Opinion | Pahalgam Attack: What NIA's Preliminary Report Hints About Pak's Plans

The nation awaits India's response to the brutal terrorist killings of innocent tourists at Pahalgam on April 22, 2025. In this context, the Indian Air Force is conducting landings on the Ganga Expressway as a demonstration of airpower - serving both strategic messaging and national morale. The Indian Navy is similarly executing maritime exercises, and the Army's South Western Command is actively engaged in armour manoeuvres in North Rajasthan. These are all indicators of progressive readiness, short of full mobilisation.

Meanwhile, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), established after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, has been working overtime to connect the dots behind the Pahalgam attack. An initial report has already been prepared.

Some Obvious Facts

Even before the NIA began its ground-level probe, several facts were evident. The Pahalgam attack was a calculated conspiracy involving multiple elements within Pakistan, designed to achieve a variety of objectives. Chief among them was to discredit India's claims of normalcy in Kashmir, disrupt a potentially record-breaking tourist season, and convey the message that the Kashmir issue remains unresolved. It also aimed to reinforce Pakistan's self-assigned role as a stakeholder in the region.

The NIA's preliminary report confirms this conspiracy and explicitly names the ISI, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and the Pakistan army as the principal actors behind it. Whether Islamabad's political leadership was aware of or complicit in this plan - or if it was solely the work of Pakistan army Chief General Asim Munir's close coterie - remains to be confirmed. There is historical precedent: in 1999, a select group within the Pakistan army leadership independently launched the ill-conceived Kargil operation, hoping to force a withdrawal from the Siachen Glacier by threatening Indian army logistics on the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh road. This reckless gamble epitomised the Pakistan army's legacy of strategic irrationality, a trait often visible in the deep state's decision-making.

General Munir's Irrational Approach

This time, too, and beyond what the NIA has preliminarily established, it seems General Munir has adopted a similar self-delusional and irrational stance. His tenure has been marred by the resurgence of the Baloch insurgency and his inability to suppress it. The recent Jaffar Express incident further damaged the Army's reputation under his watch. Concurrently, Pakistan faces increasing pressure from the Afghan Taliban along the Durand Line, which has emboldened the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in its disruptive campaign in the western regions.

Now into his third year as Army Chief, Munir is reportedly eyeing a second term beginning September 2025. He is also burdened by the legacy of the Lahore incident on May 9, 2023, when an unruly civilian mob stormed the Corps Commander's residence - an unprecedented breakdown in military authority and prestige.

Pak's Strategy Of 'Denial'

In such a precarious situation, Munir may have believed that a bold, albeit irrational, move could help restore his professional credibility. Like several of his predecessors, he likely failed to think the plan through. It's plausible he neither sought political approval nor briefed the civilian leadership, choosing instead to keep the plan confined within a tight inner circle to avoid leaks. He may have calculated that once the operation triggered an Indian response, political leadership would inevitably support the narrative of denial and portray Pakistan as the victim.

Asim Munir and his close coterie - the deeper element of Pakistan's deep state - have fundamentally failed to understand the India of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's era. Their assessment of India's likely response seems overly anchored in the precedents of the 2016 Uri and 2019 Pulwama attacks, both of which elicited calibrated Indian strikes. However, those were strategic messages, not acts designed for deterrence. Munir's advisers likely convinced him that a provocative address to the Pakistani diaspora, combined with a high-profile terrorist event in Kashmir, would stoke nationalist fervour at home. The expectation, it seems, was that this would yield the desired effect under Pakistan's well-honed strategy of denial - perfected over years by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) wing.

Why Pahalgam?

Although the NIA's preliminary findings reported in the media do not explain the choice of Pahalgam, I am certain the final report will delve into this. In my analysis, the intent was to replicate a "copycat" event inspired by the October 7 Hamas attack. This trend is not new. Terrorist groups in Pakistan often study and adapt tactics based on global incidents. The mass killing of innocent civilians gathered in leisure settings - a heinous tactic - was once frequently used by the Islamic State (IS) in Europe and now appears to have gained renewed interest among extremist groups.

I believe The Resistance Front (TRF) - a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) proxy - sought to emulate the scale and shock value of the Hamas attack. Tourist clusters in Srinagar could have been targets, but these areas are heavily secured, with rapid response mechanisms in place. Attacks along popular tourist routes would have been unpredictable in terms of casualties. Gulmarg's gondola draws significant crowds but remains under constant security surveillance.

Pahalgam, however, presented a tactical opportunity. It is a high-profile destination but geographically removed from central security infrastructure. Its location allows infiltration from the Kishtwar Range, offering terrorists a more concealed approach. Although security in the area ramps up from June each year for the Shri Amarnathji Yatra (SANJY), April provided a window of relative vulnerability. The terrorists may not have achieved the concentration of victims they had hoped for - compared, for instance, to the 1,200 civilians killed during the Gaza border assault - but the intent was clear to create maximum mayhem.

Lessons for the Future

The key takeaway is that ordinary, innocent tourists are now valid targets in the eyes of terrorist groups - and there is no remorse among their handlers for the economic damage inflicted on the Kashmiri people. This should form the central theme of our outreach: Pakistan has no genuine concern for Kashmiris and is willing to sacrifice their welfare to escalate hostilities with India.

Historically, Pakistan has assumed that the Kashmiri population would rise in support of its military. That belief was proven wrong during Operation Gulmarg in 1947-48 and again during Operation Gibraltar in 1965. Today, as India prepares to respond with a carefully developed full-spectrum strategy, we must also harden the security of all tourist zones and routes, including those associated with religious tourism, which is quite big in India.

There is growing evidence of a potential second wave of global terrorism, with many Pakistani-based terror groups seeking resurgence. India must remain alert and prepared, even as it prepares for the retribution - which it will inevitably deliver on Pakistan with an impact that will serve our national interest. Our knowledgeable gentry, especially that from the uniformed fraternity, should desist from public postulation of the details until that has been delivered.

(The writer is a Member of the National Disaster Management Authority, Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir, and Former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author