command to define authority.

Uttarakhand presents a different problem. The BJP has weaknesses: local anti-incumbency, factional anxieties, unemployment, migration from the hills, and dissatisfaction in closely fought constituencies. In 2022, as many as 23 assembly seats were decided by fewer than 5,000 votes. But the BJP enters the contest with a recognised chief ministerial face in Pushkar Singh Dhami and an organisation that is already identifying weak booths and assigning senior leaders to them. The party won 47 of 70 assembly seats in 2022 and all five Lok Sabha constituencies in 2024.

The Congress has leaders, but no leader whose authority is broadly accepted across the state. Harish Rawat retains experience and recall; Yashpal Arya holds the formal position of Leader of the Opposition; younger aspirants want generational change. What the party lacks is not talent but hierarchy.

The Confusion In Uttar Pradesh 

Uttar Pradesh is the state in which the Congress has the least organisational strength and the greatest national stake.

The 2024 Samajwadi Party (SP)-Congress arrangement produced the Opposition's most important breakthrough. The SP won 37 Lok Sabha seats and the Congress six, while the BJP was reduced to 33. Rahul Gandhi's victory from Rae Bareli and the visible chemistry between him and Akhilesh Yadav supplied the INDIA formation with its most persuasive image of cooperation.

Two years later, sections of the Uttar Pradesh Congress appear unsure whether that partnership should be consolidated, renegotiated beyond recognition, or abandoned in favour of an understanding with Mayawati.

Some Congress leaders have publicly sought an equal division of seats with the SP, arguing that the alliance benefited Akhilesh Yadav disproportionately. Others believe the party should explore the BSP route to attract Dalit voters. Mayawati, however, has repeatedly said that the BSP intends to contest the 2027 election independently.

This confusion is destructive because it mistakes aspiration for bargaining power.

The Congress contested 17 Lok Sabha seats in Uttar Pradesh in 2024 and won six. That was a significant recovery, but it did not make the Congress equal to the SP in the state. The Samajwadi Party possesses an extensive cadre, an identifiable leadership, a substantial core vote, and a presence across most assembly constituencies. The Congress cannot demand parity merely because it requires more seats to rebuild itself.

At the same time, Akhilesh Yadav must recognise that the Congress brings national legitimacy, access to sections of upper-caste and minority voters, and the political utility of Rahul Gandhi's campaign. Alliances cannot endure if the larger partner treats the smaller one as decorative.

The sensible course is neither surrender nor fantasy. It is an early, realistic settlement based on constituency-level strength, past performance, and the ability to field credible candidates.

The BJP has its own challenges in Uttar Pradesh. The 2024 result exposed discontent over jobs, recruitment examinations, caste representation, and the functioning of local MPs. But Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath remains a powerful political figure; the BJP retains a formidable booth structure, a welfare network, and the ability to frame an assembly election differently from a parliamentary one. The Congress and the SP cannot defeat that machinery while debating publicly whether they wish to remain allies.

Karnataka And Its Never-Ending Disorders

Karnataka is perhaps the most revealing test because the Congress is already in power there.

DK Shivakumar became Chief Minister in June 2026 after Siddaramaiah stepped down, resolving one leadership conflict but opening several others. The subsequent Cabinet exercise has pleased neither all the veterans nor all the younger aspirants. Names were debated in Delhi, approved by the central leadership, and formally communicated under KC Venugopal's signature. Last-minute alterations added to the impression of disorder, while Shivakumar warned dissatisfied legislators that their resignations could be accepted within minutes.

The process raises a fundamental question. What is the value of making Shivakumar Chief Minister if he is not seen as the principal author of his own Cabinet?

The constitutional position is clear: ministers are appointed on the advice of the Chief Minister. Political consultation with the party leadership is inevitable, particularly in the Congress. But consultation must not become visible appropriation. A Cabinet list carrying the unmistakable imprint of Mallikarjun Kharge, Rahul Gandhi, and Venugopal may settle Delhi's calculations while weakening the Chief Minister's authority in Bengaluru.

The 2028 Karnataka election will take place barely a year before the Lok Sabha contest. A Congress defeat would revive doubts about its ability to retain a major state government. A victory would provide money, morale, organisational infrastructure, and a southern base for 2029. The state cannot, therefore, be governed as an extended arbitration proceeding between Bengaluru and Delhi.

Delivery Problems

The larger Congress problem is transmission. Rahul Gandhi has acquired a stronger national voice. Mallikarjun Kharge brings experience and institutional legitimacy. The party has shown that it can identify major themes - inequality, unemployment, constitutional anxiety, caste enumeration, and cronyism.

But a national argument requires state-level delivery. It needs a Punjab unit that is not fighting itself, a face in Uttarakhand, an alliance in Uttar Pradesh, and an empowered government in Karnataka.

The BJP's great advantage is that the party normally responds to electoral danger through organisation: surveys, booth reviews, leadership interventions, candidate changes, and relentless messaging. Congress too often responds through committees whose recommendations become fresh material for factional combat.

The anger of young Indians over unemployment, examination failures, and insecure work is real. So is rural distress, urban fatigue, and unease over the concentration of power. But anger does not arrive at the polling booth wearing a Congress badge. It must be organised, represented, and converted into votes, constituency by constituency.

The 2029 election will not be decided in the summer of 2029. It is being shaped now, in the Congress meetings disrupted in Punjab, in its search for a face in Uttarakhand, in the confused alliance signals from Uttar Pradesh, and in the struggle over who truly governs Karnataka.

Bankipur and Datia have reminded the BJP that its fortresses can fall. They should remind the Congress of something less comforting: when it leaves political space unattended, someone else enters it.

Delhi is not conquered from Delhi. It is accumulated, state by state.

(Rasheed Kidwai is an author, columnist and conversation curator)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author