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Ashok Malik is a columnist and writer living in Delhi)
In November 2012, Xi Jinping was named China's new leader. In the complex realm of Chinese politics, where party and state structures intersect seamlessly, this nomination was not a simple, one-stage process. Over the next five months, Xi took over as general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and then President of the People's Republic of China.
More tellingly, he also took over as chair of two bodies that mirror each other: the Military Commission of the CPC and the Military Commission of the Chinese government. In both cases, he replaced the outgoing president, Hu Jintao. Previous transitions in China had seen the outgoing leader keep the top job at the military commissions till such time as his successor was ready. An interval of two odd years was expected in Xi's case as well.
That this interval was not deemed necessary made it apparent Xi was special. He began on a high, as the most powerful Chinese leader in the post-Deng period, the civilian leader empowered from day one to take on pressures from the People's Liberation Army.
The Chinese army and the Chinese trade and economy authorities provide sometimes competing narratives, particularly in regard to foreign policy. While these differences must not be exaggerated, it's not as if they don't exist either. That made Xi's quick ascension that much more significant.
As such, when Xi visits India from September 17 he does so as the best-ensconced new Chinese leader in decades. His host, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is the best-ensconced new Indian leader in decades. This coincidence has led to speculation that the two could deliver, for instance, a breakthrough deal on the border. Others argue a surge in nationalism and economic troubles in both countries don't really give either leader the space to sell a compromise.
India cannot really get back Aksai Chin and China cannot really hope for India to hand over Tawang, even if it agrees to some fine-tuning of the Arunachal Pradesh-China border. Yet, it would be a brave man who would attempt to propose this to his people. Certainly, one cannot see Modi trying to do it so early in his term, with his domestic and developmental agenda far from fulfilled.
So what then can Modi and Xi expect from each other? The foreign policy of the Modi government rests on five pillars:
Reigniting the Indian growth story and taking GDP expansion to a sustainable seven-eight per cent a year level
Making India more of a manufacturing economy, and clearing the obstacles to access of technology, particularly sensitive, dual-use technologies
Preventing any terrorism-related damage courtesy the turbulence in Afghanistan-Pakistan
Regaining ceded strategic space in the near-neighbourhood and the South Asian region, where China has made inroads. This would include maintaining the integrity of de facto or de jure international borders
Maintaining regional balance in Asia and the broader Indian Ocean region, which would encompass freedom of the global commons and high seas
The China relationship is important enough to matter to all five pillars, yet its impact is not uniform. When it comes to the first two pillars, China presents an opportunity. The agreement to build Chinese industrial parks in Gujarat and Maharashtra reflects this. India's trade deficit with China and the Modi government's keenness to make India a manufacturing economy offer pathways.
That apart, China is today the infrastructure provider of Asia. In development of India's power and telecom sectors, in building roads and in railway modernisation, sheer cost benefits will mean a role for Chinese companies.
Nevertheless there are caveats. So poor are infrastructure conditions in India that Chinese companies are not exactly rushing to "make in India", even if the end-products are for sale in India. As a major Chinese telecom manufacturer pointed out, the cost of making in India is 15 per cent higher due to poor connectivity, erratic power and so on. On the other hand import duties on Chinese-made telecom equipment vary between 16 and 24 per cent. The margin is too narrow to entice Chinese companies to seriously shift manufacturing bases to India.
Further, the availability of cheap Chinese capital and the linking of credit to purchase of Chinese telecom or power equipment has made some big Indian infrastructure companies overly dependent. The Anil Ambani Group is a case in point. Without going into paranoia about national security, it needs to be said a skew is now becoming apparent.
The third pillar - terrorism and Af-Pak - offers another paradox. Strategically the Chinese are sympathetic to Indian concerns; tactically, they are on another page. In 2013, India and Pakistan had joint secretary level talks on Afghanistan. As an Indian participant said, "We agreed on everything till it came to Pakistan. Then we stopped agreeing."
The Chinese have influence with the Pakistan army. They believe they can use this to remain relevant in post-America Af-Pak and with sections of the Taliban. After all, Beijing had opened informal conversations with the Taliban regime even before 9/11. If India suffers collateral damage, China is not going to sweat.
In South Asia, India has re-joined the game and Modi's outreach to Nepal and Sri Lanka for instance is aimed at countering Chinese advance. However, little substantial can be achieved without India's GDP growth recovering. Neither can India ask China not to build infrastructure - roads, railroads - in other countries or of course within its own borders. Instead it will need to build its capacities, and cannot continue to neglect its border regions. In this respect, the Railway Budget's proposals for train lines in the Northeast offer a start.
On a wider plane, India may be left with no alternative but to plug into Chinese infrastructure already being built as part of, say, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) framework. If this network exists, it is prudent to use it for trade and to construct facilities to make the Northeast a producer rather than just a transit point. There is no point burying one's head in the sand. Of course this calls for taking on many entrenched domestic lobbies, including security scaremongers. Modi will need to push here.
Finally, there is the question of achieving a balance in the Indo-Pacific region. China is the rising and non-status quoist power, and some onus will be on it. Even so it is in India's interests to craft military and particularly maritime arrangements with countries such as Vietnam, Japan, Indonesia and Australia and to do so boldly.
This will not necessarily jeopardise overall engagement with Beijing. Consider an analogy. Chinese and Vietnamese troops are virtually at each other's throats. Yet the two countries share a power grid as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region agreement. As such, China is used to contradictory signalling and can live with it. Hopefully Modi will nudge India's absolutist foreign policy champions in a similarly flexible direction. Were he to do so, Xi would recognise a kindred spirit.
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